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Abstract  
The five chapters of this thesis all focus on the role of demography in the evolution of 
breeding strategies.  
In the first chapter we explore the role of the adult sex ratio (ASR) in the evolution of 
mate-guarding duration. Our two models predict male guarding duration to increase with 
decreasing female availability and increasing number of male competitors. However, with 
a male biased ASR there are several factors, such as guarding inefficiency and incomplete 
last male sperm precedence, that prevent the mating system from switching to male 
monogamy.  
The second chapter adresses a situation where females have a larger effect on population 
dynamics than males (i.e. female demographic dominance). This occurs when female 
fecundity is relatively independent of male abundance, while male reproduction is 
proportional to female abundance. Our two simulation models combine dispersal 
evolution with local adaption subjected to intralocus conflict and environmentally driven 
sex ratio biases, respectively. Our proof of principle demonstrates that trait evolution is 
dominated by environments with a higher abundance of females, although this does not 
imply that all measures of population performance are improved.  
In the third chapter we focus on the role of owning a breeding territory for different rates 
of natal and breeding dispersal. For this we investigate the interplay of the asset-
protection principle and the multiplier effect. Our simulation model is set in habitats of 
spatially varying quality and individuals express dispersal rates based on their life history 
stage, sex and quality of their habitat. Breeders can evolve high dispersal rates but only if 
better opportunities are readily available. Non-breeders evolve dispersal mostly in 
response to competition. 
For the fourth chapter we stay with the importance of breeding territories, however we 
shift our focus to its role as a selective force for early arrival in migratory species. We 
investigate the role of predation upon arrival at breeding grounds as a selective force for 
later arrival. We use two models, a semi-analytic and a simulation model, to show that 
predation upon arrival can select for later arrival however in most cases it also selects for 
highly synchronous arrival. This high synchrony results in predator satiation and provides 
safety in numbers.  
In chapter 5 we use meta-analyses to investigate three questions related to paternity 
protection in birds. In socially monogamous birds males are presumed to protect their 
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paternity with mate-guarding or frequent copulation. We first test if these presumed 
paternity protection behaviors protect a male’s paternity. Our second question focusses on 
the role of male quality, if females prefer high quality males to sire their offspring then 
does this mean that high quality males can protect their paternity less? The third question 
is based on the expected relationship between paternal care and paternity protection 
behaviors (as a proxy for certainty of paternity), i.e. males are expected to provide more 
care for offspring they ‘think’ they have sired. We combine the results of these meta-
analyses with the extensive literature on topics frequently associated with paternity in an 
attempt to provide a general overview.
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Introduction 
This thesis consists of five chapters, combined they form diverse examples that together 
demonstrate the important role of demography and breeding strategies for evolutionary 
trajectories. 
Breeding strategies have evolved to optimise reproductive success dependent on 
environmental or individual specifics. In the first chapter we focus on a flexible strategy, a 
male’s mate-guarding duration in response to the adult sex ratio (ASR). With a highly 
biased male ASR one can predict  that mate-guarding is a strategy that is likely to result in 
improved reproductive success, while with a female biased ASR a male is more likely to 
maximise his reproductive success by foregoing guarding and thus mating with as many 
females as possible (Parker 1974). This has been the focus of much empirical and 
theoretical research (e.g. Grafen and Ridley 1983; Yamamura 1986, 1987; Mathews 2002; 
Kureck et al. 2011), but most research has focused on either pre- or postcopulatory 
guarding only. In the first chapter we investigate pre- and post-copulatory mate-guarding 
as a continuum and combine this with the ASR, sperm competition patterns and different 
windows for fertilization as determinants for mate-guarding duration. We investigate 
which conditions select for male monogamy and when polygamy results in higher 
reproductive success.   
Reproductive success is one of the most important determinants of fitness together with 
survival (mortality). If an individual survives to breed and breeds successfully it has 
gained fitness. As mentioned above the environment is an important determinant of 
reproductive success, as such many species have evolved local adaptation to a particular 
environment that allows them to successfully reproduce there (Kawecki and Ebert 2004). 
This means that dispersal may affect reproductive success if individuals that have 
dispersed are not adapted to the new environment. The effects of dispersal on local 
adaptation have been studied intensively theoretically (Ronce 2007), however quite often 
the assumption is made that males and females are identical in their environmental 
requirements (Caswell and Weeks 1986; Ronce 2007). In chapter 2 we explore what 
happens when males and females have different environmental optima or when 
environments differ in the offspring sex ratio that is produced. The results of this model 
highlight that these differences can have large consequences under circumstances where 
females are considered demographically dominant.  
Many species require a territory for breeding, and if territories are limited then acquiring 
a territory is key to reproductive success. Thus a territory could be considered an asset 
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worth protecting. In many species breeding dispersal is much less common than dispersal 
before breeding (Paradis et al. 1998).  Is this sufficient to explain why dispersal is often 
age-dependent? Dispersal models often consider asexual populations without age 
structure, while most of the exceptions to this only allow dispersal to evolve for one age 
class, e.g. only young or older individuals (Johnsen and Gaines 1990; Johst and Brandl 
1999). For chapter 3 we designed a simulation model to test whether individuals in 
possession of a territory are less likely to disperse because they are protecting an asset. 
Young individuals would then disperse simply because of not having an asset, but another 
factor, the multiplier effect, could work against this: we expect that offspring born in a 
good location should be less inclined to disperse. We thus also investigate to what degree 
territory quality affects the decision for individuals to disperse, i.e. individuals in low 
quality territories may be more inclined to disperse.  
In chapter 4 we stay on the topic of how owning a territory may be beneficial for 
reproductive success. In migratory birds acquisition of a good territory strongly selects for 
early arrival (Kokko 1999), while too early arrival also incurs costs (Newton 2008; 
McKinnon et al. 2010). We look at a factor that has the potential to select for later arrival 
times but is rarely considered in migration literature, namely predation upon arrival at the 
breeding ground. Our semi-analytic and simulation model use high reproductive success 
to select for early arrival while selection for later arrival is via predation upon arrival at 
the breeding ground but before breeding.  
In the final chapter we get back to the role of breeding strategies for reproductive success. 
Our approach differs from the other chapters in that we use meta-analytic techniques to 
research the role of paternity protection in birds. In socially monogamous bird species 
extra-pair paternity is common (Griffith et al. 2002). So, are those costly behaviors that are 
presumed to protect paternity actually effective? This is the first of three questions we 
attempt to answer. To explain why females pursue extra-pair copulations the “good genes” 
hypothesis is often invoked. Based on this hypothesis a female is expected to look for a 
high quality male to sire her offspring, irrespective if the male is extra- or within-pair 
(Jennions and Petrie 2000). Our second question investigates if this then implies that high 
quality males can protect their paternity less because their mates won’t pursue extra-pair 
copulations. The third question takes paternity protection behavior as a proxy for 
certainty of paternity, and asks if males that have certainty of paternity provide more care 
for offspring. Males that are uncertain of their paternity are expected to reduce the 
amount of paternal care they provide, as caring for offspring is costly (Møller and 
Birkhead 1993). In the discussion we combine the results of our three meta-analyses with 
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the extensive literature on topics frequently associated with paternity, to provide a 
general overview. 
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Chapter 1 – Understanding promiscuity: when is seeking 
additional mates better than guarding an already found one? 
Anna MF Harts and Hanna Kokko 
Evolution (2013) 67: 2838-2848 
 
Abstract  
Paternity protection and the acquisition of multiple mates select for different traits. The 
consensus from theoretical work is that mate-guarding intensifies with an increasing male 
bias in the adult sex ratio (ASR). A male bias can thus lead to male monogamy if guarding 
takes up the entire male time budget. Given that either female or male biased ASRs are 
possible, why is promiscuity clearly much more common than male monogamy? We 
address this question with two models, differing in whether males can assess temporal 
cues of female fertility. Our results confirm the importance of the ASR: guarding durations 
increase with decreasing female availability and increasing number of male competitors. 
However, several factors prevent the mating system from switching to male monogamy as 
soon as the ASR becomes male-biased. Inefficient guarding, incomplete last male sperm 
precedence, any mechanism that allows sperm to fertilize eggs after the male’s departure, 
and (in some cases) the unfeasibility of precopulatory guarding all help explain cases 
where promiscuity exists on its own or alongside temporally limited mate-guarding. 
Shortening the window of fertilization shifts guarding time budgets from the 
postcopulatory to the precopulatory stage. 
Introduction 
A simplified view of mating systems and sex differences in reproductive strategies often 
emphasizes sex differences in the optimal rate of mating, typically higher for males than 
for females (Gavrilets 2000; Arnqvist and Rowe 2005; Maklakov et al. 2005; Gavrilets and 
Hayashi 2006). Such a difference cannot, however, explain those monogamous situations 
that are based on male strategies of paternity protection, which can take the form of 
extensive mate-guarding (Beecher and Beecher 1979; Birkhead 1979) or mating plugs 
(Baer et al. 2001; Foellmer 2008; Fromhage 2012). In these cases, it appears to be in the 
best interest of a male to achieve high paternity with one or few females, rather than 
attempt maximally many matings. 
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Clearly, paternity protection and the acquisition of multiple mates can select for different 
traits. In extreme cases of terminal investment, paternity protection can mean that a male 
foregoes all chances of finding another female (Fromhage et al. 2005). Mate-guarding, 
which we focus on here (defined as the close association between a male and female prior 
to and/or after copulation for paternity assurance), does not always have to be that 
extreme. Still, there is often a direct trade-off involving time: guarding one female often 
effectively prevents a male from searching for more of them (Dickinson 1995; Birkhead 
and Møller 1992; Simmons and Siva-Jothy 1998; Fryer et al. 1999). It follows that if mate-
guarding becomes sufficiently extended over time, the mating system becomes socially 
monogamous (Mathews 2002; note that a socially monogamous system can be genetically 
monogamous too, if guarding is efficient enough). 
Past research has outlined a few principles of whether males should search (leading to a 
promiscuous mating system) or guard, with a generally emerging consensus that the adult 
sex ratio (ASR, defined here as males per female) is an extremely important predictor of 
the mating system (Grafen and Ridley 1983; Yamamura 1986, 1987; Yamamura and Tsuji 
1989; Birkhead and Møller 1992). In early models, this insight was expressed rather 
implicitly: Parker (1974) modelled both precopulatory and postcopulatory guarding, and 
showed that it is important to consider the time it takes to find a new female (this will 
obviously take longer if there are fewer females). In his model the time to find a female 
was modelled as an external constant, thus frequency-dependent selection was not 
explicitly included. Parker (1974) finished this early paper by noting that once guarding 
spreads in a population, the advantage of guarding will change.  
Grafen and Ridley (1983) took a much more explicit look at frequency-dependent 
availability of females in their model of precopulatory guarding: the proportion of 
available (unguarded) females was a function of the guarding criterion used by males. 
They found that if there are no takeovers (i.e., a male cannot usurp the position of another 
male currently guarding a female), the system evolves towards male monogamy if (i) the 
adult sex ratio (ASR) is male-biased, or (ii) if a female-biased sex ratio combines with a 
slow rate at which the sexes find each other. More recent work has replicated the finding: 
male-biased adult sex ratios generally select for male monogamy (Fromhage et al. 2005). 
Thus, theoretical work to date suggests that the prevalence of male monogamy should, at 
least approximately, reflect the prevalence of male-biased adult sex ratios in nature (e.g. 
bird populations are often male-biased, Donald 2007, while in polygynous mammals male 
death rates are typically higher than female death rates, Promislow 1992).  
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There is some empirical support for the idea that a strong male bias can create monogamy 
(e.g., Mathews 2002), including curious cases such as monogamy in Schistosoma worms 
that cause parasitic infections in humans (Beltran and Boissier 2010). The majority of 
these parasite populations worldwide appear to have a male-biased sex ratio, particularly 
in early stages of infection (Morand et al. 1993). Empirically, the broad agreement that 
male biased adult sex ratios can explain male monogamy is complemented by cases where 
female-biased ASRs are used to explain male roaming (Berger-Tal and Lubin 2011). 
However, we suspect that in many cases researchers consider monogamy as an 
exceptional case warranting an explanation, which implies a hidden assumption that 
promiscuity, being common, is simply the norm and as such requires little attention. If this 
is the case, a researcher who studies a population where a male-biased ASR combines with 
promiscuous mating might not realize that this combination ought to be explained. 
Mating systems can simultaneously exhibit aspects of promiscuity as well as some mate-
guarding. This happens if males spend some of their time budget guarding an already 
found female, and some of it searching for new females. A closer examination of  current 
theory reveals a lack of studies that ask whether guarding remains temporally limited or 
whether it evolves to fill the males’ entire time budget (male monogamy). Many of the 
models contrast guarding with non-guarding, but do not include the option of guarding for 
varying lengths of time (e.g., Sherman 1989; Yamamura and Tsuji 1989; Sandell and Olof 
1992; Fryer et al. 1999; Fromhage et al. 2008). In some cases this is justified because male 
strategies induce permanent monogamy in the form of terminal effort as is the case e.g., 
for certain spiders (Foellmer and Fairbarn 2003; Andrade and Kasumovic 2005). However 
the general case remains understudied. 
The question ‘why don’t males more often go for monogamy?’ becomes even more 
important given that existing models do not give males the option to evolve both pre- and 
postcopulatory guarding. For example, Grafen and Ridley (1983) assume guarding will end 
at copulation (and as eggs are then fertilized by the guarder, there is no benefit from 
guarding postcopulatorily to prevent sperm competition), while Yamamura (1986) 
assumes guarding begins at copulation and the male has the option of letting his mate go 
before ovipositioning, in which case his sperm can become entirely displaced by another 
male (100% last male sperm precedence). If males can improve their reproductive success 
by guarding before as well as after mating, this could conceivably increase the likelihood 
that monogamy is observed. It appears important to resolve if this leads to a conflict 
between predictions (male monogamy ought to be common) and reality (male time 
 ________________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 
 14     
budgets are not wholly taken up by guarding, instead males often go for multiple females 
and ‘accept’ less than 100% paternity with each).  
Here we show, in two different models, that the ratio of males to females is an important 
predictor of the mating system when guarding durations are allowed to evolve, but also 
that male-biased situations do not automatically lead to male monogamy, even when 
males can evolve both pre- and postcopulatory guarding. First, in a no-cue situation (males 
cannot assess temporal cues of female fertility), promiscuity can replace monogamy if 
there is incomplete last male sperm precedence. This transition happens more easily in 
populations that are not very male-biased. Incomplete last male sperm precedence in the 
absence of temporal cues does not, however, produce temporally limited guarding. 
Second, temporally limited guarding can evolve when time cues of female fertility exist. A 
short fertilization window shortens postcopulatory guarding but lengthens precopulatory 
guarding, which also implies that if precopulatory guarding is not possible in a given 
species, the entire guarding duration can remain rather short. Third, while reductions in 
female availability (more male biased sex ratios) increase guarding durations, monogamy 
is not an inevitable outcome of male-biased cases. Instead, promiscuity can exist alongside 
temporally limited guarding, when at least one of the following conditions is met: (i) 
guarding is an inefficient way to protect paternity; (ii) some paternity can be gained 
without guarding; and (iii) the fertilization window is not very brief. 
No-cue model 
Consider a population with a total of M males and F females. Females oviposit once in a 
breeding cycle which we take to be of one time unit length. At the time when this happens, 
she may be guarded by a male, or unguarded. In a no-cue situation, a male who guards a 
female has no information about the phase of her breeding cycle. 
The number of unpaired males, m, equals the total number of males minus the number of 
pairs p (m = M – p); similarly for unpaired females (denoted f, such that f = F – p). Pairs 
form when an unpaired male meets an unpaired female. The rate of two specific 
individuals meeting is µ, thus the rate with which pairs are formed in the population as a 
whole is µmf. Paired males guard for a duration G (G ≥ 0). Pairs decay at a rate  p / G, 
therefore at equilibrium p / G = µmf. Take-overs do not occur in the model. 
Besides a lack of male knowledge about when fertilization takes place we also assume that 
females are fertile asynchronously. From the male perspective, there is a trade-off 
between guarding an encountered female for longer, to increase the probability that the 
next fertilization opportunity happens while he is guarding, and locating new females. 
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Sperm competition occurs when the male locates an unguarded female that has previously 
mated but has not yet oviposited. We make the assumption that only the last two males to 
mate with a female have a chance of fertilizing her eggs. We also assume potentially 
incomplete last male sperm precedence: the last male to mate with the female fertilizes a 
proportion P2 of her eggs. All other eggs are sired by the second to last male (proportion 
1– P2). Thus values P2 > 0.5 indicate last male sperm precedence.  
The female can yield paternity for the male in two different ways. He can still be the last 
male to have mated with her when she oviposits, or he can be the second to last male. If he 
is no longer either male when she oviposits, there is no fitness payoff. A male’s fitness 
increases with the number of breeding cycles completed per time unit, scaled by the 
fitness reached in each cycle (Supplement I). 
The aim is to investigate whether a mutant with a different guarding duration (G) can 
invade a population with a resident strategy (Gpop). For this we assume that the number of 
mutants is small enough so that it does not influence the operational sex ratio (m/f) of the 
population. The mutant has a higher fitness (W) than males of the resident strategy when 
W(G) > W(Gpop) (see Supplement I for the solution). 
No-cue model: results 
The mating system evolves either towards no guarding or male monogamy. Males are 
expected to evolve longer guarding whenever (Supplement I) 
  𝑃2 >
𝐹
𝑀
 .        (1) 
Inequality (1) predicts that promiscuity (no guarding) prevails with a female-biased ASR 
and, in some cases, with male biased ASR. The less paternity is gained by the last male to 
mate with a female, the larger the range of ASR values (including quite high male biases) 
that can promote promiscuous matings (Figure 1). Conversely, males benefit from 
guarding when the chance of locating another female is small (male biased ASR) and the 
chance of losing paternity if leaving is high (last male sperm precedence).  
Thus the males stay with one female if last male sperm precedence, P2, is high. The 
immediate effect of reduced cost of lost paternity when leaving should select against 
guarding. However, a male’s own departure decisions can only impact the time he spends 
as a last male, not anything that happens thereafter (thus it has no impact on the time he 
spends as a second last male). Being the current guarder of a female at the (unpredictable) 
time point of siring opportunity guarantees being in the last male role. Thus when being 
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the last male is particularly profitable (high P2), selection favours prolonging the time 
being spent in this role. 
 
Figure 1. The two outcomes of the no-cue model: male monogamy (guarding fills the entire male 
time budget) or promiscuity (no guarding). Last-male sperm precedence (P2) ranges from 0, where 
the first male fertilizes all the eggs, to 1, where the last male fertilizes all the eggs. The solid line 
describes P2 = F / M (inequality 1). 
Inequality (1) predicts no region where temporally limited guarding is evolutionary 
stable: an increasing (or decreasing) population-wide Gpop does not select against further 
prolonging (or reducing) the guarding duration. It is, to some extent, surprising that we 
find only ‘no guarding’ (promiscuity) or ‘full guarding’ (male monogamy) solutions. This 
becomes understandable, however, once we note that we assumed that a male has no 
information regarding when a siring opportunity arises. Therefore, if it pays to guard a 
female at time t1, there is no reason why he would not benefit from guarding at any other 
time point t2. An analogous time invariance is valid in situations where it does not pay to 
guard. It therefore appears that information about siring opportunities that are female- 
and time-specific are essential for understanding why males can first guard and then leave 
a female. 
Our second model is motivated by such insights. We seek to examine if some degree of 
mate-guarding, followed by the departure of the male, can be evolutionarily stable, when 
information about female timing is available to males. As there is now a specific point in 
time when an egg is made available, the paternity gain after a male leaves the female will 
have to be modelled explicitly: a constant P2 value would not work well as an 
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approximation when males, by guarding longer, can reduce the risk that the egg is still 
unfertilized and susceptible to being fertilized by another male by the time he leaves the 
female. 
Time-cue model 
There are, as before, F adult females and M adult males. Each female produces a 
fertilizable egg at time point t = 0, although it should be noted that this time point is a 
relative one: females do not breed in synchrony in our model, thus t = 0 is the point of the 
siring opportunity that a particular focal female offers to males. Female breeding cycles 
are of length 1 (Figure 2). Thus at times t = 0,  t = 1, ..., she produces a siring opportunity 
which can either refer to a fertilizable egg or a clutch of such eggs. Note that oviposition 
does not have to occur, instead the egg is simply made available for the sire, either 
internally or externally depending on the species.  
 
Figure 2. The female reproductive cycle of the time cue model. The female makes a fertilization 
opportunity available at time points t = –1, t = 0, t = 1,…, and the exponential decline denotes the 
probability that each egg is still available (unfertilized) at time t. The female is guarded from time t 
= –b to t = a and remains unguarded for a duration of 1 – a – b. The value of the exponential function 
𝑒−𝑘𝑡  at t = a indicates the probability that the focal male sired the offspring (assuming S = 1, see 
main text). Here k = 9; larger (smaller) values make the curve fall more (less) steeply.  
Male strategies are now specified as the duration of time that he spends mate-guarding 
both before (b) and after (a) the focal point in time where the egg is available (Figure 2). 
Note that if the total guarding duration a + b reaches the value 1, we have again reached 
male monogamy.  
Consequently, a female breeding cycle is divided into a fraction b which they spend being 
precopulatorily guarded, a fraction a which they spend postcopulatorily guarded, and the 
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remaining time is spent unguarded (Figure 2). Males have a different time budget (details 
given in Supplement II) because if M > F, not every male can breed every time unit. 
 
Figure 3. The scope for paternity improvement when it is small, black line (S = 0.5 due to SI = 0.25 
and SB = 0.25), and  large (S = 1), grey line. Lengthening the postcopulatory guarding duration 
increases paternity, but less when the scope for paternity improvement is small. 
We assume that if an egg is fertilized while the guarding male is still present, it is fertilized 
by sperm of this male with probability 1–SI, where SI denotes potential mate-guarding 
inefficiency. If SI > 0, then even complete monogamy is not sufficient to ensure 100% 
paternity. On the other hand, we also need to specify the potential for a male to keep 
fertilizing eggs if he leaves, as his sperm is still present. We denote this potential to 
fertilize eggs after leaving by SB, which is the baseline paternity share by this male: if an 
egg is fertilized, it is sired by the now absent male (who was present at t = 0) with 
probability SB. Eggs are fertilized at a constant rate k, this means that the probability that 
an egg is still available to be fertilized at time t if it was made available at time t = 0 equals 
𝑒−𝑘𝑡 (Figure 2). The parameter k scales the duration of the fertilization window (see 
below). The guarding male therefore is the sire with probability SB + (1 – SB – SI) (1 – 𝑒−𝑘𝑎) 
if his postcopulatory guarding duration is a. This reflects the assumption that paternity 
equals SB if males do not guard, and it increases asymptotically towards 1–SI as guarding 
duration increases. Thus (1–SB – SI) is the scope for paternity improvement (S): it indicates 
the maximum difference in paternity achievable by guarding (Figure 3), so that S (1 – e – 
ka) is the paternity gained by guarding. If guarding is inefficient (high SI) and/or with 
baseline paternity (high SB), there will be little scope for improving paternity by extensive 
guarding (low S). 
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Small or large values of k correspond to long and short windows for fertilization, 
respectively. If k >> 1 (and if S is high), a very short postcopulatory guarding duration is 
sufficient to create high paternity for the male who was present when the egg became 
fertilizable. We consider very small values (e.g., k < 1) unrealistic, as they mean that eggs 
often fail to be fertilized by the time the female starts a new breeding cycle.  
To derive average male fitness in a population where guard durations a and b are in use, 
we note that a male breeding cycle consists of guarding (duration a + b), and a period of 
non-guarding or roaming (duration T, see Supplement II), during which he can use the 
siring opportunities that postcopulatorily unguarded females offer. Male fitness is thus the 
sum of the fitness from guarding and roaming divided by the time it takes a male to 
complete the breeding cycle. Mutant male fitness can then be compared with average male 
fitness. 
Time-cue model: results 
The results (see Supplement II for their derivation) show an overall important effect of the 
adult sex ratio (Figure 4). Although guarding durations increase with the ASR, the pattern 
is far more complex than a simplistic expectation of promiscuity at female biased ASR and 
male monogamy at male biased ASR. Postcopulatory guarding exists for a wide range of 
ASR values as long as there is sufficient scope for paternity improvement (S), but the 
duration of this type of guarding often remains limited, particularly if the fertilization 
window is short (e.g., k = 100 in Figure 5 A4). This makes good intuitive sense because it 
pays to abandon guarding to seek new mating opportunities when most eggs of the 
current female have already been fertilized, and this happens faster when k is large (short 
window). 
Male monogamy is not a likely outcome of evolution if postcopulatory guarding is the only 
form of guarding that is possible (Figure 4A). It is not strictly impossible, but it requires 
choosing parameter values from an extremely favourable and probably unrealistic range. 
E.g., k = 5, which means that it takes the whole unit time to fertilize 99.3% of eggs, 
obviously leads to longer guarding durations than any of the values in Figure 4A, but it still 
requires extremely male-biased ratios, M / F > 29.7, to yield monogamy if one assumes 
that conditions otherwise are as favourable to guarding  as possible (scope S = 1).  
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Figure 4. Both pre- and postcopulatory guarding durations increase with the adult sex ratio (ASR) 
and generally increase with the scope for paternity improvement (S), but the latter rule comes with 
exceptions in the case of precopulatory guarding. Lighter shades indicate shorter guarding 
durations (white: no guarding, black: male monogamy). Row (A), postcopulatory duration a*; row 
(B), precopulatory duration b*; row (C), total duration a*+ b* (capped at 1). Columns differ in the 
value of k as well as whether SI, SB, or both are responsible for a reduced scope (S < 1). For 
example, the value S = 0.6 results from SI = 0.4 in column 1, from SB = 0.4 in column 2, and SI = SB = 
0.2 in columns 3 and 4.   
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Monogamy evolves far more easily via precopulatory guarding (Figure 4B-C), and the 
simplistic prediction that any male bias in the ASR is sufficient to trigger it can be 
recovered for one particular case: when any reduction in the scope for paternity 
improvement is a result of high achievable paternity in the absence of any postcopulatory 
guarding (high SB; Figure 4C2). On the other hand, when there is no such baseline 
paternity gain (SB = 0) and the scope is instead compromised by inefficient guarding (high 
SI, Figure 4C1), guarding durations remain limited even if there is significant male bias in 
the ASR. 
Discussion 
Both of our models identify the adult sex ratio as an important determinant of male mate-
guarding behavior. More male competitors select for more guarding, and if guarding takes 
up the entire male budget, the prediction is male monogamy (note that females may still 
mate multiply as their monogamous mate may die). This central result is in line with 
earlier work (Parker 1974; Grafen and Ridley 1983; Yamamura 1986, 1987; Yamamura 
and Tsuji 1989; Fromhage et al. 2005, 2008).  
Adult sex ratios are notoriously hard to measure in many systems (Kosztolányi et al. 
2011). If male biases in the ASR were rare, the high prevalence of promiscuity would be 
easily explained, as all models agree that monogamy is unlikely to evolve with female 
biases in the ASR. However, data do not support a sweeping claim of an extreme rarity of 
male biases. In principle, any type mortality that targets males or females 
disproportionately can generate a bias. In the context of predation, Boukal et al. (2008) 
found male-biased predation to be 2.3 times as common as female-biased predation in a 
dataset of 81 predator-prey species pairs (ranging from molluscs preying on crustaceans 
to cases where both predator and prey are mammals).  
Although predation data suggests that female-biased ASRs may be more common as a 
whole than male-biased ASRs (see also Christe et al. 2006), a female bias is clearly not the 
only possible pattern (Kosztolányi et al. 2011). Factors that impact sex-specific death rates 
range from immunocompetence (Restif and Amos 2010) to changes in the scheduling of 
life history events (e.g., growth, Crowley 2000; or migration, Morbey and Ydenberg 2001). 
Sexes may also differ in their access to prime habitat, which may be primarily used by the 
larger-bodied or otherwise dominant sex (Marra 2000; Darden and Croft 2008). Given the 
diversity of factors at play, it is not surprising that the net effect can be either a male or a 
female bias. In the best studied taxa, i.e., birds and mammals, different patterns 
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predominate: birds typically have male-biased ASRs while mammals show the opposite 
(Clutton-Brock et al. 1985; Liker and Székely 2005; Donald 2007).  
Researchers rarely view a promiscuous mating system as something warranting special 
attention. While promiscuity can be viewed an adequate null model (Kokko and Mappes 
2013), its prevalence should also be contrasted against much theoretical work predicting 
that any degree of male bias selects for male monogamy. In many cases the ‘norm’ status 
of promiscuity might simply reflect its high prevalence among mating systems; it does not 
mean that one has yet explained why it is so prevalent, given the observed wide variation 
in adult sex ratios in nature. Thus, the main value of our work is to show that the 
transition from promiscuity to monogamy is not sharp and does not generally happen at 
1:1 adult sex ratio. Instead, we identify several reasons why promiscuity, either in the 
form of no guarding or temporally limited guarding followed by seeking new females, can 
persist despite a male bias of the ASR.  
If males have no cues of the timing of siring opportunities, all ASR > 1 values select for 
male monogamy only if there is perfect last male sperm precedence. Because last male 
sperm precedence is rarely perfect (Birkhead and Hunter 1990), this could be a relatively 
general explanation for the prevalence of promiscuity in nature. If the last male sires all 
the young, the profitability of swapping a certain ‘last male’ status (obtainable by staying 
with a single female) to the uncertain reward where finding new females combines with 
some time still spent with the current female as a last male (before she remates when 
unguarded) depends on the ASR. If there are many new females, the latter is better; if 
there are few, the certain last male status is the better option. If the last male status is less 
profitable (P2 < 1), staying with the current female carries a risk that she has mated 
beforehand, and some eggs are fertilized by a previous male. This decreases the 
profitability of guarding, and favours promiscuity.  
We are unaware of any studies linking last male sperm precedence values to evolved 
guarding patterns (but see Calbacho-Rosa et al. 2010 for a quantification of paternity 
assuming that guarding prevents copulations for few or many hours; P2 was higher when 
the second male copulated sooner). The obvious empirical challenge is that sperm 
precedence values are hard to obtain if guarding in male monogamy situations is efficient 
at preventing any sperm competition from actually occurring. Experimental manipulation 
of the intensity of sperm competition that would occur should a male abandon a female 
could prove useful in such contexts. 
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Our time cue model shows another, diverse set of conditions that allow promiscuity to 
coexist with mate-guarding. Postcopulatory guarding evolves to correspond, roughly, to 
the time it takes to ‘use up’ most of the scope for paternity improvement: if eggs become 
fertilized quickly, the male can leave quickly, with the exact duration again depending on 
the availability of new females. Male monogamy does not easily evolve via the 
postcopulatory route alone. Precopulatory guarding can be much longer, and both types of 
guarding can exist at either female- or male-biased sex ratios. Their combination can lead 
to male monogamy, but it usually requires a heavily male-biased ASR, with the exact value 
depending on the efficiency of guarding, on how much paternity can be achieved without 
any guarding, and on the length of the fertilization window. There are also situations 
where precopulatory guarding is impossible or unnecessary, e.g., if mating triggers egg 
production. In such cases the absence of the precopulatory option again limits the 
temporal scale of guarding.  
Taken together, these results are reassuring: if frequency dependence often leads to 
temporally limited mate-guarding, we have greater understanding of why real mating 
systems often combine promiscuity with some degree of mate-guarding. The frequency 
dependence arises because the relative gains achievable by roaming increase when more 
males guard (Parker 1974). The same principle explains why some guarding can also exist 
with female biased ASR.  
Of course, there are interactions that our simplistic framework does not include. For 
example, we have not included differences among males (Birkhead and Møller 1992; 
Kokko and Morrell 2005). For example, male size has been linked to mate-guarding 
success (Johnsen et al. 2003; Poirier et al. 2004), to achieving and resisting take-overs 
(Bel-Venner and Venner 2006) and to a male’s ability to monopolize multiple females 
(Schradin and Lindholm 2011).  It is also possible that extensive mate guarding is 
performed by one male morph only (side-blotched lizards; Zamudio and Sinervo 2000). A 
polymorphic system can show more complicated dynamics than the convergence of time 
budgets towards an intermediate value. Still, the essence of the frequency dependence 
remains the same as in our model, i.e. the identity of the sire, and hence the fitness gains 
obtained by guarding, depends on how much guarding is happening in the population as a 
whole.  
In a different model of a system without strict polymorphism (humans), Gavrilets (2012) 
showed that differences among individuals can also favour more guarding in situation 
where an adult sex ratio of unity would yield zero guarding. His model differs from ours in 
that it assumes non-linearly increasing gains to a male who reduces his guarding effort. 
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Hence, guarding is difficult to achieve in his model. Our decision not to include such 
nonlinearities keeps the interpretation of guarding and roaming more closely linked to the 
idea of a time budget. In our model each unit of time spent roaming gives the male siring 
opportunities that simply depend on the availability of unguarded females, not on how 
much energy (or some other allocatable resource) he has left over from guarding efforts. 
Another simplification is that we exclude the possibility that males could guard several 
females simultaneously; if this is possible, guarding does not produce monogamy. More 
importantly, existing models, ours included, do not consider that the achievable guarding 
efficiency might change with the ASR. In many species it has been shown that mate-
guarding is not fully efficient and leaves opportunity for cuckoldry resulting in multiple 
paternity (Alatalo et al. 1987; Birkhead and Møller 1992; Møller and Ninni 1998; Clutton-
Brock and Isvaran 2006; Komdeur et al. 2007). We are not, however, aware of empirical 
studies relating guarding efficiency (or, indeed, extra-pair paternity) to the adult sex ratio. 
On the other hand, the overall evolutionary outcome (multiple mating by males) does 
appear to respond to the ASR (e.g., in humans: Kokko and Jennions 2012).  
Our model does not comment directly on whether the predicted guarding durations are 
evolved responses or whether they reflect adaptive plastic male behavior in relation to the 
ASR (e.g., Parker 1974; Bretman et al. 2011).  Within-species variation in the ASR is 
possible spatially (Carroll and Corneli 1995) and temporally (Forsgren et al. 2004). If 
individuals can perceive the ASR, or at least a component thereof (e.g., the frequency of 
being in the proximity of a same-sex competitor), adaptive plastic male behavior is 
definitely possible (insects: Alcock 1994; Carroll and Corneli 1995; Kureck et al. 2011; 
crustaceans: Jormalainen 1998; Rondeau and Sainte-Marie 2001; Mathews 2002; 
mammal: Ramm and Stockley 2009; bird: Møller 1987). For example, males of the 
snapping shrimp Alpheus angulatus were significantly more likely to abandon recently 
mated females in experimentally female-biased populations than in unbiased sex ratios, 
though there was no significant difference in the duration of pairing (Mathews 2002). 
Excitingly, in the soapberry bug Jadera haematoloma, plasticity in response to 
experimental manipulations of female density was only expressed by males from a 
population where the natural social environment is variable (Carroll and Corneli 1995). 
We expect that similar findings should be possible in vertebrates, where there is 
documented individual variation in mate-guarding duration (e.g., Komers 1997; Ancona et 
al. 2010)  and variation in reproductive tactics present in a population (Schradin and 
Lindholm 2011), although in this taxon we are not aware of studies explicitly establishing 
a link between the ASR and guarding.  
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Guarding males have been shown to experience costs related to energy expenditure, 
reduced feeding opportunities, injury, and predation risk (Birkhead and Møller 1992; 
Komdeur 2001; Cooper and Vitt 2002; Ancona et al. 2010; Rodríguez-Muñoz et al. 2011). 
Additionally, males and females may have different optimal guarding durations which 
leads to sexual conflict (Jormalainen 1998; Yamamura and Jormalainen 1996; Westneat 
and Stewart 2003). None of these details are included in our model: for example, by 
considering gains per unit time rather than gains accrued during a finite lifespan, we were 
implicitly assuming that guarding and non-guarding males do not differ in mortality.  
Despite these shortcomings, we have been able to identify multiple factors that can explain 
the combination of some guarding with promiscuity. Frequency-dependent payoffs 
obtained from guarding can therefore help us better match predictions of the evolution of 
male monogamy with their real, relatively infrequent, occurrence in nature. 
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Supplement I – Solving the no-cue model 
First consider the expected number of eggs that the focal male fertilizes in the role of being 
the last male. During guarding he is always the last male (because take-overs do not 
occur). The expected time as a last male that his guarding (of duration G) gives him is 
G+(μm)–1; this is because after the G units of guarding are over, he is still the last male that 
the female has mated with until she is found again, which takes (μm)–1 time units on 
average. The time it takes for a female to be found by any male is 1/(µm) while the time it 
takes for a male to find a female is 1/(µf). A male’s breeding cycle will take (µf )–1 + G units 
of time; this is the time it takes him to find one female and to finish guarding her.  
After he is no longer the last male to have copulated with the female, he will still be the 
second to last male who has mated with this female. The expected duration of this state is 
the length of time the female is guarded by another male, Gpop, plus the time she has not 
yet been found by a third male, (μm)–1. Note that Gpop is not the focal male’s own guarding 
duration but that of any other male in the population; distinguishing between G and Gpop is 
important because a male, by changing his own behaviour, can only influence G but not 
Gpop. 
To sum up, a male who guards for G units of time will find a new female every G + (μf)–1  
time units. Each female will give him paternity proportional to  
[G + (μm)–1] P2 +  [Gpop + (μm)–1] (1–P2). A male’s reproductive success (W) is therefore 
given by 
  𝑊(𝐺) =
(𝐺+
1
𝜇𝑚
)𝑃2+(𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑝+
1
𝜇𝑚
)(1−𝑃2)
𝐺+
1
𝜇𝑓
    (S1) 
The mutant has a higher reproductive success than males of the resident strategy when 
W(G) > W(Gpop). Solving this inequality results in a simple condition for longer male 
guarding: 
 𝑃2 >
𝐹
𝑀
        (S2) 
Conversely, shorter male guarding is favoured whenever P2 < F/M. There is no frequency-
dependence leading to temporally limited guarding because P2, F and M are population-
wide constants. 
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Supplement II – Solving the time-cue model 
Female and male time budgets 
We assume that the number of  males and their mate searching ability means that every 
female is guarded at the time of the siring opportunity. Below we show why this 
assumption remains valid at the evolutionary equilibrium even if the ASR is female-biased.  
Females spend a fraction b of their time being precopulatorily guarded, a fraction a of their 
time being postcopulatorily guarded, and the remaining time, 1–a–b, they spend 
unguarded (Figure 2). The number of unguarded females (f) is therefore, on average,  
 f = F (1–a–b)       (S3) 
While females can breed every 1 unit of time, this is not true for males because M does not 
necessarily equal F. A female who is b time units away from breeding (i.e., has been 
unguarded for 1–a–b units of time) is guaranteed to become guarded by a male. Males, if 
they are numerous (M > F), have to wait on average longer than 1–a–b to find a female 
who is b time units away from giving the siring opportunity. Conversely, if there are 
relatively few males (M < F), their wait time is shorter than 1–a–b. We denote the time a 
male spends on roaming by T, thus the length of a breeding cycle for males is, on average, 
T+a+b. The number of non-guarding males (m) in the population is given by 
 𝑚 =
𝑇
𝑇+𝑎+𝑏
𝑀       (S4) 
As we did in the non-cue model (Supplement I), we specify p, the number of pairs 
(guarding male + guarded female) in the population: this obeys m = M – p and f = F – p, and 
can also be expressed as p = F (a+b). From (S4) we therefore find the solution for the 
average male wait time, 
 𝑇 =
𝑀
𝐹
− 𝑎 − 𝑏       (S5) 
Note that our model is applicable as long as T ≥ 0 (i.e., the evolution of a and b cannot 
proceed beyond the constraint a+b < M/F); as we will see, this constraint will be 
automatically satisfied by evolutionarily stable behaviour. 
To derive average male fitness in a population where guard durations a and b are in use, 
we note that a male breeding cycle consists of guarding (duration a+b), during which the 
male gains fitness 
 x = SB + S(1 – e–ka),      (S6) 
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and a period of non-guarding (duration T), during which he can use the siring 
opportunities that postcopulatorily unguarded females offer. These benefits to ‘roaming’ 
males are of magnitude 1 – x = SI + Se–ka, and they are offered by f females, distributed over 
a time of duration 1–a–b, and competed over by m males. Thus, the fitness accrued during 
a roaming period of length T is Ty, where 
 𝑦 =
𝑓
𝑚
𝑆𝐼+𝑆𝑒
−𝑘𝑎
1−𝑎−𝑏
       (S7) 
is the fitness gain per unit time when roaming, i.e., fertilizing postcopulatory unguarded 
females’ eggs. Using known relationships between F, M, f and m (above), this can also be 
expressed as 
 𝑦 =
𝑆𝐼+𝑆𝑒
−𝑘𝑎
𝑀
𝐹
−𝑎−𝑏
       (S8) 
Male fitness per unit time of his life is 
 𝑊 =
𝑥+𝑇𝑦
𝑇+𝑎+𝑏
       (S9) 
Using equations (S3)-(S6) and (S8), this expression simplifies to 
 𝑊 =
𝐹
𝑀
        (S10) 
This makes good sense. One male or another gets a total of 1 unit of siring opportunities 
for each breeding cycle of each female, thus for the average male, the total number of 
siring opportunities that arise for him, either while guarding or non-guarding, must equal 
F/M. 
Fitness of a mutant male 
The above result refers to the population average when all males use a and b as pre- and 
postcopulatory guarding durations. We now ask what happens when a male deviates from 
the norm and uses a different value of a and/or b from the rest of the population. 
We deal with postcopulatory guarding first, as this is the simpler case. Altering this 
duration, a, impacts the rate at which a mutant male completes his breeding cycle without 
altering his wait time (which remains the population average, equation S5). Changing the 
guarding duration also changes the proportion of eggs fertilized that are made available by 
the guarded female. Thus, a male with a deviant value of a has his fitness characterized not 
by eq. (S10) but by (S9) with T and y following the population norm, and a and x having a 
different value from the resident strategy. Differentiating, we obtain 
 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑎
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑎
𝑆𝐵+𝑆(1−𝑒
−𝑘𝑎)+𝑇𝑦
𝑇+𝑎+𝑏
=
𝐹
𝑀
(𝑆𝑘𝑒−𝑘𝑎 −
𝐹
𝑀
)   (A11) 
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This is positive when 𝑆𝑘𝑒−𝑘𝑎 >
𝐹
𝑀
, which means that a will increase until 
 𝑎∗ =
ln⁡(𝑆𝑘
𝑀
𝐹
)
𝑘
       (S12) 
 Note that if SkM/F < 1, 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑎
 is negative for all a, thus a* = 0. Thus, a small scope for 
paternity improvement, a long fertilization window (small k), and a female-biased sex 
ratio all decrease the likelihood that any postcopulatory guarding will occur. 
Fitness calculations for precopulatory guarding are slightly different than those for 
postcopulatory guarding, because a shorter or longer b cannot be assumed to lead to a 
different duration of guarding or roaming until a new mate is found, respectively. Instead, 
given that we assume sufficiently many males that each female will be guarded every 
breeding cycle, a male who delays guarding (uses a shorter b) will never find a female 
approaching her t = 0. Thus a male with a shorter b than the population average roams 
continually, gaining fitness through inefficiently guarded eggs as well as those still 
unfertilized after another male’s guarding period is over. A roaming male’s fitness 
accumulates at a rate y per time unit. It follows that if y > F/M (where y follows equation 
S8), shorter values of b are favoured. 
An increased value of b has similarly drastic effects on mate-finding. A male whose b 
exceeds the population average by an infinitesimally small duration ∆b can remove all his 
waiting time: he accepts females further away from giving a siring opportunity than what 
is acceptable to other males, thus in the absence of competition, he is guaranteed to find 
such a female without delay. A male who avoids all waiting by shifting to b+∆b (where ∆b 
is approximately zero) has fitness 
𝑆𝐵+(𝑆)(1−𝑒
−𝑘𝑎)
𝑎+𝑏
 obtained from (S9) with waiting time set 
to zero. Thus, longer b values are favoured when 
𝑆𝐵+(𝑆)(1−𝑒
−𝑘𝑎)
𝑎+𝑏
>
𝐹
𝑀
, and shorter b values 
are favoured when b leads to y > F/M. It follows that selection favours longer guarding b 
when b is ‘too small’, shorter values of b when b is ‘too long’, and  these two options collide 
when 
   
𝑆𝐵+(𝑆)(1−𝑒
−𝑘𝑎)
𝑎+𝑏
=
𝐹
𝑀
= 𝑦 =
𝑆𝐼+(𝑆)𝑒
−𝑘𝑎
𝑀
𝐹
−𝑎−𝑏
    (S13) 
Biologically, the interpretation is that when b increases in the population, competitor 
males spend longer in each breeding cycle, which means that fewer males compete for the 
eggs that guarding males cannot fertilize (those that have been left unguarded and are still 
not fertilized, or those that remain unprotected by inefficient guarding). This frequency 
dependence increases the relative value of going for these eggs (higher y), i.e., roaming. At 
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the point where non-guarding leads to the same fitness as guarding for an infinitesimally 
longer period than the population average, we have the equilibrium.  
 𝑏∗ = {
𝑀
𝐹
(1 − 𝑆𝐼 − 𝑆𝑒
−𝑘𝑎) − 𝑎⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓𝑎∗ > 0
𝑀
𝐹
𝑆𝐵⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑎
∗ = 0
   (S14) 
The sum a*+b* (eq. A12 + eq. A14), in cases where guarding occurs, is  
𝑀
𝐹
(1 − 𝑆𝐼) −
1
𝑘
, 
which gives an intuitive first result: the duration of guarding as a whole increases with the 
ASR and decreases if guarding is inefficient (high SI) ; it also increases with the speed of 
eggs becoming fertilized. We are also finally able to confirm our assumption, that there 
will always be enough males to begin guarding females who are b* time units away from 
offering a siring opportunity, is valid. This follows because the waiting time, 𝑇 =
𝑀
𝐹
− 𝑎 −
𝑏, reaches the equilibrium value  
𝑀𝑆
𝐹
+
1
𝑘
  if a* > 0, and 𝑇 =
𝑀
𝐹
(1 − 𝑆𝐵) if ⁡𝑎
∗ = 0.⁡ Since both 
values are positive, the roaming population of males does not ‘run out’ under either 
scenario: each male still spends some time T > 0 roaming in between two guarding bouts. 
There are two special cases. We already noted above that postcopulatory mate-guarding is 
not selected for when⁡𝑆𝑘
𝑀
𝐹
. Second, it is also possible that the sum a*+b* ≥ 1. This means 
that males are never selected to stop guarding a single focal female; they persist in 
guarding from one breeding cycle to the next. This solution implies male monogamy. 
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Chapter 2 – Demography can favour female-advantageous 
alleles 
Anna MF Harts, Lisa E Schwanz and Hanna Kokko 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B (2014) 281: 20140005 
 
Abstract 
When female fecundity is relatively independent of male abundance, while male 
reproduction is proportional to female abundance, females have a larger effect on 
population dynamics than males (i.e. female demographic dominance). This population 
dynamic phenomenon might not appear to influence evolution, because male and female 
genomes still contribute equally much to the next generation. However, here we examine 
two evolutionary scenarios to provide a proof of principle that spatial structure can make 
female demographic dominance matter. Our two simulation models combine dispersal 
evolution with local adaptation subjected to  intralocus sexual conflict and 
environmentally driven sex ratio biases, respectively. Both models have equilibria where 
one environment (without being intrinsically poorer) has so few reproductive females that 
trait evolution becomes disproportionately determined by those environments where 
females survive better (intralocus sexual conflict model), or where daughters are 
overproduced (environmental sex determination model). Surprisingly, however, the two 
facts that selection favours alleles that benefit females, and population growth is improved 
when female fitness is high, together do not imply that all measures of population 
performance are improved. The sex-specificity of the source–sink dynamics predicts that 
populations can evolve to fail to persist in habitats where alleles do poorly when 
expressed in females. 
Introduction 
In diploid species, half of the genetic material of each offspring is provided by the male 
parent, the other half by the female parent. At the same time, the population dynamic 
properties of populations are more strongly influenced by female than by male 
performance. This is encapsulated in the concept of female demographic dominance 
(Crowley 2000), which refers to a set of assumptions where female fecundity is relatively 
independent of male abundance, while male reproduction is proportional to female 
abundance. While demographic dominance in this pure form is obviously a simplification 
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(in reality males can have a multitude of effects on female fecundity, Arnqvist and Nilsson 
2000; Rankin and Kokko 2007), it holds in an approximate sense widely enough to make 
the lack of attention to its consequences surprising. Sexual asymmetries in demographic 
importance are rarely taken into account when studying sexual conflict or primary sex 
ratios (but see Freedberg and Taylor 2007).  
The reason why demographic dominance might be safely ignored is that each offspring 
inherits equally many autosomal genes from both the male and the female parent. 
Therefore, even if males and females differ in their life histories or reproductive roles, the 
overall expectation is equal male and female fitness in diploid species with a 1 : 1 primary 
sex ratio. As pointed out by Arnqvist (2004), one should therefore express caution when 
interpreting claims that female evolution elevates their fitness above that of males or vice 
versa. There is an intuitive sense in which females or males can be argued to ‘win’ a 
conflict: consider, for example, intralocus sexual conflict. The evolved allelic values might 
be closer to the optimum of one sex (also often expressed as a smaller ‘lag load’, reviewed 
in Kokko and Jennions 2014). Because of the equal number of genes that pass through 
males and females to form the next generation, females are typically not assumed to be 
more likely to ‘win’ even though they are the main determinant of the size of the next 
generation.  
Here, we build ‘proof of principle’ models to show that spatial variation in habitat creates 
scenarios where it is no longer safe to ignore female demographic dominance when 
arguing about sexual conflict or sex ratio dynamics. Our two models consider 
subpopulations that are linked via dispersal in spatially varying habitats. This creates 
conditions where genotype × environment interactions are important for understanding 
population dynamics. Local adaptation to a particular habitat can lead to a large number of 
propagules from that habitat; alleles carried by these propagules can come to predominate 
in the global population (as in source–sink theory, Kawecki 1995). However, this effect can 
be sexspecific: above-average offspring production requires that females, rather than 
males, are locally adapted. Therefore, female demographic dominance can, in our two 
models, result in: (i) more viable females than males (model 1), and (ii) female-biased sex 
ratios (model 2). 
Perhaps surprisingly, we also show that improved female performance does not 
necessarily maximize global population performance: if females ‘win’ the conflict in one 
habitat but ‘lose’ it in another, then the population as a whole can evolve to be mainly 
found in habitats where ‘females win’. The population will underuse habitats where ‘males 
win’, as population growth is predicted to be very poor in areas where only males can 
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thrive. It is notable that this process, where populations evolve to thrive in one habitat 
only, can occur despite neither habitat being intrinsically more difficult to adapt to than 
the other; it arises solely owing to sexual conflict. 
The models 
Our individual-based models of sex-specific local dynamics and dispersal assume sexually 
reproducing diploid populations where alleles directly impact survival (intralocus sexual 
conflict model) or offspring sex (environmental sex determination model). Individuals in 
each model inhabit worlds that consist of two different environments of 50 habitat 
patches each, creating spatial heterogeneity in a world that totals 100 patches. Each world 
is initialized by placing 1000 individuals, each an adult female or an adult male (50% 
probability of being either), onto the patches. As there are 100 patches, each initial 
subpopulation has a size of approximately five males and five females. All simulations 
were run for 10 000 generations with 10 repetitions unless stated otherwise. In all 
simulations, 10 000 generations was found to be sufficient for convergence.  
First model: intralocus sexual conflict. 
There are three evolving traits in this model. One diploid locus, a, codes for the 
quantitative trait that impacts an individual’s survival in the local patch (‘survival allele’ 
for short). This locus is expressed in both sexes as the mean of paternally and maternally 
inherited allelic values. The two different environments of 50 patches each, which we label 
environment A and B, differ in the optimal trait value a that leads to highest survival, but 
this is also sex-dependent (Figure 1; see below). There are also two diploid loci, df and dm, 
which control the dispersal propensity and are expressed in females only (df) or males 
only (dm). We assume co-dominance for each of the three diploid loci, such that 
phenotypes are the mean of the relevant allelic values. 
When each simulation commences, individuals are assigned values of a that match the 
local environmental optima depending on the location of the individual but not on its sex. 
Individuals are also assigned values of df and dm (these are initially uniformly distributed 
with mean dinit and a range (dinit – σinit , dinit + σinit) around this mean). 
Each generation starts with reproduction within each subpopulation (inhabitants of a 
patch). We specify the number of offspring (N) produced by each subpopulation of F 
females and M males as follows: if F ≥ 1 and M ≥ 1 (at least one individual of each sex is 
locally present) then 𝑁 = 2 + 4𝐹𝑒−𝑐𝐹, rounded to the nearest integer; otherwise N = 0. 
This function, where c is a constant determining the strength of local competition, has the 
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desirable properties of female demographic dominance, in that M does not appear in the 
equation beyond the M ≥ 1 requirement, as well as local competition, in that: (i) 
subpopulations with at least one female always produce at least two offspring (on average 
one of each sex); (ii) the small  subpopulation’s output increases if more females are 
added; but (iii) stronger overcrowding (large F) reduces the subpopulation’s output. 
These rules also imply a kin-selected reason to disperse: a dispersing individual alleviates 
competition for its relatives (also note that our model ignores some other known reasons 
to disperse, e.g. inbreeding avoidance, as we assume no cost to consanguineous matings). 
The model then randomly selects a mother and a father among locally present individuals 
as parents for each offspring. The offspring inherit their genes according to Mendelian 
inheritance rules and each offspring has an equal probability of developing as a male or as 
a female.  
Mutations then potentially occur at loci a, df and dm, each allele doing so with probability μa 
or μd (the latter value is the same for both dispersal loci). If mutation occurs, the allele’s 
value changes by an amount taken from a uniform distribution with range [ – σa , σa ] (for 
a) or [– σd , σd] (for either dispersal allele). Dispersal alleles that have their new values 
below 0 or above 1 are set to 0 or 1, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the survival allele trait value (a) and survival in each 
environment. For females Eopt is lower than Ei ; for males it is the opposite. All individuals start each 
simulation with trait values matching either Environment A or Environment B, and there is initially 
no sex bias in survival. Also note that individuals with a = EB survive well if dispersed to 
environment A but only if they are males; similarly, individuals with a = EA survive well if dispersed 
to environment B, but only if they are females. 
All adults die after reproduction (i.e. we assume nonoverlapping generations). Thereafter, 
the offspring disperse based on their sex-specifically expressed dispersal probability, 
which is the mean of their sex-specific dispersal alleles. Dispersing offspring land in a 
randomly chosen patch among all 100 patches, i.e. dispersers are as likely to experience 
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environment A as B (note that we allow a disperser to land back on its natal patch, to keep 
this symmetry). Viability selection occurs after dispersal. Survival is modelled according to 
the conceptual model provided by Cox and Calsbeek (2009): its values are derived as 
𝑆 = 𝑒−𝑏(𝐸𝑜𝑝𝑡−𝑎)
2
, where b is a constant, Eopt the sex- and environment-specific optimal trait 
value and a the mean of the individual’s survival alleles. Thus, an individual reaches its 
best survival when its alleles match perfectly the local requirements of the environment, 
such that a = Eopt; mismatches in either direction are associated with reduced survival. Eopt 
is assumed higher for males (Eopt = Ei  +⁡k) than for females (Eopt = Ei – k), where Ei refers 
to the environmental value in environment A or B. Thus, when the model is initiated (a = 
Ei), neither males nor females experience optimal survival, and their survival probabilities 
are equal (Figure 1). This assumption reflects unresolved intralocus sexual conflict where 
optimal traits differ between males and females (e.g., Fedorka and Mousseau 2004; 
Foerster et al. 2007; Prassad et al. 2007; Cox and Calsbeek 2009) as well as between 
environments. Offspring survival concludes a generation, and the surviving offspring 
become the breeders of the next generation. 
Second model: environmental sex determination 
In the second model, we focus on a sex determining mechanism that has the potential to 
create biased sex ratios: temperature-dependent sex determination (TSD). In this model, 
the two different environments differ in climate. Environments A and B are now 
interpretable as ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ patches (50 each). Studies of TSD characterize a trait 
known as the pivotal temperature (Tpiv), above which offspring develop mainly as one sex, 
and below which the other sex is overproduced (Bull 1980). Reflecting this, we state that 
an offspring with Tpiv will develop as a female according to the sigmoidal probability 
distribution: 𝑃𝑓 = 1 (1 + 𝑒
(𝑇𝑝𝑖𝑣−𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑣))⁄  , and as a male with probability Pm = 1 – Pf, where 
Tenv is the local temperature (Girondot 1999). Thus, if Tpiv ˃ Tenv the offspring is likely to 
develop as a male and conversely, if Tpiv ˂Tenv, as a female. 
The subpopulations are initialized as in the first model, now with pivotal temperature 
alleles initially set to match the environment (Tpiv = Tenv, within each environment). Tpiv is 
the average of the maternally and paternally inherited alleles, which are initially identical. 
Dispersal probability, as in the first model, is controlled by two diploid loci, one for male 
and another for female dispersal; an individual only expresses its sex-specific dispersal 
alleles. Dispersal alleles are initialized and inherited as in model 1. We assume co-
dominance for the three diploid loci.  
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To provide another contrast to the previous model, we now assume overlapping 
generations. Evolution occurs as follows. Density dependence acts locally on fecundity, 
such that the number of offspring (N) produced by a local subpopulation is determined by 
the number of local females (F),  𝑁 = 𝐹𝑒−𝑐𝑓, where c is a constant (and N is rounded to the 
nearest integer). The function is similar in its gist but differs somewhat from that used in 
model 1, as there is no requirement of at least two offspring produced by a single female—
the current model requires smaller fecundities to sustain a population as generations are 
overlapping (parents survive). Parents and the genes passed on to offspring are selected 
as in the first model, but the sex of each offspring is now determined via a genotype ×
⁡environment interaction (Pf and Pm, see above). 
Births are followed by mutation, each of the alleles present in the offspring mutate with a 
probability μd (dispersal) or μpiv (pivotal temperature alleles). If mutation occurs, the 
allele’s value changes with an amount taken from a uniform distribution within the range 
[– σd , σd]  and [– σpiv , σpiv] for the dispersal and pivotal temperature alleles, respectively 
(for dispersal alleles, if the new values are below 0 or above 1, they are set to 0 or 1, 
respectively). 
Next, there is mortality in the parental generation: each adult survives with probability s < 
1 (i.e. we assume overlapping generations) irrespective of sex or any trait values. 
Thereafter, natal dispersal occurs. Dispersal is global, modelled as in model 1. Thus, a 
disperser has an equal probability of landing in a ‘warm’ or a ‘cold’ patch. After dispersal, 
all offspring become adults and are thus able to breed in the next generation together with 
surviving adults. 
Note that even though the two models use the same dispersal rules, they differ somewhat 
in their costs of dispersal. Neither model assumes any other cost of dispersal than an 
indirect cost due to local adaptation, but in the intralocus sexual conflict model this could 
have a negative impact on the viability of the disperser, whereas in the current model a 
locally adapted individual that disperses to a novel environment and reproduces there 
does not experience a viability cost. Instead, it might pass on pivotal temperature genes 
that are maladaptive in the current climate, thus the cost is delayed by one generation. 
As our aim is to provide two ‘proof of principle’ examples, we show outcomes based on a 
single set of parameter values in our figures (with the exception of initial dispersal alleles, 
as variation in this parameter proves important in model 2). For an additional evaluation 
of the generality of the results, see supplement III. 
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Results 
First model: intralocus sexual conflict 
Regardless of whether simulations are started with low (dinit = 0.15, first row, Figure 2) or 
high (dinit = 0.85, second row, Figure 2) dispersal, dispersal alleles evolve to be similar 
across environments and are somewhat male-biased (Figure 2a,e; note the near identical 
results between the different dinit runs). Although the proportion of dispersing 
individuals remains relatively low, this gene flow is sufficient to equalize the survival 
alleles across environments (triangles Figure 2b,f ), thus the population as a whole is not 
locally adapted (in line with population genetic theory which predicts that relatively little 
gene flow is sufficient to ‘swamp’ local adaptation, Mayr 1963; Kirkpatrick and Barton 
1997). The evolved survival alleles nearly match the environmental value for environment 
B.  
Given that the allelic values conferring best viability are not only environment-specific but 
also sex-specific in this model, identical allelic values can produce very different male and 
female viabilities. The globally evolving trait values predict very high viability for males 
and low viability for females in environment A, while the same alleles in environment B 
predict higher female than male viability (Figure 2c,g). This makes subpopulations in 
environment A unproductive (few females live to produce young), and consequently the 
total population size evolves to be far greater in environment B (Figure 2d,h). 
Environment A males have the highest viability of all individual categories. However, 
because of the low abundance of individuals in environment A, a randomly sampled 
individual of the global population has, on average, higher viability if it is a female (mean 
viability is 0.719 ± 0.005 (s.e.) for all females, and 0.676 ± 0.006 for all males when dinit = 
0.15; 0.725 ± 0.005 for all females and 0.669 ± 0.006 for all males when dinit = 0.85). 
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Figure 2. Evolutionary outcomes of the intralocus sexual conflict model, plotted at generation 
10000 of 10 independent simulation runs per scenario (except for mean dinit = 0.15 where one 
simulation resulted in extinction in both environments and points are based on 9 independent 
runs). (a, e) sex- and environment-specific mean of dispersal alleles, (b, f) sex- and environment-
specific mean of survival alleles, (c, g) sex- and environment-specific mean of survival as predicted 
by Figure 1 and (d, h) sex- and environment-specific number of individuals, measured after survival 
and before breeding. Means ± S.E. given in d and h; in other cases the S.E. are too small to be visible 
and have thus been left out. Initial dispersal is dinit = 0.15 in a–d, and dinit = 0.85 in e−f. Black 
symbols refer to environment A, grey symbols to environment B; squares denote males, circles 
denote females, and triangles denote both sexes combined. In (b, f) the solid line is the Ei value and 
the dotted lines indicate the sex- and environment-specific optima for a alleles. Also note that EA 
males have near perfect survival (black squares in (c, g)). Parameter values: EA = 5.58, EB = 6.42, b = 
0.7, c = 0.05, ainit = E(A or B), μa = μd = 0.1, σinit = σd = σa = 0.05, and k = 0.74. 
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Second model: environmental sex determination 
Unlike model 1, the environmental sex determination model features two alternative 
stable states for dispersal. Depending on initial dispersal alleles, the population evolves to 
low (approx. 10% individuals disperse, dinit < 0.35) or high dispersal (approx. 80%, dinit > 
0.4) (Figure 3a). Both evolved dispersal rates appear sufficient to prevent local adaptation, 
as Tpiv evolves to the same value in both environments (Figure 3b). However, the value of 
Tpiv differs between runs that lead to low versus high dispersal: when dispersal evolves to 
be low, Tpiv evolves to almost match the Tenv of the warm environment, whereas when 
dispersal evolves to be high, Tpiv evolves to the mean of the two environments (Figure 3b).  
This leads to a dichotomous pattern in the primary sex ratio produced. If dispersal is low, 
such that Tpiv evolves to be near Tenv of the warm environment, the warm environment 
produces a slightly female-biased sex ratio and the cold environment greatly 
overproduces sons. By contrast, high dispersal and the evolved intermediate Tpiv leads to 
warm environments overproducing daughters and cold environments equally 
overproducing sons (Figure 3c). The latter equilibrium leads to a relatively balanced 
population-wide sex ratio (Figure 3d, high dispersal). The low-dispersal equilibrium, 
however, shows a similar asymmetry in environment use as was already shown for model 
1: there are few females in the cold environment, which renders these subpopulations 
unproductive, contributing relatively little to the global gene pool. 
The situation for the cold environment appears to be a vicious circle: despite being 
inherently equally suitable as a breeding area, any initial underproduction of daughters in 
this environment (owing to gene flow from warmer areas) means that few females breed 
locally. Therefore, the contribution of cold environments to the global gene pool remains 
weak, and the entire population instead adapts to the warm environment only. The 
situation remains more egalitarian when dispersal is high, because every population then 
has many females—either because of overproducing them (warm environments) or 
because of substantial immigration (cold environments). Under this scenario, every 
subpopulation continually contributes to the global gene pool.  
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Figure 3. Evolutionary outcomes of the environmental sex determination model. The average 
(mean ± s.e.) at generation 10000 of 10 independent simulation runs per scenario: (a) dispersal 
alleles, (b) pivotal temperature, (c) offspring sex ratio (males/total) and (d) number of adults per 
environment, as a function of the initial dispersal (dinit). Cold subpopulations in black and warm 
subpopulations in grey (Tenv = 24 and 28, respectively). In (a) and (d) squares denote males and 
circles denote females. In (b) and (c), triangles denote the mean for each environment. Other 
parameters: s = 0.7, c = 0.032, σinit = σd = 0.05, ainit = Tenv, μpiv = μd = 0.1, σpiv = 0.25. 
Generality 
Unsurprisingly, our examples (Figures 2 and 3) require a suitable combination of 
parameter values. To confirm that they do not represent highly unlikely special cases, we 
ran 600 simulation trials for the intralocus sexual conflict model and 500 simulation trials 
for the environmental sex determination model (owing to extinctions, we ran a higher 
a 
b 
c 
d 
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number of simulation trials for model 1). The range of the randomly chosen parameter 
values for these runs is given in supplement III.  
In the intralocus sexual conflict model, these trials showed that female survival evolves to 
exceed male survival when the two environments vary substantially enough (see 
supplement III, Figure S1, for details). In the environmental sex determination model, we 
compared the offspring sex ratio between the cold and the warm environment 
(supplement III). If the environments did not differ much, high and low initial dispersal led 
to an identical and simple pattern with Tpiv equal to the mean for the two environments 
(supplement III, Figure S2). If environments were sufficiently different, we found two 
equilibria that depended on initial conditions, similar to our main example of Figure 3. The 
evolutionary outcome of populations initiated with little dispersal is that the warm 
environment produced a relatively balanced sex ratio, and the cold populations produced 
a strongly male-biased sex ratio (squares in supplement III, Figure S2); high dispersal as 
the initial condition led to a repetition of the simpler pattern where the male bias of cold 
environments is approximately as strong as the female bias of warm environments (stars 
in supplement III, Figure S2). Thus, our findings as a whole appear to generalize, as long as 
there is strong enough environmental variation. 
Discussion 
Our models include no other asymmetry than the fact that local population growth 
depends more strongly on the number of females than on the numbers of males (female 
demographic dominance). Consequently, if a population is adapted, say, to the mean of 
two environments, it will have some individuals residing in environments that favour 
females and some in environments that favour males. The former type of environment 
then becomes more productive as a result of females being the more important 
determinant of demography. Selection as a whole then becomes disproportionately driven 
by alleles’ success in this environment, and the entire system can begin evolving in a 
direction where female-advantageous alleles predominate. 
It is well known from source–sink theory that evolution of traits can become 
demographically dominated by populations with above-average productivity (Ronce and 
Kirkpatrick 2001; Kawecki and Ebert 2004). Substantial gene flow can also lead to one 
‘generalist’ phenotype even when the selective environment differs between populations 
(e.g., Kisdi 2002; Hendry et al. 2001). We have shown that these principles have significant 
impacts on trait evolution when there are sex differences in the genotype × environment 
interaction responses. If the trait impacts survival in a sex-specific manner, or has an effect 
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on the primary sex ratio, then a source–sink structure emerges in environments that do 
not differ in their suitability a priori but simply owing to variance among subpopulations 
in numbers of reproductively mature females (see also Freedberg and Taylor 2007, for an 
argument of how this might favour the evolution of TSD per se).  
Models with coevolution of local adaptation and dispersal very rarely include sexual 
reproduction (Caswell and Weeks 1986; Ronce 2007), even though local variation in sex 
ratio have been identified as increasing extinction risks (Aresco 2005; Donald 2007; 
Lambertucci et al. 2012) and can be a significant source of selection for or against 
dispersal (Greenwood 1980; Meier et al. 2011). Conversely, models of sexual conflict 
rarely consider genotype × environment interactions (while mate choice studies do so 
more commonly, Ingleby et al. 2010). There is clearly more scope for studies linking these 
fields. 
Both of our models show evolutionary endpoints with the following properties: there is a 
trait that impacts how many females are produced and/or survive to mature, and the trait 
is subject to a genotype × environment interaction that impacts how many mature females 
(versus males) will live in each environment. Given that trait evolution is 
disproportionately influenced by those environments where the genotype × environment 
interaction favours females rather than males, one might be tempted to conclude that the 
end result (e.g. in model 1, the average female survives better than the average male) also 
improves population-wide performance measures such as the ability to persist in a wide 
variety of environments. However, this is a premature conclusion: if one type of 
environment becomes disproportionately female-favouring, the importance of adapting to 
the male-favouring environment can become reduced to such a degree that the population 
barely persists in these (environment A in our intralocus sexual conflict model, and the 
cold environment in our environmental sex determination model). This is remarkable, 
given that we assumed no intrinsic quality differences of these environments: we assumed 
identical local density dependence across environments, therefore the same number of 
females led, in principle, to equally good reproduction in either environment.  
Our additional result of two alternative stable states, visible in the environmental sex 
determination model only, is dependent on ancestral dispersal rates that evolve into high 
or low dispersal. This is in line with previous research, which has identified the potential 
for alternative stable states based on dispersal rates (Billiard and Lenormand 2005). The 
mechanism operating in our model, however, differs from earlier studies with coevolution 
of local adaptation and dispersal (Kisdi 2002; Billiard and Lenormand 2005). While earlier 
studies document equilibria with much dispersal and little local adaptation or vice versa, 
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we found no evidence of local adaptation in the strict sense (the two environments never 
evolved clear differences for the alleles used to determine the level of local adaptation, i.e. 
the survival alleles of model 1 or pivotal temperature of model 2). 
Local adaptation is not, per se, prevented from occurring in our models. Separate 
computer runs with no dispersal (supplement III, Figure S3) lead subpopulations in the 
two different environments to evolve distinct distributions of Tpiv or a. This confirms that 
local adaptation is possible, and that our main results are based on dispersal being 
sufficient to ‘swamp’ local adaptation (even the lower dispersal rate of the two alternative 
equilibria in model 2 was able to do this). Instead, the two equilibria in model 2 reflect 
differences as to whether dispersal always brings enough females to every type of 
subpopulation so that no subpopulation ends up too small to contribute to the global gene 
pool, or whether the local production of females can become compromised and the global 
process of adaptation is no longer impacted by performance in these environments.  
How general are our findings? We assumed a relatively strict form of female demographic 
dominance, where male availability does not constrain female reproduction unless there 
are no males locally. Thus, the mating system in our model is likely to be a key factor in the 
outcome of these models. Had we modelled a strictly monogamous mating system, instead 
of the polygynous mating system of our models, males and females would have been 
equally important for population productivity; an emergent pattern where females as a 
whole evolve higher viabilities is then unlikely ( Legendre et al. 1999). For clarity, we also 
assumed clear differences between exactly two types of environment, local density 
dependence and global dispersal with no spatial correlation between neighbouring 
habitats. 
Relaxing these assumptions is a clear avenue for further study. Intuitively, it appears that 
the scale of density dependence will matter. If it were to act on a global scale rather than 
the local scale as we modelled, then the dynamics would feature even more significant 
evolutionary effects of female demographic dominance, because highly productive sites 
can maintain their above-average contribution to the global gene pool. In the opposite 
case, stronger local density dependence than we included could result in a situation of ‘soft 
selection’ (Débarre and Gandon 2011). Under soft selection, improved local adaptation 
does not translate into higher productivity, as local density regulation equalizes 
productivity across habitat patches. Consequently, the differing numbers of females that 
reproduce in each patch have no evolutionary implications. On the other hand, our results 
are unlikely to depend crucially on our assumption of global dispersal. If individuals do 
not often disperse to the alternative habitat type, the essence of our model still applies, but 
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with a lower effective dispersal rate. Since the striking effects of female demographic 
dominance were found irrespective of dispersal rates in model 1, and at low-dispersal rate 
in model 2, we expect the results to generalize to many spatial structures. The details of 
such effects, however, would be a fruitful avenue of further study. 
It is important to note that dispersal in our models had no direct costs. Any selection 
against dispersal was based on the possibility that moving leads to maladaptation to the 
new environment. This is particularly important for understanding the low-dispersal 
equilibrium in model 2. Dispersal is more likely to lead an individual from award to a cold 
environment than vice versa, simply because any new offspring is more likely to be born 
in a warm rather than a cold climate (warm patches have more females than do cold 
patches). Thus, it is likely to be warm-adapted in its pivotal temperature (see, McNamara 
and Dall 2011, for a more general version of this  argument). In the intralocus sexual 
conflict model, the mechanism is similar, but impacts the disperser’s own viability.  
The strong demographic effects of the population sex ratio in a metapopulation could 
partially explain why primary sex ratios across biota (with any mechanism of sex 
determination) so frequently depart from 50 : 50 (Bull and Charnov 1988). Even with local 
adaptation, biased sex ratios are predicted under some selective regimes (e.g. condition-
dependent sex ratios, Charnov and Bull 1989; Hulin et al. 2008). However, sex ratios often 
seem to be even more biased than expected under adaptive explanations, particularly in 
species with TSD that exhibit extremely female-biased sex ratios in some populations (Bull 
and Charnov 1988; Hulin et al. 2008). Our results indicate that female-biased sex ratios 
can be expected across a range of dispersal levels, either owing to a lack of local 
adaptation or to demographic swamping by adapted populations and restricted gene flow 
from populations in male-producing climates, even if other suggested mechanisms such as 
cultural inheritance (Freedberg and Wade 2001)are absent. Note that we have not 
included selection for more variable sex ratios, which may also impact population 
persistence if there is a frequent need to colonize empty patches (Freedberg and Taylor 
2007).  
In conclusion, our results demonstrate a potentially underappreciated role for female 
demographic dominance in trait evolution under sexual conflict. We have examined this 
principle under two very different scenarios, but we suspect that the finding can be quite 
general: whenever local population productivity is more dependent on the production or 
performance of females than of males, and there is spatial variation with different 
subpopulations contributing to the global gene pool, we can expect sexual asymmetries to 
emerge where female-beneficial alleles can be said to have an upper hand. Simultaneously, 
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however, our results warn against any naïve expectation that this necessarily maximizes 
global population performance: our examples also show that the conflict can cause severe 
failure to adapt to some habitats despite these being, in principle, adequate for breeding. 
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Supplement III – Supplementary simulations  
Our supplementary simulations used randomly chosen sets of parameter values with 
values chosen as indicated in Table S1.  
Supplementary simulations 
Intralocus sexual conflict Environmental sex determination 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Ediff [0, 2] Tdiff [0, 8] 
EA 6 – Ediff/2 
Tenv of cold 
habitat 
26 – Tdiff/2 
EB 6 + Ediff/2 
Tenv of warm 
habitat 
26 + Tdiff/2 
k [0.7, 1.0] s [0.55, 0.85] 
c [0.025, 0.075] c [0.015, 0.049] 
σinit [0.025, 0.075] σinit [0.025, 0.075] 
Table S1. Parameter values used in supplementary simulations; parameters not mentioned are 
given in figure legends. A range is indicated as [minimum value, maximum value], and the value for 
each parameter set sampled rom a uniform distribution spanning this range. 
Details for supplementary simulations: Intralocus sexual conflict model 
We chose 600 sets of random parameter values (Table S1) and ran two independent 
simulation runs for each, one initialized with low (dinit sampled from a uniform 
distribution with range [0.1, 0.1 + 2σinit ]) or high dispersal (dinit sampled from a uniform 
distribution with range [0.8, 0.8 + 2σinit]). As no clear differences evolved between 
outcomes of different dinit values apart from a stronger tendency to go extinct with high 
initial dispersal, the outcomes from surviving populations are pooled in Figure S1. Mean 
female survival clearly exceeds mean male survival once environments differ substantially 
enough.  
Details for supplementary simulations: Environmental sex determination model 
Each of the 500 trials consisted of two independent simulation runs that used otherwise 
identical parameter values (given in Table S1) but one started with low dispersal (dinit 
sampled from a uniform distribution with range [0.2, 0.2 + 2σinit ]), the other with high (dinit 
sampled from a uniform distribution with range [0.8, 0.8 + 2σinit ]). The evolved outcome 
confirms the generality of Figure 3 as long as the environments differ substantially enough 
(Figure S2).  
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Figure S1. Difference between mean female and mean male survival for the 600 random trials, 
plotted against the environmental difference between the two habitats (Ediff). Only data from 
surviving populations are shown (at generation 10000). 
 
Figure S2. Offspring sex ratio (males/total) at generation 10000 in the cold and the warm 
environment of the 500 random trials, plotted against the temperature difference between the two 
habitats, Tdiff. Stars, high initial dispersal; squares, low initial dispersal. Red symbols are used for 
the warm environment and blue symbols for the cold environment. 
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Simulations without dispersal 
Locally adapted populations evolved (Figure S3: left, intralocus sexual conflict model; 
right, environmental sex determination model) in simulations without initial dispersal and 
where dispersal was not able to evolve (dinit = 0 and μd = 0). 
 
Figure S3. Mean allele values at generation 100 based on 10 independent simulation runs for the 
survival allele (a) on the left and the pivotal temperature allele Tpiv on the right. Since without 
dispersal extinctions occur more often, we recorded allele values at a lower number of generations 
than in our main findings. The dotted lines represent the respective local environments 
(environment A and the cold environment are the lower lines, respectively).  
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Chapter 3 – Evolution of natal and breeding dispersal: 
when is a territory an asset worth protecting? 
Anna MF Harts, Kim Jaatinen and Hanna Kokko 
Behavioral Ecology, In Press 
 
Abstract 
Evolutionary models of dispersal frequently lack explicit reference to the age or sex of the 
individuals that disperse. This contrasts with reality where dispersal behavior strongly 
depends on individuals’ state, including age. To study why natal dispersal occurs more 
commonly than breeding dispersal, we investigate the interplay of two categories of 
explanation: the asset-protection principle (APP) and the ‘multiplier effect’ (ME). The APP 
states that adults in possession of territories should be more reluctant to disperse. 
According to the ME the simple fact of being born tells individuals that the site is of high 
quality, which may promote philopatry. Our model is set in habitats of spatially varying 
quality and individuals express different dispersal rates depending on state (life history 
stage, sex and quality of residential habitat). The model considers the accuracy of 
information about habitat quality, the proportion of good quality habitat and the 
magnitude of habitat quality variation. We show that the predictions of the APP hold, but 
only when the ‘invisible’ asset of likely future prospects in the current habitat is taken into 
account. Effects of the ME are consistently harder to detect, mainly due to density 
dependency overriding the benefits of habitat quality. We predict higher natal than 
breeding dispersal when territorial vacancies are scarce, and more variable breeding than 
natal dispersal when they are common.  
Introduction 
Dispersal is known to be driven by a range of selection pressures, such as kin competition, 
inbreeding avoidance and escaping negative effects of spatiotemporal variation in habitat 
quality (Hamilton and May 1977; Johnson and Gaines 1990; Bowler and Benton 2005, 
Roze and Rousset 2005; Ronce 2007; Clobert et al. 2012; Duputié and Massol 2013). 
General models of dispersal typically consider the effects of these factors in asexual 
semelparous populations; when considered, the most common categorization of the 
individuals is their sex (Johnsen and Gaines 1990; Gros et al. 2009; Shaw and Kokko 
2014). Much less attention has been paid to whether dispersal strategies of individuals 
 ________________________________________________________________ Chapter 3 
 57     
depend on age or other stages they have reached in their life history (Starrfelt and Kokko 
2012), e.g., whether the individual already possesses a breeding territory or whether they 
have bred successfully (Switzer 1993; Johst and Brandl 1999; Arlt and Pärt 2008; Edelaar 
and Bolnick 2012).  
Dispersing prior to ever breeding, i.e. natal dispersal, is in many species more common 
than breeding dispersal, which occurs between two breeding attempts (Greenwood and 
Harvey 1982; Paradis et al. 1998; Johst and Brandl 1999). Therefore, assumptions of age- 
or state-independent dispersal clearly contrast with reality. For example, in an extensive 
British bird dataset, natal dispersal distances were larger than breeding dispersal 
distances for 61 out of those 69 species for which sufficient information of both natal and 
breeding dispersal was available (Paradis et al. 1998). Some stage-structured dispersal 
models simply take such patterns as given, such that only juveniles are assumed to 
disperse (e.g. Ronce et al. 1998, 2000; Schjørring 2002). The focus of this study is on 
elucidating why adults are often less prone to leave. To do so we investigate the interplay 
of two relevant factors: the asset-protection principle (APP; Clark 1994), and the implicit 
information of site quality obtained by residing at a natal site (‘multiplier effect’ i.e. ME; 
McNamara and Dall 2011; foreshadowed by Hastings 1983).  
In territorial species, breeding dispersal implies that the individual foregoes an 
opportunity to breed in a territory that it already ‘owned’ (Belichon et al. 1996; Danchin 
and Cam 2002; Doligez and Pärt 2008), while natal individuals do not generally possess a 
breeding site yet. It is therefore tempting to explain the relative scarcity of breeding 
dispersal with the asset-protection principle (Clark 1994). This principle was originally 
phrased in the context of antipredator behaviour, but it generalizes to various situations 
where an individual can risk losing what it already has. In the current context, adults in 
possession of a site or territory have more to lose if they disperse than juveniles (see also 
Morris 1982 for a similar statement). However, the accuracy of information about one’s 
territory, as well as the magnitude of habitat quality variation might both matter, as a poor 
quality territory may not qualify as an asset worth protecting (if the individual perceives 
this accurately enough). Because individuals on poor sites are then expected to show 
breeding dispersal (Krebs 1971; Mestre and Bonte 2012), spatial habitat quality variation 
could therefore, as a whole, promote dispersal. 
The multiplier effect (ME, McNamara and Dall 2011), in turn, refers to the fact that if good 
habitats lead to better reproduction than poor habitats, then an individual is 
disproportionately likely to be born in a good habitat (relative to the global availability of 
such habitat). The interesting corollary is that the simple fact of being born gives an 
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individual implicit knowledge that its local habitat quality is likely to be above the average 
of the entire landscape — even if no other cues exist (for earlier treatments of this effect, 
though without use of the term ‘multiplier effect’, see Hastings 1983; and Holt 1985). If 
juveniles stay at ‘home’ and eventually breed there, this knowledge effect could extend to 
adult life. The multiplier effect can thus as a whole select against dispersal if habitats vary 
in quality (Hastings 1983; Holt 1985; McNamara and Dall 2011).  
We therefore have a rather contrasting set of predictions, that appear to be based on 
starkly different assumption structures. If individuals can condition their dispersal on 
spatial variability (McPeek and Holt 1992; Leturque and Rousset 2002; Rodrigues and 
Johnstone 2014), we expect a different set of responses than the simple dispersal-reducing 
effect of spatial variability when explicit habitat assessment is impossible (Hastings 1983; 
Holt 1985; McNamara and Dall 2011). Real life is unlikely to be black and white with 
respect to information use, however. In reality, assessment of habitat is a continuum 
ranging from cases where the only source of information is the demographic effect 
(disproportionate production of individuals in good sites) that a natal site of a randomly 
chosen young individual tends to be of above average quality, to cases where individuals 
can immediately assess their current habitat in an error-free manner. 
Thus, we suspect that the evolved dispersal rates of individuals differing in state 
(especially with respect to their assets) will depend on exactly how well they are informed 
about their current habitat quality. Past models have tended to assume that all individuals 
either have this information or that they do not; they also often assume only one dispersal 
event and discrete generations, which effectively prevents comparing the dispersal 
behaviour of individuals with and without assets. Overlapping generations thus offer 
intriguing ways to combine the APP with the ME, not least because information provided 
by the ME can only exist for those individuals who have not yet dispersed. To consider all 
these processes requires a model where dispersal propensity can depend on life stage, 
where habitat quality variation ranges from absent to substantial, and where different 
accuracies of habitat quality assessment, including no perceptual ability, i.e., all 
‘knowledge’ is evolutionarily acquired.  
The model 
Addressing the impact of asset-protection and multiplier effects requires considering 
spatially varying habitats, and to be able to explicitly contrast natal and breeding dispersal 
requires overlapping generations. Habitats in our model can therefore be either good or 
poor, and this impacts the reproductive success of their inhabitants. Habitats consist of 
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breeding sites (territories) which have three types of residents: a breeder ‘owns’ the 
territory, but there can also be non-breeders who in turn come in two flavours: ‘natals’ if 
they have not yet dispersed, and ‘floaters’ if they have left their place of birth. We 
differentiate between natals and floaters because if the multiplier effect is strong, selection 
should favor expressing two different dispersal rates depending on whether individuals 
are still in the habitat that produced them. Breeders are expressing yet another dispersal 
rate. 
We assume that individual breeders with a territory (owners, ‘breeders’) cannot be 
ousted, thus some breeding success is guaranteed for them, but with spatial variation in 
habitat quality, being an owner (of a potentially poor territory) also means foregoing 
chances of competing for other (potentially better) territories. Natals and floaters acquire 
breeding territories at a rate of territories becoming vacant due to mortality and dispersal 
of breeders. Competition is concentrated on the site they reside in, but with some 
additional probability of outcompeting others at sites that aren’t their focal one. To 
evaluate the role of direct cues of habitat quality, we assume that individuals may have 
either perfect, imperfect or no knowledge of the quality of their local environment, beyond 
the evolutionary knowledge offered by the multiplier effect. 
Our individual-based simulation model assumes s breeding territories, each being 
potentially occupied by one breeding male and one breeding female and a number of non-
breeders of both sexes. A proportion z of breeding territories is considered to consist of 
good habitat and the remainder is considered poor habitat. All individuals are assigned to 
a territory but only breeders can reproduce. Within each sex, an individual’s state is thus 
characterized by its life history stage (natal, floater, breeder) and type of habitat (good, 
poor). 
A simulation is initiated by creating N diploid breeders, each a male or a female (50% 
probability of being either). Every individual has six diploid loci that determine its 
dispersal probability d (0 ≤ d ≤ 1) conditional on its life-history stage (natal, floater, 
breeder) and its perceived current habitat quality (good or poor; note that this may differ 
from reality if there is perceptual error, see below). The individual disperses with a 
probability equal to the mean of the two alleles at the appropriate locus. Alleles were 
initiated as uniformly distributed random numbers chosen from the range [0, 1]. 
In the first generation the breeding territories are filled in a quality-dependent manner 
which also maximizes the number of pairs that form and minimizes the number of cases 
where a territory is occupied by either a female alone or a male alone: males and females 
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take turns, first choosing good territories until none are available, then choosing poor 
territories, but always preferring a site with a mate over a site without one. This simple 
procedure leaves initially approximately s−N/2 poor territories empty. The number is 
approximate because the number of males is not necessarily exactly equal to the number 
of females. For example, if s = 700, z = 0.5 and N = 1000, we have approximately 500 males 
and 500 females, which will fill all the 350 (sz) good territories and approximate 150 of 
the poor ones.  
Each generation has the same sequence and timing of events. A generation starts with 
reproduction within each territory that has both a male and a female breeder; it is 
followed by mortality, and then two steps during which individuals can change their 
location: a dispersal stage, and a stage of competing for breeding sites. During the latter, 
an individual can acquire the status of a breeder if previous breeders have died or 
dispersed.  
Reproduction occurs in those territories that have at least one individual of each sex (only 
the breeding pair can produce any young; see below for more information on breeding 
pair formation). The number of offspring produced follows a Poisson distribution with 
mean λ in poor territories and αλ (α ≥ 1) in good territories, thus good territories have 
higher reproductive success by a factor α. Offspring sex is randomly determined. In 
addition to Mendelian inheritance at all loci, each of the dispersal alleles mutate in 
offspring after birth with probability μ. A mutation changes the allele’s value with an 
amount taken from a normal distribution with range [–σd, σd]. Allelic values that fall below 
0 or exceed 1 are set at 0 or 1, respectively.  
Mortality is set to occur after reproduction, with all individuals having the same 
probability (m) of surviving to the next generation. Survivors then assess their habitat. An 
individual’s perception of a habitat may differ from reality, and we model the error as ε 
(with 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.5). Here ε = 0 represents perfect perception of habitat quality such that an 
individual residing in good habitat always perceives it as good, and vice versa. At the other 
extreme, ε = 0.5 implies that there are no effective cues as an individual is just as often 
wrong as it is right. Individuals that misperceive the quality of their local territory use the 
dispersal allele for the habitat type they are not in. For example, if a natal individual 
residing in a good quality territory makes a perception error in assessing the territory (it 
does so with probability ε) it will disperse based on the ‘natal in poor habitat’ dispersal 
locus.  
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The dispersal stage makes dispersing individuals land in a randomly selected territory, 
thus if z = 0.5 there is an equal chance of landing in a good or a poor territory. For 
simplicity we do not exclude the possibility of landing in the territory the individual 
dispersed from; the large number of sites makes this in practice unlikely. Breeders (and 
natals) that disperse become classified as a floater until they (again) find a breeding 
territory.  
Following dispersal, there is competition for breeding sites, which is shorthand for 
competing to acquire the status of a breeder at a site. Like dispersal, this can lead to shifts 
in individuals’ location, but these are now movements that directly target vacancies that 
have been created by mortality or breeder dispersal. Some of the breeding territories have 
become vacant for potential breeders of a given sex. We assume that non-breeders (natals 
and floaters alike) can perceive vacancies in more than one territory, but their 
competitiveness for a vacancy is elevated by a factor r > 1 (which we call the locality 
factor) if the vacancy occurs in the territory where they currently reside. For example, if r 
= 10 and the former female breeder has died, the local female non-breeders, if there are 
any in the focal territory, are each equally likely to acquire the territory, and their 
probability of doing so is 10-fold that of any non-breeders that currently reside elsewhere.  
Competition for sites occurs in a specific order, this order is designed to maximize the 
number of breeding pairs. First, males compete for territories without male breeders that 
have at least one local female (breeding or non-breeding). Secondly, males compete for the 
territories that lack a male breeder but have no local females (but at least one local male 
who is not yet assigned breeder status). Last, males compete for completely empty 
territories. Nonbreeding females compete after males have taken up breeding territories: 
first for territories that lack a female breeder but have a breeding male and local non-
breeding females. Secondly, females compete for territories without any type of female but 
with a breeding male. Thirdly, females compete for territories without a breeding male, 
and thus also lack non-breeding males, but with local non-breeding females. Finally, 
females compete for territories that have no males or females of any type. Individuals that 
acquire a breeding position change state to a breeder; the non-breeders retain their 
current state (natal or floater) and location as they may compete for a breeding site again 
in the next year if they survive to compete again. A breeding pair will breed again in the 
next year unless one or both members of the pair disperse or die. 
Because natal philopatry may lead to competition between kin, we ran additional 
simulations in which we ‘shuffled’ all individuals within their category (natal, floater or 
breeder), sex and territory quality class (Poethke et al. 2007). In this exercise individuals’ 
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current locations are swapped within each class, which keeps the numbers of individuals 
per site intact but cancels all kin structuring in the population. For example, a female natal 
individual in a good territory randomly takes the place of another female natal individual 
in a good territory, meaning that the numbers of individuals in each category, sex and 
territory quality class are identical before and after shuffling, while the genetic structure 
of the population has changed. Comparing the results then allows assessment of the effects 
of kin competition on the evolution of dispersal rates. The results of these additional 
simulations can be found in supplement IV.  
All simulations were run for 5000 generations, which proved sufficient to yield no further 
change on average. All simulations led to identical results for both males and females, 
wherefore only one sex is shown in the figures below (where applicable). We used the 
following parameter values as a ‘baseline’, i.e. unless otherwise stated: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 
1000, λ = 0.3, α = 5, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. The chosen values ensure the 
population does not go extinct unless mortality is higher or productivity is lower (smaller 
α or z) than the baseline. The main results will focus on varying α, z, ε and m; for results of 
variation in λ and r, as well as those where kin competition has been removed, see 
supplement IV). 
Results 
Based on the APP (Clark 1994) one might expect that breeders, being the only type of 
individual with ‘assets’, should evolve lower dispersal rates than non-breeders. We found 
this to be true only in a qualified way: breeders in good territories were always reluctant 
to disperse (Figures 1-3). In the absence of territory quality variation (Figure 1a at α = 1), 
or when individuals were unable to assess the quality of their territory (Figure 3c), all 
breeders behaved identically, and breeding dispersal remained low as compared to 
juvenile dispersal. Outside these special conditions, breeders in possession of poor quality 
territories showed a much wider variety of responses: breeding dispersal rates could 
either increase or decrease with habitat quality variation (Figure1) or with the proportion 
of habitat that is better than their own (Figure 2). The breeding dispersal of such 
individuals could then either fall below or exceed that of juveniles (Figures 1-3).  
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Figure 1 (Left). Evolved means of the dispersal allele with different benefits of a good territory (α) 
for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for mortalities (a) m = 0.1, (b) m = 0.2, (c) m 
= 0.3. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual clarity) gives the mean of 40 
simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by individuals in good territories, 
symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines denote breeders, squares 
denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Note that extinctions occur in (b) and (c) with α < 3 and 
α < 5, respectively. Standard errors not shown as all S.E. < 0.02. Parameter values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N 
= 1000, λ = 0.3, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. 
Figure 2 (Right). Evolved means of the dispersal allele with different proportions of good 
territories (z) for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for (a) m = 0.1, (b) m = 0.2 
and (c) m = 0.3. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual clarity) gives the 
mean of 40 simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by individuals in good 
territories, symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines denote breeders, 
squares denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Note that extinctions occur in (c) with  z ≤ 0.3. 
Standard errors not shown as all S.E. < 0.02 (except when extinctions occur). Parameter values: s = 
700, N = 1000, λ = 0.3,  α = 5, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. 
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The decisive factor explaining these patterns is a demographic one: breeding dispersal 
from poor territories increased sharply with mortality (m; Figure 3), though less so in the 
presence of large perceptual error hampering territory quality assessment (ε; as noted 
above, high ε creates conditions where all breeders behave similarly). These effects did 
not remain minor. When mortality was high and cues of territory quality were reliable, 
breeders in poor territories evolved much higher dispersal rates than any other type of 
individual (Figure 3a-b).  
The explanation for such high breeding dispersal rates from poor territories highlights the 
pitfalls of only considering concrete possessions, such as territories, as assets. A non-
breeder in our model has an invisible asset: the ability to compete for a larger number of 
vacancies than the one territory that a breeder is committed to. Therefore, if territory 
vacancies created by mortality occur at a sufficiently high rate, a non-breeder’s 
reproductive value can exceed that of a breeder whose territory is poor. This argument 
fails, however, under conditions of low mortality: breeders that disperse become non-
breeders and have to compete with a very large accumulated pool of non-breeders, and 
the high number of competitors (Figure 4) then makes it much less likely that breeding 
dispersal pays off at either habitat quality (Figure 3 with low m).  
Because of these complexities, it is not obvious whether making outside options more 
lucrative selects for more dispersal. One way to increase the ‘lucrativeness’ is to increase 
α, the difference between reproductive success in good vs. poor sites. High α means that 
breeders at poor territories forego potentially much better options elsewhere, but any 
dispersal-promoting effect of α only occurs at low mortality (Figure 1a). Higher mortality 
rates negate the effect of α because they make dispersal from poor territories high 
throughout a large range of habitat quality variation (Figure 1b-c). The dispersal-
promoting effect of z, the proportion of territories that are of high quality, is likewise not 
uniform. While it is therefore not sufficient to only consider the existence of outside 
options, since the likelihood of acquiring them after leaving the current option depends on 
the severity of competition. This competition is likely strong if there are many dispersers 
from other sites, and/or in case of low breeder turnover resulting from low mortality.  
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Figure 3 (Left). Evolved means of the dispersal allele with different mortality probabilities for each 
of the six states measured at 5000 generations for (a) no perceptual error, ε = 0, (b) ε = 0.1, (c) ε = 
0.5. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual clarity) gives the mean of 40 
simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by individuals in good territories, 
symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines denote breeders, squares 
denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Standard errors not shown as all S.E. < 0.02. Parameter 
values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 1000, λ = 0.3, α = 5, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1.  
Figure 4 (Right). The number of non-breeding females (paired grey bars, dark grey – natal females, 
light grey – floater females) competing for available breeding spots (paired white bars), the left bar 
of each pair denotes good territories and the right bar denotes poor territories, (a) ε = 0, (b) ε = 0.1, 
(c) ε = 0.5. Each bar gives the mean of 40 simulations at 5000 generations. Parameter values are as 
in Figure 3. Note that the figure would look identical if we used males instead of females. 
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For non-breeders the expectations are likewise complex. On the one hand, one can extend 
the APP to the ‘invisible’ assets of likely future prospects in the current habitat. We would 
then expect non-breeders in good territories to evolve lower dispersal rates compared 
with non-breeders in poor territories. On the other hand, with a strong ME we would 
expect individuals that have already moved at least once (floaters) to evolve higher 
dispersal rates than non-breeding natals that have remained in their natal site. This is 
because information from the ME only applies in the natal territory, as we assumed no 
spatial autocorrelation in territory quality.  
Non-breeders appear to follow the extended form of the APP, as long as relatively accurate 
information on habitat quality was available (Figure 3); however, differences between 
different categories of non-breeders were always slight (Figures 1-3). Still, especially 
when good territories are scarce, the dispersal rate for non-breeders from good territories 
is consistently lower than from poor territories (Figure 2).  
It is considerably harder to detect effects of the ME, as natal individuals did not evolve 
systematically lower dispersal rates than floaters (Figures 1-3). Additionally, variation in 
reproductive success between good and poor territories does not consistently select 
against dispersal as the ME might predict (Figure 1). This is likely to reflect the fact that 
ME in its purest form assumes no knowledge beyond the emergent information that arises 
from demography (individuals are disproportionately born in good sites) and evolution 
(which impacts dispersal rates of competitors); our results show that dispersal strategies 
can strongly react to individuals differing in their state, particularly of the perceived 
habitat quality when this is possible to assess. Another fact that makes the effects of the 
ME harder to detect in our results is density dependence often overriding the habitat 
quality advantages offered by the ME. Competition for high quality breeding territories 
intensifies as soon as the numerous natal individuals attempt staying there (Figure 4). 
This means that their success of acquiring the territory becomes density-dependent: more 
philopatry means smaller chances of acquiring the local high quality territory. A disperser 
trades off these prospects for less intense competition in (potentially) poor territories, and 
dispersal rates evolve to be intermediate where these effects balance. 
We ran a series of supplementary simulations to examine the generality of the results. 
Higher values of breeding success, λ, led to little change from our baseline values for all 
other dispersal rates than those of breeders in poor sites, which become reduced when λ is 
high (Figure S1). Increasing the importance of local competition (such that non-breeders 
compete most efficiently for a vacancy in their current territory; high r) led to little change 
except for a clearer differentiation between non-breeders (natals and floaters) in good vs. 
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poor sites (Figure S2); this makes intuitive sense because being a non-breeder at a poor 
site becomes more strongly penalized when most breeding vacancies are filled by a strictly 
local – as opposed to neighbouring – individual. Finally, when we remove kin competition 
from our model, the results are near identical to our original results (compare Figure S3-5 
to Figure 1-3). 
Discussion 
Our model sheds light on why juveniles of many animals exhibit higher dispersal 
propensities than adults. The short answer is that the model confirms the importance of 
the asymmetry that an adult might already own a breeding site, which could be lost when 
moving; in some cases this creates situations where breeders at any site evolve low 
dispersal rates. However, our modelling also reveals that the caveats are important. 
Individuals who at first sight do not appear to own anything may be in a better position to 
vie for available vacancies than individuals who have settled for a less than ideal option. In 
the presence of habitat quality variation, we can therefore sometimes expect breeders 
residing in suboptimal territories to be more prone to disperse than any other type of 
individual. Although we have not explicitly modelled preferential treatment of individuals 
that reside among kin or queues of territory inheritance, such processes could further tilt 
the balance between philopatry and dispersal in favor of the former (see Ekman et al. 
2001).  
In general, our work highlights that the balance of dispersal-promoting and philopatry-
promoting factors can very strongly depend both on how accurately individuals perceive 
their current options relative to what is available in the population as a whole (Switzer 
1993; Boulinier and Danchin 1997; Schjørring 2002; Doligez et al. 2003; Valone 2007). 
These factors are, in our model at least, stronger than the effects of kin competition (see 
below). Consider, for example, the situation where accurate information of habitat quality 
is completely unavailable (ε = 0.5 in Figure 3c); now breeding dispersal remains low 
regardless of other parameter values. This might appear surprising, as the opposite effect 
— more dispersal with less information — has been found in models that make differing 
assumptions about information use (Enfjäll and Leimar 2009). Our result becomes 
intuitive, however, once one realizes that individuals that dispersed from a territory 
perceived to be poor would more often than half the time (if z = 0.5, more individuals as a 
whole will be born in good than poor habitat) make the mistake of leaving the state with 
the best reproductive value of all.  
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Our results also highlight the capacity of demographic parameters (here mortality) to 
change the rank order of dispersal propensities. Such a strong effect may appear 
surprising, given that mortality was identical (set at m) for every individual in the 
population: at first sight one might expect less breeding dispersal, not more, if the current 
breeding attempt is more likely to be an individual’s last one, as is the case when m is high 
(Ronce et al. 1998, 2000). However, high mortality also means that there are few 
competitors alive to compete for each vacancy that is created, and this greatly improves 
the likely payoff of the dispersing strategy.  This strengthens the view that effects of the 
disperser’s lifespan cannot be considered in isolation from the rate of territory acquisition 
(see Kokko and Lundberg 2001).  
There is an intriguing possibility not included in our model: the perceptual errors 
themselves might depend on the experience that individuals have accumulated. If 
breeders are more knowledgeable than floaters, our results suggest that it is not a priori 
clear that their site fidelity will increase. That is because knowing that one’s own site is 
poor can select for leaving that site. One simple way to learn is to use one’s own breeding 
success as a cue of habitat quality (Pärt and Gustafsson 1989; Switzer 1993; Haas 1998; 
Öst et al. 2011), but more detailed knowledge accumulation is obviously possible too. In 
this context it is interesting to note that learning has a greater scope to operate in species 
that are long lived enough to have time to correct their mistakes. In a habitat choice 
context, each mistake can take up a significant ‘chunk’ of lifespan (Kokko and Sutherland 
2001).  
Our model did not consider density-dependent dispersal strategies in the sense of 
individuals measuring and using local density as a cue. It is known that the consequent 
rules for dispersal plasticity can depend on whether dispersal is performed at the natal or 
adult stage (Parvinen et al. 2012), however, in these models the timing of dispersal is 
considered as separate scenarios rather than letting them potentially co-occur in a 
population. The latter type of approach would help understand when we expect either or 
both to occur in a specific population.  
Kin competition is generally known to select for dispersal (Hamilton and May 1977; Ronce 
et al. 2000; Rodrigues and Johnstone 2014), yet strong effects of kin competition are not 
necessarily universal: e.g. in the model of Poehtke et al. 2007, a marked effect of kin 
competition was restricted to cases where dispersal rates remained low (< 0.1). In our 
model, non-breeders evolved higher rates than 0.1 based on demographic considerations 
alone. At least three features of our model create conditions where the selective pressure 
to disperse more, based on reducing the intensity of competition as experienced by related 
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individuals at the natal site, will be relatively low. First, the most likely future breeders at 
the natal site are always the disperser’s own parents: they retain the priority to breed at 
the site if they themselves do not disperse (or die). This likelihood is independent of the 
focal offspring’s dispersal decisions. Second, high dispersal — which in our model arises 
through other factors — implies a continual influx of immigrants to any site, thus one 
disperser’s efforts to reduce competition at the natal site can become relatively 
insignificant. Third, it should be noted that the relatedness structure in a diploid species 
with stochastically variable lifespans of parents (as in our model) creates less strict kin 
competition than in some classic models of dispersal (e.g. Hamilton and May 1977), which 
assumed asexual reproduction such that individuals are bound to compete with their 
clones. 
Numerous models have confirmed that spatial heterogeneity may favor dispersal if it is 
conditionally expressed (e.g. McPeek and Holt 1992; Leturque and Rousset 2002; 
Rodrigues and Johnstone 2014). Our model is in line with this work as it, too, highlights 
that dispersal can be strongly shaped by heterogeneity, but as our modelling of the APP 
necessitates taking into account conditional (state-dependent) responses, it is probably 
not surprising that dispersal does not increase uniformly with the degree of heterogeneity. 
The habitats are at their most diverse in our model when α is high and when z = 0.5, but 
these values do not maximize dispersal. Instead, the results show how strongly 
demography shapes the outcomes. One might, for example, expect that high z (implying 
that most sites are good) select for high dispersal from the few remaining poor sites, as 
randomly landing at a site is likely to lead to improved site quality. However, high z also 
means high global productivity, and thus a disperser from a poor (or any) site faces 
reduced chances of acquiring a territory at all. Whether the balance then favours more or 
less dispersal from poor sites (Figure 2), is modulated by overall mortality, which has a 
strong impact on the strength of competition (Figure 4). 
Although the results from our model are in many ways in agreement with established 
empirical knowledge — for instance, natal dispersal is more frequent than breeding 
dispersal in many species (Greenwood and Harvey 1982; Paradis et al. 1998; Johst and 
Brandl 1999), and breeding animals in good quality territories have been found to be less 
prone to disperse or disperse shorter distances than individuals in poorer habitats (Krebs 
1971; Stacey and Ligon 1987; Cline et al. 2013) — the details of the fit between model 
predictions and reality remain unknown. Qualitative support, however, can be found in 
certain studies, in the sense that previous breeding success has been shown to lead to 
higher site fidelity (Haas 1998; Danchin and Cam 2002) and breeding failure as a result 
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from e.g. predation has been show to increases the propensity and distance of dispersal 
even in relatively site tenacious animals (Öst et al. 2011); some species show evidence of 
paying attention to both intrinsic site quality and own breeding success (Kokko et al. 
2004). Such results imply that breeders can be sensitive to current site quality, and indeed 
a key qualitative prediction from our model is that conditional dispersal rates can evolve 
to be much more variable among breeders than among any other class or between classes 
of individuals. In our model, we did not specify exactly how animals might assess site 
quality: we simply assumed that they do so either perfectly, or with some error. Responses 
that are at least partly based on own experience (see Switzer 1993) could potentially 
strengthen the conditionality among breeders even more, as they gather direct experience 
of local habitats in a manner that can be more difficult for non-breeders (though cases of 
public information could make such differences milder again, see Danchin et al. 2004). 
Like all models, ours is a simplification of reality and the robustness of its conclusions 
needs to be evaluated against its assumption structure. For example, we do not necessarily 
expect kin competition to always play an equally minor role as in our model; above we 
have outlined the reasons why this is likely to happen in our particular case. We have 
assumed a strict dominance hierarchy in the sense that a breeder is guaranteed some 
reproductive output if it survives and does not disperse, while competition among non-
breeders is of a much more egalitarian nature: apart from an advantage of being ‘nearby’ 
(the locality factor r), there is no impact of age or other asymmetries among individuals. 
We also assumed that the sole determinant of movement-related fitness is success in 
competing for vacant territories (of varying quality). Obviously, if there are either 
immediate or delayed survival consequences of spending time as a non-breeder in 
different habitats, then the payoff structure will become more complicated. 
In conclusion, our model demonstrates that individuals can possess both visible and 
invisible assets when they differ in their state of territory ownership, the likely quality of 
the habitat they are in, the proportion of the world that has this quality and the benefits of 
being in a good quality site. Demography can have a major influence on whether an 
individual who is already breeding should commit to its site or whether it should still 
consider joining the pool of dispersers: high breeder turnover selects for greater dispersal 
propensities as a whole, and can lead to patterns that deviate from the general expectation 
that natal individuals should disperse more. It is only under low turnover conditions that 
territories of any quality are an asset worth protecting under all circumstances. 
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Supplement IV – Supplementary figures 
 
Figure S1 (Left).  Evolved means of the dispersal allele with different values of reproductive 
success (λ) and different benefits of a good territory (α) for each of the six states measured at 5000 
generations for (a) m = 0.1 and (b) m = 0.2. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for 
visual clarity) gives the mean of 40 simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities 
used by individuals in good territories, symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected 
by lines denote breeders, squares denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Standard errors not 
shown as all S.E. < 0.02. Parameter values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 1000, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 
0.1. 
Figure S2 (Right).  Evolved means of the dispersal allele with different values of the locality factor 
value (r) for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for (a) m = 0.1 and (b) m = 0.2. 
Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual clarity) gives the mean of 40 
simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by individuals in good territories, 
symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines denote breeders, squares 
denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Standard errors not shown as all S.E. < 0.02. Parameter 
values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 1000, λ = 0.3, α = 5, ε = 0, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. 
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Figure S3 (Left). Evolved means of the dispersal allele without kin competition and with different 
benefits of a good territory (α) for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for 
mortalities (a) m = 0.1, (b) m = 0.2, (c) m = 0.3. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted 
for visual clarity) gives the mean of 40 simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities 
used by individuals in good territories, symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected 
by lines denote breeders, squares denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Note that extinctions 
occur in (b) and (c) with α < 3 and α < 5, respectively. Standard errors not shown as all S.E. < 0.02. 
Parameter values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 1000, λ = 0.3, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. 
Figure S4 (Right). Evolved means of the dispersal allele without kin competition and with different 
proportions of good territories (z) for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for (a) m 
= 0.1, (b) m = 0.2 and (c) m = 0.3. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual 
clarity) gives the mean of 40 simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by 
individuals in good territories, symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines 
denote breeders, squares denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Note that extinctions occur in 
(c) with  z ≤ 0.3 in all but one of the simulations, for this reason z = 0.3 is shown. Standard errors 
not shown as all S.E. < 0.02 (except when extinctions occur). Parameter values: s = 700, N = 1000, λ 
= 0.3,  α = 5, ε = 0, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1. 
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Figure S5. Evolved means of the dispersal allele without kin competition and with different 
mortality probabilities for each of the six states measured at 5000 generations for (a) no perceptual 
error, ε = 0, (b) ε = 0.1, (c) ε = 0.5. Each symbol (sometimes slightly horizontally shifted for visual 
clarity) gives the mean of 40 simulation runs. Symbols in grey are dispersal probabilities used by 
individuals in good territories, symbols in black are for poor territories. Circles connected by lines 
denote breeders, squares denote floaters, and triangles denote natals. Standard errors not shown as 
all S.E. < 0.02. Parameter values: s = 700, z = 0.5, N = 1000, λ = 0.3, α = 5, r = 10, μ = 0.1 and σd = 0.1.  
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Abstract 
For migratory species, the timing of arrival at breeding grounds is an important 
determinant of fitness. Too early arrival at the breeding ground is associated with various 
costs, and we focus on one understudied cost: that migrants can experience a higher risk 
of predation if arriving earlier than the bulk of the breeding population.  We show, using 
both a semi-analytic and simulation model, that predation can select for later arrival. This 
is because of safety in numbers: predation risk becomes diluted if many other individuals, 
either con- or heterospecific, are already residing in the area. Predation risk dilution can 
also select for more synchronous arrival because deviating from the current population-
wide norm to earlier or later dates leads to higher predation risk or to failures in territory 
acquisition, respectively. The fact that selection for high arrival synchrony can in some 
cases be more important than selection for a specific date (early or late) within the season 
is an example of an ‘evolutionary priority effect’: whichever strategy — in this case a 
particular arrival time — becomes established in a population can remain stable over long 
periods of time; there are many possible equilibria (multiple stable states) which the 
population can remain at. Mixed arrival strategies are also possible under some 
circumstances.  
Introduction 
In migratory species, the date of arrival to the breeding grounds is a key biological event 
that has received increasing interest in the recent literature, both as a case-study of life-
history evolution (Alerstam et al. 2003) and due to its response to climate change and its 
role as an indicator of warming (Pulido 2007). Arrival date is known to be the result of a 
trade-off between multiple selection pressures. Early arrival is often beneficial in terms of 
male competition for territories and females (e.g. Kokko 1999; Morbey and Ydenberg 
2001; Smith and Moore 2005), female competition for breeding locations (Kokko et al. 
2006), reproductive success (e.g. Bensch and Hasselquist 1991; Hasselquist 1998; Teder 
2014), egg-resource gathering (Nager 2006; Descamps et al. 2011; Kristensen et al. 2015), 
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and to guarantee temporal synchrony between nestling needs and resource phenology 
(e.g. Both et al. 2006; Jonzén et al. 2007). However, early arrival also incurs costs if it 
exposes arriving individuals to harsh early-season conditions; escaping such conditions is 
the primary reason why migration occurs at all, thus part-time exposure to these costs can 
be detrimental (Newton 2008; McKinnon et al. 2010).  
Predation at the breeding grounds is a significant factor affecting migratory birds (Martin 
1995; Newton 1998; Fontaine and Martin 2006; Krams et al. 2014), yet the effect of 
predation upon adults on arrival timing has not received much attention in the migration 
literature (Fontaine and Martin 2006; Low et al. 2010; Chapman et al. 2011). The 
significance of predation for migratory populations is highlighted by findings that 
predation pressure can be responsible for birds selecting safer breeding sites further 
north (McKinnon et al. 2010), and that phenology can be affected by both the predation of 
adults at stop-over sites (Jonker et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2014), and nest-predation of 
juveniles (Borgmann et al. 2013; Du et al. 2014). However, given that predation in general 
is hard to measure, relatively little is known about the effects of predation on adults upon 
arrival at breeding grounds as a cost of early arrival (Sillett and Holmes 2002; Abrams and 
Ginzburg 2000; Newton 1998). The question of the effect of predation upon adults at the 
breeding grounds upon phenology remains therefore largely open. 
Migratory species are exposed to predation risk in non-breeding areas, during migration, 
and in breeding areas (e.g. Sillett and Holmes 2002; Lank et al. 2003), but these risk are 
likely to differ for the following reason. In non-breeding areas, migrants are likely to form 
a smaller fraction of all potential prey than in breeding areas, at least early in the 
migration season. Resident predators in breeding areas, that have been sustained by those 
prey resources that are available throughout the year, can (partially) switch to exploiting 
migratory species soon after they appear. This creates an interesting dynamic for arrival 
times within a population of migrants, when their arrival adds a significant number of 
individuals to the prey community at the breeding grounds early in the spring. This 
creates the potential for the focal species to experience frequency-dependent predation 
analogous to the Darling Effect for predation upon juveniles which can select for 
synchronous breeding (Gochfeld 1982; Ims 1990; Langerhans 2007). 
Consider (as a simplification which we will relax below) that a local bird predator takes 
one bird per day, and that there is an overwintering species with 50 local individuals 
having survived the winter. The first-arriving individual of the migratory species has 
mortality risk of 1/51 (assuming it is as easy for the predator to catch to catch as the 
resident species) if no conspecifics arrive on the same day. If it arrived one day later when 
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3 more conspecific individuals also arrive, it shortens the risky period by one day and now 
its first-day risk has been reduced to 1/(49+4) = 1/53 (note that the local community was 
diminished by 1 individual in the meantime). This example shows that ‘safety in numbers’, 
i.e. the predator dilution effect (Bednekoff and Lima 1998; Connell 2000; Jones 2003), can 
select for later arrival and potentially also for more synchronous arrival (Ims 1990). 
Obviously, we must also take into account that there will also be some daily mortality 
elsewhere than on the breeding grounds; our model below integrates across site-
dependent mortality on all days of the potential arrival time period. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that the frequency-dependent nature of mortality risk, as described 
above, is probably less strong in milder conditions (the overwintering grounds) where the 
prey community is likely to be more diverse and abundant throughout the year. 
In this study we aim to quantify the likely effects of predation upon arrival phenology by 
varying the likelihood of being predated in two types of models: a simulation approach 
where we allow for a population containing individuals with multiple different arrival 
time strategies, and a semi-analytical approach where we quantify the success of a mutant 
in an otherwise monomorphic population. Both models are based on a hypothetical 
migratory species in which intraspecific competition for territories yields benefits for 
early arriving individuals. We build our models using the biological example of migratory 
birds, however the results are general to any system in which the benefits of early arrival 
is traded against frequency-dependent selection (e.g. emergence time distribution in 
insects; Williams et al. 1993; Pompanon et al. 1995). In both of our models, we replace the 
above simplistic calculation of daily risk (above) with predation risk that is based on a 
Type II functional response of the predator (Murdoch 1973) when faced with two types of 
prey: the resident community of prey which the predator has been diminishing over the 
winter, and the newly arriving migrants. 
Models 
Simulation model 
The simulation model denotes the migrating species as S1 and the resident species as S2. 
Note that the resident ‘species’ may comprise an entire community of resident animals; its 
precise composition does not matter for our present purpose, which is to examine the 
effects of predation and the availability of alternative prey on migration timing within the 
focal species S1.  
Each S1 individual has a haploid locus δ that determines arrival time at the breeding 
ground within the range of options which we denote as days T = 1 … Tmax. The range of δ, 0 
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≤ δ ≤ 1, is interpreted such that the lowest values correspond to arriving at the earliest 
possible arrival day T = 1, and the highest value corresponds to T = Tmax. To be precise, an 
individual arrives at time T whenever its δ is within the interval [
𝑇−1
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
,
𝑇
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
]. For example, 
if Tmax = 5, those individuals whose δ falls between 0.4 and 0.6 arrive at the breeding 
ground on day 3.  
Selection for early arrival operates via territory quality: we assume that early arrival gives 
priority access to better territories. There are V territories of which a proportion α are of 
good quality, yielding higher reproductive success for their owners. The remaining 
territories are of lower quality (see below for details). 
We denote total predatory effort by X, and assume that predation is the only force 
potentially selecting against early arrival. In reality, of course, costs of too early arrival can 
manifest themselves in many ways, not only through predation. We justify our choice with 
the conceptual clarity it produces: in the absence of predators (X = 0), we should see 
individuals arriving as early as possible, and deviations from this must be due to the 
effects of predation. 
Each generation starts with arrival of species S1, and we track the dynamics of arrived 
individuals for each of the Tmax time steps (Figure 1a). At the start of each time step those 
individuals arrive whose δ matches the current time, as explained above. Territory 
acquisition proceeds as follows for each time step T. If there are more good quality 
territories than individuals arriving, all individuals are assigned to a good quality territory. 
If there are more individuals arriving than there are good quality territories, the good 
quality territories will be randomly divided among the arriving individuals and the 
remaining individuals acquire a poor quality territory (if available). When there are more 
individuals arriving than there are territories, both the good and poor quality territories 
are randomly divided among the arrivees and the remaining individuals become floaters, 
i.e. they are at the breeding ground but have no territory. A floater can become a territory 
owner in a subsequent time step as territories become available due to predation, in which 
case floaters compete with arriving individuals for available territories. They acquire 
territories with equal probability to newly-arrived individuals. When T = Tmax, territories 
that have become available due to predation will be filled by randomly chosen floaters. 
Some territories remain without an owner if there are fewer floaters than available 
territories at T = Tmax .  
Each time step T exposes individuals that have arrived on the breeding grounds to 
predation (Figure 1c). Predation occurs according to a Type II functional response with 
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two different types of prey items (Murdoch 1973). This means that at each time step T, the 
number of S1 and S2 prey items taken depend on the number of individuals alive at the 
breeding grounds, denoted N1(T) and N2(T) respectively. Daily predation on S1 is assumed 
to affect floaters and territory owners equally. The number of individuals of species S2 at 
the beginning of the season, T = 1, is assumed to be constant, denoted N2*(i.e. N2(1) = N2*). 
Individuals of S1 that are not yet on the breeding grounds also experience a daily mortality 
risk (p0).  
 
Figure 1. Diagram representing (a) the simulation model and (b) the semi-analytic simplification, 
(c) shows the daily arrival dynamics at the breeding ground for species S1. Starting after the census, 
individuals in the simulation model depart from the overwintering grounds (in blue) and migrate to 
the breeding ground (in green) on the day determined by their arrival time allele (δ). In the semi-
analytical model the vast majority of the population arrives on day T except mutants who arrive a 
day earlier or later (where possible). Both models incorporate a daily mortality throughout the 
arrival time period, with survival probabilities shown in (c) both for individuals that have not 
arrived yet (above the blue line) and for individuals that have (below the green line). After arrival 
of all individuals, reproduction occurs in both (a) and (b), after which all individuals of species S1 
migrate back to the overwintering ground where they face winter mortality before they repeat the 
cycle.  
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A Type II functional response specifies the number of individuals predated on a given day: 
for species S1 this is 𝑃1(𝑇) =
𝑎𝑁1(𝑇)𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(𝑇)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(𝑇)
 and for S2, 
𝑃2(𝑇) =
(1−𝑎)𝑁1(𝑇)𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(𝑇)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(𝑇)
 (Murdoch 1973). Here a (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) is the predator 
preference for S1 over S2 (e.g. one species might be easier to catch than the other), such 
that a = 0.5 indicates no preference, and a > 0.5 indicates a preference for S1. X reflects 
total predatory effort, and it is proportional to predator abundance and the time they 
spend foraging. The handling time b includes both time spent finding and handling prey.  
The interpretation of P1(T) and P2(T) is problematic for non-integer values: if we always 
rounded to the nearest integer to determine the number of individuals taken, then low 
daily predation pressures would lead to consistent rounding down to zero and the 
predator never eats. Therefore the fractional portion of P is treated probabilistically, e.g. P1 
= 0.3 means that no S1 prey are taken in 70% of cases and one prey in 30% of cases, and P1 
= 2.9 means that two prey are taken in 10% of cases and three prey in 90% of cases. The 
individuals of S1 that are predated are randomly selected from all individuals, i.e. territory 
owners as well as floaters, that have arrived on the breeding ground. For S2, the number of 
individuals that are predated are simply deducted from the current numbers (using the 
same rounding rules as for S1): N2(T+1) = N2(T) – P2(T). Not yet arrived S1 individuals are 
assumed to have a daily mortality risk p0 that is applied independently for each such 
individual (Figure 1c). 
We repeat the above procedure for each day T = 1 to Tmax,  and then the breeding season 
commences. Reproductive success on a given territory is Poisson-distributed with mean 
RG for good territories and RP in poor territories (RG > RP). Offspring inherit the arrival time 
locus δ from their parent (i.e. asexual reproduction), but this allele may mutate in 
offspring with probability μ. When mutation occurs, offspring δ is changed by a value 
taken from an uniform distribution with range [ − σ , σ ] (if the new value is below 0 or 
above 1, the new value is set to 0 or 1, respectively). The reproduction of species S2 is not 
tracked explicitly as we assume no significant interactions with S1 outside the period of 
interest (the shared predator’s effects during the spring migration). 
After reproduction all S1 individuals migrate, vacating all territories. Before the start of 
the new spring migration season each individual dies with probability γ, irrespective of 
the value of δ. Individuals that survive, i.e. parents and their offspring, form the N1(1) of 
the next spring migration season, leading to overlapping generations.  
Each simulation is initiated with a specified N1(1) = N1* individuals of species S1 at the 
start of the first generation (and N2 individuals of S2 as in the beginning of every spring 
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season). The arrival time locus δ is initially normally distributed with mean ε and interval 
[ε – θ, ε + θ]. The simulations were run for 5000 generations. The results are shown as the 
average of 10 randomly chosen replicates. Parameter values used (unless varied): a = 0.5, 
X = 850, N1*= N2* = 1000, Tmax = 5, ε = 0.5, θ = 0.5, μ = 0.1, σ = 0.01, p0 = 0.05, γ = 0.1, V = 
500, b = 5, α = 0.5, RG = 2, RP = 1. 
Semi-analytic model 
The semi-analytic model simplifies the individual-based simulation model by assuming a 
monomorphic population (Figure 1b), i.e. one in which all individuals arrive to the 
breeding grounds on the same day. We are interested in finding out which days (between 
T and Tmax) are evolutionarily stable, depending on variation in predation pressure. 
As we are interested in exploring the microevolutionary dynamics of the system, we use 
three simplifying assumptions commonly invoked in eco-evolutionary models (Geritz et al. 
1998). First, we assume that the microevolutionary timescale is longer than the 
population dynamic timescale, such that the population can be assumed to be at 
population-dynamic equilibrium. Second, we assume that the initial number of mutant 
individuals is small enough that their effect on the dynamics and fitness of individuals in 
the population using the prevailing arrival strategy can be ignored. Third, we assume that 
the mutations themselves are small, such that we need only consider the fitness of mutant 
arrival day strategies that are either one day earlier or one day later than the prevailing 
strategy. 
As in the simulation model, the daily population dynamics for the alternative-prey species 
during the predation and territory-allocation period is described by 
𝑁2(𝑇, ?̂?) = ⁡ {
𝑁2
∗,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝑇 = 1.
𝑁2(𝑇 − 1, ?̂?) (1 −
(1−𝑎)𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(𝑇−1,?̂?)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(𝑇−1,?̂?),
) , otherwise.
 (1) 
where 𝑁1
∗(?̂?) is the species’ population size evaluated at steady-state (which depends 
upon the prevailing arrival-day strategy), in accordance with our first assumption. For the 
focal species, the dynamics are described by 
𝑁1(𝑇, ?̂?) = {
0,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝑇 < 𝑇.̂
(1 − 𝑝0)
?̂?−1𝑁1
∗(?̂?),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝑇 = ⁡𝑇.̂
𝑁1(𝑇 − 1, ?̂?) (1 −
𝑎𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(𝑇−1,?̂?)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(𝑇−1,?̂?)
) , otherwise.
  (2) 
At the end of the predation and territory-allocation period, the number of individuals 
remaining to reproduce is 
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𝑀1
∗(?̂?) = 𝑁1(𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥, ?̂?) (1 −
𝑎𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝐷1(𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥,?̂?)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝐷2(𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥,?̂?⁡)
).   (3) 
The yearly population dynamics can then be described by 
𝑁1
∗(?̂?) = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑀1
∗(?̂?) + 𝑀𝐺𝑅𝐺 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑃),⁡     (4) 
where MG (MP) is the number of individuals holding a good (poor) territory at the end of 
the predation and territory-allocation period. N1*(?̂?) and M1*(?̂?) can be obtained 
numerically solving Equation 4 for different prevailing arrival-day strategies ?̂? (see data 
accessibility). We are interested in the scenario in which territory competition is a strong 
selective force and the population contains floaters, and so for the parameter range 
explored the population is only viable when there is complete occupancy of both types of 
territories, therefore MG equals the number of good territories VG, and likewise MP = VP. 
The invasion fitness of the mutant with arrival-day strategy 𝑇′ entering a population with 
prevailing arrival-day strategy is ?̂? is 
𝑊(𝑇′, ?̂?) = (1 − 𝛾)𝑝𝑠(𝑇
′, ?̂?)(1 + 𝑝𝐺(𝑇
′, ?̂?)𝑅𝐺 + 𝑝𝑃(𝑇
′, ?̂?)𝑅𝑃),    (5) 
where 𝑝𝑠(𝑇
′, ?̂?) is the mutant’s probability of survival, and 𝑝𝐺(𝑇
′, ?̂?)⁡(𝑝𝑃(𝑇
′, ?̂?)) is the 
probability that the mutant will obtain a good (poor) territory. In accordance with the 
second assumption, the mutant at invasion has no influence upon the fitness of individuals 
in the population using the prevailing strategy, and so their fitness is 𝑊(?̂?, ?̂?) = 1 , and the 
mutant can successfully invade if its invasion fitness is 𝑊(𝑇′, ?̂?) > 1 . 
The probability of an individual surviving a given day T is 
𝑠(𝑇, ?̂?) = {
1 − 𝑃0,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡not⁡yet⁡arrived⁡at⁡breeding⁡grounds.
max(0,1 −
𝑎𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(𝑇,?̂?)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(𝑇,?̂?)
) ,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡at⁡breeding⁡grounds.
 (6) 
In accordance with the third assumption, we need only consider mutants with arrival-day 
strategies one day earlier or one day later than the prevailing strategy. 
The mutant's survival probability is the same as the prevailing strategy modified by the 
one more and one fewer days spent at or away from the breeding grounds. Therefore, for 
the mutant arriving one day earlier than the prevailing strategy  
 𝑝𝑠(?̂? − 1, ?̂?) =
𝑀∗(⁡?̂?)
𝑁1
∗(⁡?̂?)
max⁡(0,1−⁡
𝑎𝑋
1+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(?̂?−1,?̂?)
)
1−𝑃0
 ,     (7) 
and for the mutant arriving one day later than the prevailing strategy 
 𝑝𝑠(?̂? + 1, ?̂?) =
𝑀∗(⁡?̂?)
𝑁1
∗(⁡?̂?)
1−𝑃0
1−⁡
𝑎𝑋
1+𝑎𝑏𝑁1(?̂?,?̂?)+(1−𝑎)𝑏𝑁2(?̂?,?̂?)
 .     (8) 
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The mutant's probability of acquiring a good territory, a poor territory, or no territory at 
all, depends upon whether it arrives earlier or later. Mutants arriving one day earlier than 
the prevailing strategy can easily take a good territory, therefore 
𝑝𝐺(?̂? − 1, ?̂?) = 1 ,        (9a) 
𝑝𝑃(?̂? − 1, ?̂?) = 0 ,        (9b) 
For mutants arriving one day later than the prevailing strategy, their probability of 
acquiring a good territory is equivalent to that of the prevailing strategy minus the 
probability of acquiring a good territory by the end of the first day 
𝑝𝐺(?̂? + 1, ?̂?) =
𝑉𝐺
𝑀1
∗(⁡?̂?)
−
𝑉𝐺
𝑁1(?̂?+1,?̂?)
=
𝑉𝐺(𝑁1(?̂?+1,?̂?)−𝑀1
∗(⁡?̂?))
𝑀1
∗(⁡?̂?)𝑁1(?̂?+1,?̂?)
 .   (10) 
Similarly the probability of acquiring a poor territory is 
𝑝𝐵(?̂? + 1, ?̂?) =
𝑉𝐵(𝑁1(?̂?+1,?̂?)−𝑀1
∗(⁡?̂?))
𝑀1
∗(⁡?̂?)𝑁1(?̂?+1,?̂?)
 .       (11) 
The invasibility of each prevailing strategy (?̂?) can now be classified according to its 
invasibility to mutants arriving one day earlier and one day later than the prevailing 
strategy (Equation 5). For example, if 𝑊(?̂? + 1, ?̂?) > 1 then the population is invasible to 
mutants arriving one day later. The evolutionary singular strategy (ESS) T * is the 
prevailing strategy which is invasible to neither strategy 
𝑊(𝑇∗ − 1, 𝑇∗),𝑊(𝑇∗ + 1, 𝑇∗) < 1 .      (12) 
Results 
Our results confirm the intuitive expectation that the arrival time strategy evolves to be as 
early as possible in the absence of predation pressure (as we included no other costs of 
early arrival). In the simulation model, 10 replicate simulations with X = 0 produced the 
result that 6773.3 (29.7 SE) individuals arrive on day T = 1, while 3.4 (0.4 SE) individuals 
arrive on day T = 2, and none on days T = 3 – 5 (parameter values: a = 0.5,  N1*= N2* = 
1000, Tmax = 5, ε = 0.5, θ = 0.5, μ = 0.1, σ = 0.01, p0 = 0.05, γ = 0.1, V = 500, b = 5, α = 0.5, RG = 
2, RP = 1). The small number of individuals arriving on day two are due to mutations in the 
arrival allele rather than later arrival being favored by selection. In the semi-analytic 
model, in the absence of predation pressure we obtain a similar result. No strategy is 
invasible to a later arrival-day strategy (𝑊(?̂? + 1, ?̂?) = (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝0)
?̂? < 1 for all 
0 < 𝑝0 ≤ 1 and⁡0 < 𝛾 ≤ 1), and for the default parameter values, 𝑊(?̂? − 1, ?̂?) =
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝0)
?̂?−2(1 + 𝐵𝐺) > 1 for all 1 < ?̂? ≤ 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥. Therefore all arrival-day strategies 
after the first day are invasible to a strategy of arrival one day earlier. 
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Figure 2. Evolutionary stable arrival day for two different models, the simulation model (a – c) and 
the semi-analytical model (d – f). Different values for a are shown in (a, d), for X (b, e), for N2 (c, g). 
In (a – c), coloured (non-white) areas indicate that individuals arrive on this arrival day, the color 
(also see legend) indicates the number of individuals arriving (averaged over 10 simulations unless 
extinctions occurred), and ‘total’ refers to the sum of individuals  alive when the census (Figure 1) 
is taken. In (d – f), the dark blue color indicates an ESS, light blue indicates that individuals arriving 
earlier have higher fitness and grey shows that extinctions occur. Note that the x-axis may span a 
different range for the semi-analytical model than for the simulation model. Where not specifically 
varied (on the respective x axis), we used parameter values a = 0.5, X = 850, N1*= N2* = 1000, Tmax = 
5, ε = 0.5, θ = 0.5, μ = 0.1, σ = 0.01, p0 = 0.05, γ = 0.1, V = 500, b = 5, α = 0.5, RG = 2, RP = 1. 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
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Figure 2a-c summarises the effect of increasing predation pressure in the individual based 
simulation model. Predation pressure can be increased in various ways: by increasing 
predator preference for the focal species a, by increasing the total predation effort X, and 
by decreasing the number of alternative prey N2. In each case, we chose a baseline 
parameter value which leads to arriving as early as possible being favoured, and then 
examined the effect of stronger predation. Mild increases in the predation pressure from 
the baseline do not lead to a deviation from the earliest possible arrival, and the only effect 
is a population size decline (Figure 2a-c). Increasing the predation pressure further results 
in later arrival times and larger population sizes (provided the populations survive, see 
below).  
In some simulations, when predation pressure was high (a > 0.75, X > 1175, N2 < 550), 
some populations go extinct. This occurs when the simulations are seeded with an initial 
arrival strategy distribution that is unviable (initial arrival strategy: ε = 0.5, θ = 0.5, δ = [0 , 
1]). It can be interpreted as a failure to undergo evolutionary rescue, where the speed of 
evolution was too slow compared to the loss of individuals caused by the high predation 
pressure. This corresponds to a scenario in which a new predator invades or an existing 
predator has a sudden density increase. 
In all parameter value explorations, we found parameter regions where different runs of 
simulations did not converge to the same arrival day strategies; they retained their 
differences regardless of how long the simulation is run (a = 0.7-0.8, X = 1000-1200, N2 = 
500-550). The semi-analytic model (Figure 2d-f) reveals why this occurs. When predation 
pressure is low, the earliest arrival-day strategy is the only ESS, and it is also an 
evolutionary attractor: all later arrival-day strategies are invasible to the strategy of 
arriving one day earlier (light blue region, Figure 2d-f). However as predation pressure is 
increased, late arrival-day strategies emerge as alternative ESSs (dark blue region, Figure 
2d-f), emerging first on the last day and then at progressively earlier days. The first late-
arrival ESS to emerge is on the last day because this is where the alternative-prey (S2) 
populations are lowest and consequently daily predation pressure is highest. As predation 
pressure is increased, earlier late-arrival ESSs emerge. These late-arrival day ESSs are not 
evolutionary attractors, a population strategy near a late-arrival ESS will either move 
away from it and towards earliest arrival if it is in the light blue region of Figure 2d-f, or 
remain where it is if it itself is a late-arrival ESS (dark blue region). Consequently any 
population initiated with a strategy within the dark blue region will remain at that 
strategy (an ‘evolutionary priority effect’ sensu Gourbière and Menu 2009). Finally, when 
predation pressure is very strong (high a, high X, and low N2), the earliest arrival-day 
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strategies are no longer viable, and a population adopting such a strategy will go extinct 
(grey regions, Figure 2d-f).  
 
Figure 3 a – e. Simulations with a = 0.7 and different initial intervals (i.e. θ = 0.1) for the arrival 
allele (δ) over time, (a) initial arrival on day 1, δ = [0 , 0.2], ε = 0.1, (b) initial arrival on day 2, δ = 
[0.2 , 0.4] , ε = 0.3, (c) initial arrival on day 3, δ = [0.4 , 0.6] , ε = 0.5, (d) initial arrival on day 4, δ = 
[0.6 , 0.8] , ε = 0.7 and (b) initial arrival on day 5, δ = [0.8 , 1.0] , ε = 0.9. All other parameter values 
as in Figure 2. Color indicates the number of individuals arriving (see legend).  
Which ESS the simulation model reaches depends upon the initial conditions and 
stochastic events during the evolutionary process. When simulations in the parameter 
range of multiple ESSs were seeded with different initial arrival day strategies, the 
evolutionary simulations led to different arrival day strategies. Provided that the 
evolutionary parameters were set such that the genetic variability was low (i.e. θ = 0.1), 
these evolutionary endpoints were similar to that with which they were initialised (Figure 
3). This shows that alternative stable states are also possible in the simulation model, with 
significant inertia that constrains arrival dates to largely stay where they were initiated.  
In the region for which the semi-analytic model predicted multiple ESSs, the simulation 
model additionally predicted that, for a given simulation, persistent mixed arrival-day 
strategies may occur. For example, when 10 simulations of 10,000 generations were run 
with X = 1125, more than half of the simulations showed the persistence of populations 
with a mixture of strategies although, after 10,000 generations, first or last day arrival was 
more common than arrival on intermediate days (Figure 4). In simulations where mixed 
strategies persist for a long period of time (i.e. >1000 generations), a bimodal pattern (e.g. 
arrival on day T =2 and day T =4) is common, suggesting that one part of the population 
specialises in a strategy favouring higher reproduction at the cost of higher mortality due 
to predation, whereas the other specialises in lower mortality at the cost of reproduction.  
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Figure 4 (1) – (10). The evolution of the arrival time allele for ten individual simulations with X = 
1125, all other variables have the standard values as given with Figure 2. 
Discussion 
We have explored models of arrival time evolution under two competing objectives: 
arriving early to obtain a high quality territory versus arriving late to reduce predation 
risk. Our models were designed to test the idea that frequency-dependent predation can 
select against early arrival, but they revealed a richer set of outcomes than a simple shift 
towards later arrival with increased predation. Due to the frequency-dependence and the 
interplay of the selective forces, high predation pressure is predicted to select for 
synchronous arrival with conspecifics, however stochastic effects and large arrival 
strategy mutations can lead to persistence of populations with mixed arrival-day 
strategies. We discuss these below.  
The importance of arriving synchronously is seen most clearly in the semi-analytic model 
(Figure 2d-f), where the scenario modelled is a monomorphic population, with a 
separation between the population-dynamic and evolutionary time-scales, and where 
mutations in arrival strategy are small (no greater than one day). Selection for 
synchronous arrival is also responsible for the finding of the individual-based simulation 
model that initial arrival dates can be largely retained for a very large number of 
generations (Figure 3). This type of ‘evolutionary priority effect’, where the strategy that 
establishes itself first can persist on an evolutionary timescale, has been discussed before 
in a different context of dormancy evolution (Gourbière and Menu 2009). To understand 
these effects in the current context, it is important to consider both (1) selection against 
arriving earlier than the prevailing arrival strategy and (2) selection against arriving later 
than the prevailing arrival strategy. We consider these in turn.  
First, selection against earlier arrival can be understood as a result of predator satiation 
(Ims 1990) or the predator dilution effect (Bednekoff and Lima 1998; Connell 2000; Jones 
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2003). Predation risk, from the perspective of the prey, is frequency-dependent: 
individuals can reduce their predation risk by only being present at the breeding grounds 
when many other individuals are also present. In this way they avoid being temporarily 
one of only few prey items available for resident predators. When predation pressure is 
high, the predator dilution/ satiation effect is the dominant effect on predation risk, 
therefore there is strong selection against arriving earlier than the prevailing arrival 
strategy. 
Second, selection against later arrival can be understood as the result of competition for 
territories. Assuming that territory acquisition is a quick process (Beletsky and Orians 
1987; Smith and Moore 2003) with strict priority effects (Newton 2008 and references 
therein) and a limiting number of territories, the probability of acquiring a (high-quality) 
territory is much lower for individuals arriving even one day after the prevailing arrival-
day strategy. To understand why, consider the extreme case where most individuals arrive 
synchronously on the same day. On this day all territories are vacant and available to the 
competing individuals. In contrast, after this day the only territories that are available to 
competing floaters and late-arrivers are those that have been vacated due to a territory-
holder being predated. Compared to this cost of much lower territory acquisition, the 
benefits of arriving one day later than the prevailing strategy are meagre: they consist of a 
small reduction of predation risk compared to individuals using the prevailing strategy, i.e. 
a difference of one day exposure to predation.  
The net effect of selection against both earlier arrival and later arrival above is that the 
population cannot be invaded by either strategy, and hence synchronous arrival remains 
evolutionarily stable. It is noteworthy that the models predict that many adjacent days can 
all be alternative ESSs. Selection for synchrony means that, to avoid predation, it is best to 
arrive when the majority does so, regardless of other timing issues. Earlier would be 
dangerous, while later would mean losing out in the competition for territories. This 
implies, in accordance with the evolutionary priority effect, that there may be a certain 
degree of ‘inertia’ in arrival times: it is costly to deviate from the norm if the norm brings 
about advantages in terms of predator dilution effect. This result has implications for 
climate change scenarios, where phenological adaptation to a shift in nestling food 
resource phenology may be hindered by the stabilising selection for phenological 
synchrony caused by predation pressure. 
Our prediction of synchronous arrival date for migratory birds in response to frequency-
dependent adult predation is analogous to breeding synchrony in other systems. For 
example, the evolution of emergence time of juvenile salmon is a trade-off between 
 ________________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 
 92     
predation risk and territory acquisition; early emergers miss out on dilution effects 
resulting in heavy mortality from predation, but late emergers suffer from habitat 
saturation and have difficulty finding high quality feeding habitats (Cutts et al. 1999). As 
other examples, the mast fruiting of plants, the synchronous emergence of 13-year 
periodical cicadas, and synchronous metamorphosis in toads may have all evolved to take 
advantage of predator satiation (Gochfeld 1982; Williams et al. 1993; Devito et al. 1998). 
Finally, both spatial clustering and temporal breeding synchrony have been observed in 
many bird taxa (Danchin 1988; Ims 1990; Rolland et al. 1998; Varela et al. 2007). Known 
as the Fraser Darling effect, it is a strategy of using nest-predator satiation to reduce 
individual predation risk (Nisbet 1975; Ims 1990; Langerhans 2007). To our knowledge, 
ours is the first study to suggest that a similar effect may also affect adult migratory 
phenology. 
When the individual-based simulation model is run with genetic parameters set such that 
genetic variability is high, the model predicts the persistence of populations of mixed 
arrival day strategies. This difference in results between the simulation and semi-analytic 
model is due to the different scenarios that are implied by their assumptions. In the 
simulation model the population has (at least initially) variation for the arrival allele while 
the semi-analytic model assumes a monomorphic population for the arrival time allele. 
The invasion approach of the semi-analytic model assumes that there are few individuals 
that arrive earlier or later than the general population, and only one day earlier or later 
than the general population, and tests whether these ‘invaders’ have higher fitness than 
the general population. In contrast, the simulation model permits many invaders to arrive 
at once, and potentially invaders whose arrival strategy is more than one day different to 
the prevailing strategy.  
Which model is most suitable depends upon the particulars of the system of interest. 
Typically eco-evolutionary phenology models use analytic techniques that make similar 
assumptions to the semi-analytic model here (e.g. Jonzén et al. 2007; Kristensen et al. 
2015), however full individual-based simulations are able to reveal much more complex 
dynamics than can be deduced from analytic techniques alone. 
The effects of predation upon arrival for migratory species appear understudied, as 
research has largely focussed on predation during migration or during nesting (e.g. 
Lindström 1990; Sillett and Holmes 2002; Fontaine and Martin 2006; Chapman et al. 
2011; Sofaer et al. 2013). This is largely due to the difficulty of distinguishing between 
predation and movement to other breeding locations before egg laying (Sillett and Holmes 
2002; Alerstam et al. 2003). One reason why predation upon pre-breeding adults may 
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have received less attention is that it has a limited effect upon population persistence. In 
populations with many floaters, any territory holder that dies can be rapidly replaced, and 
so predation of adults at the pre-breeding stage will not usually reduce the number of 
offspring produced (Newton 1998); this is also true in our model. However, we have 
shown that predation at this crucial time of the life cycle can influence arrival time 
phenology very significantly despite the small number of individuals affected: precisely 
because the local population remains small early in the season, the per capita risk can 
remain significant. The consequent evolutionary response may in turn influence 
synchrony between peak nestling resource demand and resource phenology. In such 
cases, predation will influence offspring numbers indirectly, and the predicted inertia 
could have a stronger impact still if climate change shifts the nestling-resource’s 
phenology.  
We note a number of simplifications in both models. Firstly, we assumed that the 
predator’s relative preference for the migrant species is constant across all migrant 
densities (i.e. we assume Type II rather than more complicated functional responses). 
Perhaps more importantly, our models ignore interyearly fluctuations in weather, food 
availability, and predator and alternative prey abundances. These have been shown to 
impact traits such as breeding success (e.g. Sofaer et al. 2013) and selection could 
consequently fluctuate more in time than in our model. Weather may also make it likely 
that migrant species find it in practice difficult to reach as high synchrony as predicted by 
our model (unless they travel physically together, as many migrants do; our model 
together with flocking advantages during travel might give a good set of reasons why 
individuals strive to keep together during the journey). 
In conclusion, our models suggest that the combination of competition for limited 
breeding territories and strong frequency-dependent predation will select for not only 
later arrival times but also for more synchronous arrival times, with stochasticity in 
arrival strategy also potentially leading to the persistence of populations of mixed arrival-
day strategies. This dual prediction was made possible by the fact that we explored both a 
full individual-based simulation as well as a more traditional semi-analytic model that 
uses the adaptive dynamics framework. This result is made possible by taking a game-
theoretic approach to the role that synchronicity with conspecifics plays in predator 
evasion via the predator satiation effect.  
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Chapter 5 – Mate-guarding and frequent copulation in 
birds: a meta-analysis of their relationship to paternity, 
male quality and male parental care. 
Anna MF Harts, Isobel Booksmythe and Michael D Jennions 
Submitted to Biological reviews 
 
Abstract 
In many bird species males are presumed to protect their paternity by guarding their mate 
intensely or by copulating frequently. These costly behaviours are assumed to reduce 
sperm competition and thereby elevate paternity. In recent decades much has been 
written about sperm competition and extra- and within-pair paternity in birds. However, 
we lack a recent meta- or comparative analysis on behaviours that are assumed to protect 
a male’s paternity. Here we conduct a meta-analysis to address three key questions related 
to correlates of presumed paternity protection. First, we simply ask if mate-guarding 
and/or frequent copulation are positively associated with a male’s paternity. Second, we 
test the predictions of a frequently proposed hypothesis, which is based on the premise 
that females should prefer a high quality male to sire offspring because of his ‘good genes’. 
For socially monogamous species this implies that a female is unlikely to seek extra-pair 
matings if her social male is of high quality. High quality males should therefore less often 
perform behaviours that protect their paternity, and we thus ask if there is evidence for 
such a pattern. Third, we focus on the relationship between paternal care and paternity 
protection. Paternal care is costly so, all else being equal, we expected that cuckolded 
males will provide less care. But how do males know whether there are unrelated 
offspring in their nest? We test whether the intensity with which a male protects his 
paternity acts as a proxy for certainty of paternity and thereby generates a positive 
correlation between paternity protection behaviour and the level of male paternal care. 
Our results indicate that (1) presumed paternity protection behaviours are significantly 
positively correlated, albeit weakly, with paternity (r = 0.18) and that (2) males of higher 
quality use presumed paternity protection behaviours significantly less often (r = –0.19). 
However, closer inspections shows that this pattern only holds for mate-guarding (r = –
0.28), and not for frequent copulation which is (non-significantly, P=0.057) positively 
correlated with male quality (r = 0.33). We also find that (3) males that invest more in 
 ________________________________________________________________ Chapter 5 
 99     
presumed paternity protection behaviours tend to provide more care (r = 0.23, although 
this trend is marginally non-significant, P = 0.056). We combine our results with existing 
knowledge to provide an overview of the relationships between paternity, paternity 
protection, parental care, male quality and other relevant factors in birds. 
Introduction 
Behaviours presumed to protect paternity are important male traits that have likely 
evolved because they increase net male reproductive success (Parker 1970; Alcock 1994). 
In birds, it is assumed that males commonly use mate-guarding and/or frequent 
copulation to protect their paternity (Møller and Birkhead 1991). Depending on the 
species’ mating system and life history, males may use one or both of these types of 
putative paternity protection. Mate-guarding by males can be described as a behaviour in 
which a male remains close to his pair-bonded female to deter extra-pair copulation 
attempts. Mate-guarding behaviours include the male following the female’s movements 
and spending a large proportion of the time within a short distance of her (Birkhead and 
Møller 1992). For example, during the fertile period male bluethroats (Luscinia s. svecica) 
stay a larger proportion of their time in close proximity to their mate, and the male also 
follows the female far more often during this period than when she is no longer fertile 
(Krokene et al. 1996). Mate guarding appears to ensure that a male can interfere with, or 
even prevent, other males’ copulation attempts (Westneat 1994; Currie et al. 1999). In 
birds, mate-guarding occurs predominantly post-copulation during the female’s fertile 
period. The fertile period is thought to be from around 5 to 10 days before the first egg is 
laid, until the day the penultimate egg is laid (Birkhead and Møller 1992). Mate-guarding is 
often observed to be most intense from approximately 4 or 5 days before the first egg is 
laid until, depending on clutch size, the day the first egg is laid, or one or two days after the 
first egg is laid (e.g. Krokene et al. 1996; Foerster and Kempenaers 2005; Hoi et al. 2011). 
Many bird species that use mate-guarding also copulate far more often than seems 
necessary for fertilization alone (Hunter et al. 1993; e.g. Hoi et al. 2011). 
Frequent copulation is often the sole type of putative paternity protection in bird species 
where males are unable to guard their mates, e.g. due to the simultaneous need for long 
feeding trips and nest defence (Møller and Birkhead 1991). During the fertile period these 
within-pair copulations are more frequent (e.g. Barber and Robertson 2007; Hoi et al. 
2011), although there are examples of species where males have also been observed to 
copulate frequently with their mate before the fertile period (e.g. Villaroel et al. 1998). In 
tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolor) frequent copulation during the presumed fertile 
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period involves approximately 18 copulation attempts per hour, and  approximately 5 of 
these attempts per hour are expected to be successful (defined as leading to cloacal 
contact), resulting in an average of 322 copulation attempts during the presumed fertile 
period (Crowe et al. 2009).  
The purpose of paternity protection is to avoid or reduce sperm competition and reduce 
extra-pair paternity. Sperm competition has received a lot of interest over the last few 
decades (e.g. Parker 1970, Birkhead and Møller 1998; Jennions and Petrie 2000; Simmons 
2001; Alonzo and Pizzari 2013); so too has within and extra-pair paternity, since the 
discovery of affordable DNA techniques to assign parentage (Griffith et al. 2002). This has 
led to a number of hypotheses — some adaptive, others mechanistic or proximate — that 
offer explanations for variation in levels of extra-pair paternity between species, 
populations and among individual males (Westneat et al. 1990; Kempenaers et al. 1992; 
Hasselquist et al. 1996; Petrie and Kempenaers 1998; Westneat and Stewart 2003; 
Neudorf 2004; Akçay and Roughgarden 2007).  See Table 1 for a brief overview of the 
hypotheses we refer to in text (also see Forstmeier et al. 2014 for a recent overview).   
Despite intense research on many of these hypotheses (see Stutchbury and Morton 1995; 
Westneat and Sherman 1997; Møller and Ninni 1998; Griffith et al. 2002; Matysioková and 
Remeš 2014; Arct et al. 2015),  a crucial factor has received little attention: how paternity 
protection behaviours that are assumed to increase paternity relate to actual paternity. 
For example, there are no recent comparative analyses, meta-analyses or reviews on 
paternity protection in birds. A meta-analysis by Møller and Ninni (1998) is the most 
recent publication we are aware of that compares behaviours associated with paternity 
protection across species.  
There is variation in the intensity with which individual males seem to protect their 
paternity, and for various species there have been attempts to relate putative mate 
guarding to a male’s share of paternity (e.g.  Dunn et al. 1994; Kempenaers et al. 1995; 
Møller and Tegelstrom 1997; Johnsen et al. 2003). Paternity protection is likely a costly 
behaviour (e.g.  due to an associated reduction in foraging time) (Lens et al. 1997; 
Komdeur 2001; Low 2006) so we would only expect it to have evolved and be maintained 
if there are compensatory benefits. The most obvious benefit would be ensuring paternity. 
Here we therefore perform a meta-analysis investigating the relationship between two 
behaviours (mate guarding and frequent copulation) associated with paternity protection 
and (within-pair) paternity. In their meta-analysis Møller and Ninni (1998) reported a 
non-significant relationship, but since 1998 the cost and ease of detecting extra-pair 
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paternity have resulted in many additional scientific publications on the topic, warranting 
an updated analysis. 
Table 1. Overview of hypotheses referred to in text for different aspects of within and extra-pair 
paternity. References: 1) Westneat et al. 1990, 2) Jennions and Petrie 2000, 3) Mays and Hill 2004, 
4) Akçay and Roughgarden 2007, 5) Brown 1997, 6) Arct et al. 2015, 7) Petrie and Kempenaers 
1998, 8) Sheldon 1994, 9) Morrow et al. 2002, 10) Trivers 1972, 11) Westneat and Sargent 1996, 
12) Møller and Birkhead 1993a, 13) Westneat and Stewart 2003, 14) Stutchbury and Morton 1995, 
15) Mauck et al. 1999. 
For most of the last two decades, the dominant assumption has been that females engage 
in extra-pair copulations to gain indirect, genetic benefits (e.g.  Petrie and Kempenaers 
1998; Jennions and Petrie 2000; Akçay and Roughgarden 2007; for a recent critique of this 
idea see Forstmeier et al. 2014). Based on this ‘good genes’ hypothesis one would 
generally predict that a female paired to a high quality male is less likely to search for and 
accept extra-pair copulations (e.g. Kempenaers et al. 1992). Does this then mean that high 
quality males can afford to protect their paternity less? Alternatively, it might pay for 
Hypothesis or topic Explanation, prediction Ref. 
Good genes A female should seek the best genes for her offspring by mating 
with a high quality male, irrespective of whether this male is 
within- or extra-pair. 
1,2,3,4 
Genetic compatibility/ 
similarity 
Females seek genes for their offspring that are compatible with 
their own genes, or at least not incompatible (e.g. due to mating 
with a related individual). 
4,5,6 
Other/direct benefits 
to female 
A female may receive other benefits from extra-pair mating, for 
example in the form of foraging opportunities, future mating, 
mate replacement, additional paternal care. 
7 
Protect against 
infertility of social male 
Females seek EPC’s to protect against infertility of their social 
mate. 
8,9 
Mate guarding  
trade-off 
A male has to ‘choose’ how he divides his time between 
protecting his paternity, searching for extra-pair copulations 
and other essential activities, e.g., feeding. 
1 
Male care trade-off Males face a trade-off between caring for offspring and 
investing this energy in other activities, e.g. feeding or finding 
additional mating opportunities. 
10 
Female constraint A male is expected to provide care to the offspring in response 
to his share of paternity or his certainty of paternity. 
11 
Breeding density/ 
short NND 
Short distance to other males or females means increased 
opportunity for EP opportunities. 
12,13 
Breeding synchrony/ 
asynchrony 
Synchronous breeding allows females to easily find EPC’s. 
Alternatively, more asynchronous breeding can facilitate EPC’s 
because males can protect their paternity and search for EPC’s. 
14 
Polygyny Polygynous males are expected to be unable to effectively 
protect their paternity with primary females, dependent on 
when the male attracts a secondary female. 
1 
Longevity Long lived species have long term pair bonds and these are 
expected to be associated with higher fidelity. 
15 
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these males to invest as heavily, or more heavily, in protecting their paternity simply 
because they have larger energy reserves than lower quality males; this idea applies if 
guarding benefits everyone but varying costs are the main driver of observed effort levels. 
This is the classic conundrum of the extent to which variation in resource acquisition will 
lead to a negative phenotypic correlation between traits that a priori would seem to 
require a trade-off (Van Noordwijk and de Jong 1986). Here we document the phenotypic 
relationship between male quality and the two putative behavioural measures of male 
investment into paternity protection. Finally, because the intensity with which a male 
invests in protecting his paternity may be a cue as to his likely share (certainty) of 
paternity, we report the phenotypic relationship between the two putative measures of 
paternity protection and the resultant level of male paternal care. Based on the two main 
hypotheses involving paternal care in Table 1 the expectation would be that males that 
protect their paternity more intensively (i.e. are more certain of their paternity) will also 
provide more paternal care. Again, however, this assumes that variation in male quality 
does not alter the value of investing in different paths to fitness (e.g. see Kokko & Jennions 
2008 for the argument that males with high mating success should decrease their parental 
investment; in the current context this is particularly relevant for those species, included 
in our analysis, where the male may be polygynous and possess several nests). 
We aim to combine our results on the three relationships (paternity protection and 
paternity, paternity protection and male quality and paternity protection and paternal 
care) with existing knowledge to provide an overview of the relationships between these 
three factors in birds. 
Methods 
Literature search 
The literature was searched for studies containing data on two forms of paternity 
protection that are common in birds, specifically, frequent copulation and mate guarding. 
This search was performed using ISI Web of Science and was updated until 1 January 
2014. We used each of the key words ‘guard*’, ‘fertilization*’, ‘paternity’, or ‘copulation*’, 
within the following Web of Science categories: Ecology, Zoology, Evolutionary Biology, 
Ornithology, Biology, Behavioral Sciences and Multidisciplinary Sciences. Additionally, we 
performed a forward search on a previous meta-analysis on paternity studies by Møller 
and Ninni (1998) to locate and include papers that cited it. We did not attempt to find 
papers in other ways, or seek out unpublished datasets from colleagues, as these methods 
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can themselves introduce biases (Murtaugh 2002, Jennions et al. 2013). Our search 
method resulted in 20 882 unique references after duplicates were removed.  
The references returned by these searches were initially assessed based on the journal 
name, title and abstract (see Figure 1 for an overview of the selection process). Papers on 
taxa other than birds or on an irrelevant topic were excluded (for example, references on 
‘mammalian guard hairs’). We initially included references with information on within- or 
extra-pair paternity and male quality even if paternity protection was not mentioned, 
because it became apparent that the required data was sometimes published without it 
being the main focus of a paper. For inclusion in the meta-analyses a paper had to meet 
eight criteria.  
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram showing the paper selection process.  
(1) The publication reported the relationship between paternity protection (namely 
frequency of within-pair copulations and/or mate guarding) and at least one of three 
factors (a) paternity, (b) male quality or (c) paternal care (for definitions of each factors 
see data extraction and coding). 
(2) The data were from socially monogamous or polygynous species that form pairs at a 
nest. In the case of polygynous species the study had to report on the male’s primary nest. 
Other mating systems and types of pairs were excluded (e.g.  cooperative breeding, 
polyandry and polygamy). 
(3) The study was not performed with captive birds (i.e. in an aviary or on farmed birds).  
Literature search returned 20882 
References excluded by journal title, 5611 
References excluded by species or title, 12769 
References excluded by abstract, 1191 
References for which paper was not found, 10 
Potentially relevant papers found, 1301 
Paper does not contain suitable data, 1214 
Papers with suitable data, 87 
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(4) The data were from a single breeding event for the population (e.g. the first breeding 
attempt in species with multiple clutches per season).  
(5) The data were specific to the fertile period. Where possible we only used data from the 
peak fertile period (~4 days prior to laying the first egg until the day before the last egg 
was laid). If this period was unavailable we accepted data from up to 10 days prior to 
laying the first egg until the day before the last egg was laid. 
(6) Paternity was determined by so-called ‘DNA methods’ (see Griffith et al. 2002).   
(7) The paper contained appropriate statistics or raw data and sample sizes so that effect 
sizes and variances could be calculated. 
(8) The calculation of paternity was based on chicks per nest rather than on a subset of the 
population. For example, we exclude a case where the level of extra-pair paternity was 
reported for the entire population per year (Korpimäki et al. 1996).  
For ten references we were unable to locate the paper, but given that 87 out of 1301 
papers contained suitable data (Figure 1), the likelihood that these few papers contained 
data that could change the outcome of our meta-analysis is very small. 
Data extraction and coding 
We used the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) as our measure of effect size. When a study 
did not report a correlation but included other statistics, the effect size (r) was calculated 
from the reported statistics (e.g.  mean ± S.D., t, F, p, R2) using standard formulae (see 
Lipsey and Wilson 2001; Nakagawa et al. 2007; Borenstein et al. 2009; Koricheva et al. 
2013). Our first preference was for correlation coefficients (including Spearman rank, 
Kendall τ and R²), second for raw means with standard deviations, third for a 2 x 2 
frequency table, fourth for statistics in the form of t, F, U, Wald and Z, fifth by calculating 
the mean and standard deviation or a 2 x 2 frequency table from raw data given in the text 
(including from tables or graphs), and finally from p-values (p-values were first 
transformed to t). The correlation coefficients (r) were subsequently transformed to 
Fisher’s Z (Zr) for use in analyses. We did not include results that were reported only as 
non-significant or as “p > “ (e.g. “all p > 0.3”) for a test. 
In a few instances several publications reported results for a species for the same year and 
population. To avoid overlapping data or duplicated results we only allowed one paper to 
provide data for a population for a specific study period. We used the data from the paper 
that best matched our preference for the reported test statistic, or that was likely to 
include the most data.  
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These criteria yielded 87 papers that contributed 92 studies with 228 effect sizes for 50 
species (see supplement V for this dataset). “Paper” serves as an identity for a single 
publication per species (with one exception, Kempenaers et al. 1998 has data on two 
species and, for ease of analysis, this has been given two separate paper identifiers). 
“Study” is used to identify independent data published within a single paper, such as data 
from different years or different populations. Conversely, data in separate papers from the 
same population in the same year, but addressing different questions or measures, were 
assigned the same study identity to account for their non-independence (there is only one 
such occurrence: Kempenaers et al. 1992 and 1995).   
For each reported measure of the relationship between paternity protection and paternity 
or male quality or paternal care we calculated an individual effect size. We calculated 
separate effect sizes for different years or populations. Thus a paper could contribute 
multiple effect sizes for a particular relationship. Measures of paternity protection were 
grouped into three categories: mate guarding, copulation frequency, and manipulation of 
paternity protection. The measure mate guarding comprises measures such as the mean 
distance between the social pair, or the proportion of time spent together/apart. 
Copulation frequency is the observed within-pair rate of copulation. Manipulations of 
paternity protection were used in several studies. The most frequently used method was to 
temporarily remove a paired male or female, thereby lowering the ability of the male to 
guard or copulate frequently with his mate.  
Depending on the study, Paternity was presented as within-pair and/or extra-pair 
paternity at the male’s nest. We adjusted the sign of the measure accordingly: more 
within-pair or fewer extra-pair offspring in a clutch equate to higher values for paternity. 
Male quality was measured in a variety of ways across and within papers, using several 
different traits as proxies or indicators. We grouped these different measures of male 
quality into the following categories: age, colour, hormone, polygyny, size or song. Age is a 
measure of male age, which was often represented as a class, because in many species it is 
only possible to make a distinction between young and older males. Colour includes 
different measures of colouration, such as hue and brightness, and experimental 
manipulations of colour or the use of colour bands that affect male attractiveness. 
Hormone is a measure of testosterone levels and includes manipulations using 
testosterone implants. Polygyny distinguishes between males that have attracted one 
(monogamous) or multiple (polygynous) females. Size includes measures of mass, 
measures of body or ornament size and body condition. Finally, Song is a measure of 
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acoustic output by the male. In general it was clear that the authors of the original papers 
considered the trait in question to be a signal or correlate of male quality. 
Finally, Paternal care comprised a male’s contribution (which could be expressed relative 
to his mate and/or in absolute terms) to either feeding of young or the incubation of eggs.  
Table 2 shows an overview of the number of papers, studies, species and effect sizes per 
question. The direction of the effect sizes is based on the direction of the relationship 
between the variables. A positive direction thus indicates that: 1) more intense paternity 
protection behaviours correspond to higher paternity, 2) males of higher quality perform 
more intense paternity protection and 3) males that protect their paternity more intensely 
provide more paternal care.    
   # papers # studies # species # ES 
All   87 92 50 228 
Q1 All  46 46 32 81 
Paternity Guard  28 28 24 51 
 Manipulation  12 12 11 15 
 Copulation  14 14 12 15 
Q2 All  40 42 28 109 
Male Guard  36 38 24 97 
quality  Age 16 16 12 26 
  Color 6 8 3 18 
  Hormone 2 2 2 4 
  Polygyny 6 5 5 11 
  Size 12 12 9 31 
  Song 5 5 4 7 
 Manipulation  - - - - 
 Copulation  11 11 10 12 
  Age 1 1 1 1 
  Color 1 1 1 1 
  Polygyny 5 5 5 6 
  Size 4 4 3 4 
Q3 All  17 18 15 38 
Parental Guard  2 2 2 2 
care Manipulation  11 11 9 27 
 Copulation  5 5 5 9 
Table 2. Overview of the number of papers, studies, species and effect sizes for each of the three 
questions for different measures of paternity protection. Male quality is divided into the different 
trait categories. 
Our method sometimes resulted in multiple effect sizes (ES) for the same relationship 
from a single study. For example, a study could look at the relation between age and mate 
guarding intensity and use multiple measures of mate guarding (e.g. one ES for distance 
between social pair and another ES for time together). To handle non-independence of the 
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data in the analysis we used two different approaches. First, we used a standard random-
effects meta-analysis, which required that each study contribute a single effect size. For 
this we calculated a weighted mean effect size per study for each analysis (using a within-
study meta-analysis). Second, we used a multi-level random-effects meta-analysis, which 
allowed for the use of multiple, non-independent effect sizes from a study by including the 
random factors ‘study’ and ‘species’ in the model. We also control for phylogenetic non-
independence. The type of male quality or paternity protection was included as a fixed 
moderator. 
We calculated the variance in Zr as 1/(N–3), where N always refers to the number of 
breeding pairs included in the study. In Supplement V we also include information on four 
other moderators used in our analyses: species, year of publication, paper and study. For 
18 effect sizes the authors did not indicate the direction of the effect (i.e. we could extract 
or calculate an effect size but not its direction). This was always associated with 
statistically non-significant results. In an attempt to control for the uncertainty introduced 
by these directionless effect sizes we used the following three-step approach. First, we 
excluded them from the analysis (dataset 1). Second, if the first analysis revealed a 
significant mean effect we included the directionless effect sizes but used r = 0 (and thus Zr 
= 0) as the effect size (dataset 2). Third, if the analysis was still significant we assigned a 
direction opposite to that predicted (for Q1 and Q3 this is negative and for Q2 positive) 
(dataset 3).  
Standard random-effects meta-analyses 
Separate random-effects meta-analyses were conducted for each question. As mentioned 
above a study contributed one (weighted) ES to any given analysis. For each question a 
meta-analysis was conducted across the categories combined (‘All’) and then for each 
individual category. For example, for Q1 the ‘All’ analysis included effect sizes for the 
relationship between paternity and all measures of paternity protection: mate-guarding, 
manipulation of paternity protection, and copulation frequency. We then ran separate 
meta-analyses of the relationships between paternity and mate-guarding, paternity and 
manipulation of paternity protection, and paternity and copulation frequency. However, 
we did not run separate analyses for categories that contained fewer than four effect sizes.  
We used a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) method to estimate τ² in all our 
random-effects meta-analytic models. A meta-regression was used to determine the effect 
of publication year for each question, separately for all categories combined (‘all’) and 
then for each category.  We ran these meta-regressions separately due to the use of 
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weighted mean effect sizes, to test for any differences among the categories of paternity 
protection or male quality. We used Cochran’s Q statistic and I² to estimate the 
heterogeneity in effect sizes.  
Multi-level (phylogenetic) random-effects meta-analyses 
In the multi-level meta-analyses studies we included all effect sizes for each question by 
using species and study as moderators. Because this method implicitly assumes that there 
is no within-study correlation between effect sizes, i.e. r = 0 (see Booksmythe et al. In 
press) we also ran all the models with a correlation between effect sizes of r = 0.5 (see 
Supplement VI, Table S1 and S2 for the results). Note that the results with correlations 
between effect sizes are qualitatively very similar to those that do not (compare Table 6 
and 7 to Table S1 and S2). We used Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
generalised mixed-effects models to determine the overall effect size. For each of our three 
question we ran four multi-level models: 1) a null model, which included species and 
study as random effects, 2) a multi-level meta-regression, which added two moderator 
variables (publication year and category) to the null model, 3) a phylogenetic null model, 
which added information on phylogenetic relationships to the null model (i.e. model 1), 
and 4) a phylogenetic meta-regression, which added phylogeny to the multi-level meta-
regression model (i.e. model 2). Models 2 and 4 were run without the intercept to obtain 
the mean estimates for the fixed effects directly. We ran models that included a phylogeny 
twice, using two different avian phylogenetic trees (the Ericsson tree and the Hackett tree: 
birdtree.org, Jetz et al. 2012; see Figures S1 and S2 in Supplement VI). In tables and figures 
we present the results for the Ericsson tree. The results for the Hackett tree are in 
Supplement VI, Tables S3-S5. The results from the two phylogenetic models were 
quantitatively similar, although for Question 1 they yield qualitatively different results 
based on the p = 0.05 threshold. 
We used an inverse Gamma prior (V = 0.002 and nu = 1) for the random effects in all our 
multi-level models. The models were run for 1,100,000 iterations with a burn in of 
100,000 iterations and a thinning interval of 1000. We calculated a modified version of the 
I² statistic to estimate the heterogeneity (Nakagawa and Santos 2012). We report 
phylogenetic heritability, H², as an index of the phylogenetic signal. 
Publication bias 
To test for publication bias we visually inspected funnel plots of the relationship between 
effect sizes and their precision (1/SE). Variance in the observed effect sizes should 
decrease with increasing sample size (as sampling error is reduced) and this pattern is 
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expected to be symmetrical. Asymmetry in the funnel plot can indicate potential 
publication bias (Jennions et al. 2013). We used Egger’s regression (Egger et al. 1997) to 
statistically test for funnel plot asymmetry. We also used the trim-and-fill method (Duval 
2005) as a further test of publication bias. These tests were performed on the data 
excluding directionless effect sizes (i.e., dataset 1). For the multi-level meta-analyses the 
model residuals were used in tests of bias.  
All statistical analyses for the standard random-effects meta-analyses and bias detection 
were conducted in R using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010). For the multi-level 
random-effects meta-analysis we used the MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010, 
Hadfield and Nakagawa 2010). 
Results 
Standard random-effects meta-analyses 
Question 1: Paternity protection and paternity  
There was a significant positive relationship between factors predicted to increase 
paternity and a male’s realized paternity when looking at all measures of paternity 
protection combined or when looking separately at mate guarding or manipulation of 
paternity protection (Figure 2A, Table 3). There was, however, no significant relationship 
between copulation frequency and paternity (Table 3). These findings were robust to the 
use of more conservative datasets (datasets 2 and 3), with the exception that the 
relationship between mate guarding and paternity was marginally non-significant (p = 
0.057) for the most conservative data set (Table 3).  
Question 2: Paternity protection and male quality  
Across measures of paternity protection we found a significant negative relationship 
between paternity protection and male quality. Higher quality males invest less in traits 
that protect paternity (Table 3), although with the more conservative dataset the 
relationship was marginally non-significant (p = 0.053 in dataset 2, Table 3). When 
considering the data for mate-guarding and copulation frequency separately, there was a 
significant negative relationship between mate-guarding and male quality and a significant 
positive relationship between copulation frequency and male quality (Table 3, Figure 2B). 
More attractive males invest less in mate guarding, but copulate more frequently with 
their mates.  
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Table 3. Results from the random-effects meta-analyses for each of the questions. Paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – 
male quality, Question 3 – paternal care. Trait 1 is the category of paternity protection and trait 2 the category for male quality where applicable, k  = the 
number of effect sizes, m = the number of species and n = the number of broods.   
Question Trait 1 Trait 2 Dataset k m n Mean (r) L. CI U. CI z value p(z) Q df (Q) p (Q) I2 (%) 
1 All 
 
1 43 31 1144 0.183 0.089 0.274 3.776 0.000 74.45 42 0.001 40.54 
   
2 46 32 1199 0.168 0.078 0.255 3.641 0.000 76.39 45 0.002 38.15 
 
    3 46 32 1199 0.162 0.070 0.251 3.423 0.001 79.68 45 0.001 40.60 
 
Guard 
 
1 25 23 509 0.166 0.027 0.299 2.334 0.020 42.42 24 0.012 42.41 
   
2 28 24 564 0.134 0.010 0.253 2.117 0.034 43.28 27 0.025 35.51 
 
    3 28 24 564 0.124 -0.004 0.249 1.903 0.057 45.78 27 0.013 39.34 
 
Manipulation   1 12 11 335 0.228 0.066 0.378 2.742 0.006 22.80 11 0.019 50.31 
  Copulation   1 14 12 300 0.084 -0.043 0.208 1.299 0.194 13.04 13 0.445 6.06 
2 All 
 
1 36 23 1339 -0.187 -0.349 -0.013 -2.110 0.035 184.32 35 0.000 83.68 
 
    2 42 28 1460 -0.153 -0.300 0.002 -1.938 0.053 199.19 41 0.000 81.14 
 Guard All 1 32 19 868 -0.275 -0.429 -0.105 -3.131 0.002 154.33 31 0.000 82.49 
   2 38 24 976 -0.241 -0.379 -0.093 -3.152 0.002 159.51 37 0.000 78.80 
   3 38 24 976 -0.211 -0.358 -0.053 -2.614 0.009 171.23 37 0.000 80.89 
  
Age 1 14 11 423 -0.294 -0.548 0.010 -1.901 0.057 72.43 13 0.000 88.34 
  
Color 1 6 1 81 -0.278 -0.487 -0.038 -2.260 0.024 1.24 5 0.941 0.00 
  
  2 8 3 139 -0.155 -0.327 0.027 -1.673 0.094 3.55 7 0.830 0.00 
  
Polygyny 1 5 5 139 -0.418 -0.552 -0.263 -4.950 0.000 1.74 4 0.783 0.00 
  
Size 1 9 6 203 0.040 -0.284 0.357 0.237 0.813 28.91 8 0.000 76.57 
 
  Song 1 5 4 137 -0.423 -0.705 -0.024 -2.070 0.039 17.09 4 0.002 78.71 
 Copulation All 1 11 10 296 0.334 0.115 0.523 2.930 0.003 32.91 10 0.000 70.07 
  
Polygyny 1 5 5 143 0.129 -0.137 0.378 0.954 0.340 8.78 4 0.067 55.25 
    Size 1 4 3 83 0.414 0.006 0.705 1.986 0.047 7.42 3 0.060 63.66 
3 All   1 18 15 488 0.227 -0.006 0.437 1.910 0.056 76.78 17 0.000 82.51 
 
Manipulation   1 11 9 310 0.347 0.036 0.596 2.174 0.030 51.65 10 0.000 85.89 
  Copulation   1 5 5 107 0.173 -0.190 0.494 0.935 0.350 11.04 4 0.026 63.82 
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We ran seven separate meta-analyses for the relationship between measures of paternity 
protection and each individual ‘male quality’ category that had four or more effect size 
estimates. For mate-guarding there was a significant negative relationship for three 
categories: colour, polygyny and song (Figure 2B, Table 3), although the effect for colour 
was not significant with the more conservative dataset 2 (Table 3). The relationships 
between mate-guarding and male size or age were non-significant (Table 3). There was no 
significant relationship between copulation frequency and polygyny, while the relationship 
with male size was significantly positive (Table 3). Larger males copulate more frequently 
with their mates. 
 
Figure 2. Forest plots of the meta-analytic means for A. Question 1, B. Question 2 and C. Question 3. 
‘Standard’ refers to the results from the standard random-effects meta-analyses and ‘Multilevel‘ 
refers to the results from the 4 models for multilevel (phylogenetic, Ericsson phylogeny) random-
effects meta-analyses.  See the main text for a description of the categories. k = the number of effect 
sizes.  
Question 3: Paternity protection and paternal care 
Combining all measures of paternity protection there was a marginally non-significant 
positive relationship with paternal care (p = 0.056, Table 3, Figure 2C). The trend was for 
males that protected their paternity more to provide greater paternal care. We ran 
separate meta-analyses for manipulated paternity protection and copulation frequency in 
relation to paternal care. We found a significant positive result for manipulations of 
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paternity protection (Table 3), indicating that males from manipulated pairs provided less 
care for their offspring than control males. The relationship between copulation frequency 
and paternal care was non-significant (Table 3). 
Heterogeneity and publication bias 
The heterogeneity (I2) in effect sizes (Table 3) was low to moderate for Question 1 and 
moderate to high for most of the relationships tested within Questions 2 and 3 (Table 3, 
Figure A3 in Supplement VI). We ran meta-regressions with year of publication as a 
moderator to explain some of this heterogeneity (Table 4). For Question 1 publication year 
explained a significant proportion of the heterogeneity for the relationship between 
paternity and ‘all’ measures of protection, and for the relationship between paternity and 
copulation frequency. More recently published articles had more positive effect sizes. For 
Question 2, publication year affected only the relationship between mate-guarding and 
age (earlier publications had smaller effect sizes) and for Question 3 publication year 
affected the relationships between paternal care and both copulation frequency and 
manipulations of paternity protection (earlier publications had more positive effect sizes).  
Question Trait 1 Trait 2 Q1 p B[year] L. CI U. CI 
1 All 
 
7.291 0.007 0.123 0.034 0.211 
 
Manipulation 
 
2.092 0.148 0.127 -0.045 0.292 
 
Guard 
 
2.174 0.140 0.106 -0.035 0.241 
 
Copulation 
 
5.083 0.024 0.138 0.018 0.255 
2 All 
 
0.228 0.633 -0.041 -0.209 0.128 
 Guard All 0.542 0.462 -0.064 -0.229 0.106 
  
Age 6.071 0.014 -0.311 -0.520 -0.066 
 
 Color 0.358 0.550 0.135 -0.300 0.523 
 
 Polygyny 0.587 0.444 -0.074 -0.256 0.114 
 
 Size 0.334 0.563 0.093 -0.217 0.386 
 
 Song 0.030 0.863 0.048 -0.461 0.533 
 Copulation All 1.967 0.161 0.158 -0.063 0.364 
  
Polygyny 0.248 0.618 0.088 -0.252 0.409 
  
Size 0.149 0.699 0.123 -0.467 0.638 
3 All 
 
2.803 0.094 -0.187 -0.388 0.032 
 
Manipulation 
 
5.189 0.023 -0.327 -0.559 -0.047 
 
Copulation 
 
5.545 0.019 -0.335 -0.565 -0.059 
Table 4. Meta-regression results for year from the random-effects meta-analysis. Paternity 
protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – paternal 
care. Trait 1 is the category of paternity protection and trait 2 the category for male quality where 
applicable, L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Inspection of the funnel plots revealed varying levels of asymmetry in our different 
analyses (Figure A3 in Supplement VI). Egger’s regression test indicated a publication bias 
for studies of the relationship between paternity and mate-guarding (Q1), and studies of 
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the copulation frequency and polygyny relationship (Q2; Table 5). However, for these two 
potential cases of publication biases trim-and-fill did not identify ‘missing studies’. Trim-
and-fill did, however, identify missing studies in the following three tests addressing 
Question 2: mate-guarding and age, mate-guarding and song, and copulation frequency 
and size; and for two tests of Question 3: ‘all’ measures of protection and paternal care, 
and copulation frequency and paternal care (Table 5). Correcting for these ‘missing 
studies’ resulted in stronger (greater absolute magnitude) mean effect sizes but did not 
qualitatively alter results, except that the mean estimated relationship between ‘all’ 
measures of paternity protection and paternal care became significantly greater than zero 
(Table 5). 
Multilevel (phylogenetic) random-effects meta-analyses 
The results of the multilevel random-effects meta-analyses (Table 6) were largely in 
agreement with those of the standard meta-analyses (see Table 3, analyses using ‘All’ 
measures combined). For Question 1 (paternity protection and paternity), multilevel 
Model 1 confirmed that males that protect their paternity more have greater realized 
paternity (Figure 2A). For Question 2 (paternity protection and male quality) the trend for 
higher quality males to protect their paternity less was marginally non-significant in 
multilevel Model 1 (Figure 2B). For Question 3 multilevel Model 1 indicated that the 
relationship between paternity protection and paternal care was non-significant (Figure 
2C). 
Model 2 estimated the effects of different trait categories as moderators in the analysis. 
These can be compared to the results of the standard random-effect meta-analyses for 
individual categories (compare Table 7 to Table 3; Figure 2). Again, the standard and 
multilevel approaches mainly yielded very similar results; but for the individual categories 
of male quality there were some surprising differences between the two meta-analytic 
approaches. In contrast to the standard model, in multilevel Model 2 there was a 
significant relationship between mate guarding and age, with older males protecting their 
paternity less than younger males. The relationship between mate-guarding and colour, 
which was significantly negative in the standard meta-analysis, was not significant in 
multilevel Model 2. Because copulation frequency did not have a significant relationship 
with male quality we did not test individual male quality categories. 
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Question Trait 1 Trait 2 
t, 
Egger’s 
Df (t) p (t) 
Missing 
k: TAF 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI z value p(z) Q df (Q) p (Q) I2 (%) 
1 All 
 
1.513 41 0.138 0          
 
Manipulation 
 
-1.115 10 0.291 0          
 
Guard 
 
2.860 23 0.009 0          
 
Copulation 
 
0.539 12 0.600 0          
2 All 
 
0.397 34 0.694 0          
 Guard All -0.194 30 0.848 0          
  
Age -0.249 12 0.831 5 -0.484 -0.677 -0.228 -3.497 0.001 136.56 18 0.000 90.58 
 
 Color 0.390 4 0.716 0          
 
 Polygyny 0.076 3 0.944 0          
 
 Size -0.888 7 0.404 0          
 
 Song 2.481 3 0.089 1 -0.546 -0.804 -0.117 -2.423 0.015 27.69 5 0.000 86.51 
 Copulation All 0.297 9 0.773 0          
  
Polygyny 4.528 3 0.020 0          
  
Size -0.799 2 0.508 2 0.621 0.232 0.839 2.901 0.004 18.5 5 0.002 78.31 
3 All 
 
0.583 16 0.568 5 0.380 0.163 0.563 3.322 0.001 141.64 22 0.000 86.20 
 
Manipulation 
 
1.311 9 0.222 0          
 
Copulation 
 
-1.589 3 0.210 2 0.325 -0.160 0.598 1.870 0.061 16.58 6 0.011 65.81 
Table 5. Results of Egger’s regression tests and trim-and-fill (TAF) tests for the random-effects meta-analyses. Paternity protection in relation to: 
Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – paternal care. Trait 1 is the category of paternity protection and trait 2 the category for 
male quality where applicable, L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
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Question Model Data-  
set 
k m n Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI I2study 
(%) 
I2species 
(%) 
I2Effect size 
(%) 
I2phylogeny 
(%) 
I2total  
(%) 
H2 (%) 
1 1 1 76 31 1144 0.196 0.096 0.298 20.49 14.20 11.83  46.52  
  2 81 32 1199 0.185 0.096 0.279 23.70 12.24 9.62  45.55  
  3 81 32 1199 0.180 0.088 0.275 27.75 11.33 9.08  48.17  
 3 1 76 31 1144 0.176 0.012 0.327 17.77 11.87 10.60 10.03 50.26 23.73 
  2 81 32 1199 0.166 -0.030 0.288 19.76 10.39 9.41 9.59 49.15 21.30 
2 1 1 96 28 2262 -0.151 -0.354 0.015 4.75 55.53 22.53  82.81  
 3 1 96 28 2262 -0.028 -0.303 0.483 4.12 39.63 19.81 21.16 84.73 46.80 
3 1 1 38 15 869 0.246 -0.065 0.498 9.40 15.75 66.40  91.55  
 3 1 38 15 869 0.219 -0.197 0.639 7.23 12.68 59.17 13.35 92.43 13.67 
Table 6. Results from the multilevel meta-analyses for each of the questions, paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male 
quality, Question 3 – paternal care, for Models 1 and 3 (null model and phylogenetic null model (Ericsson phylogeny), respectively). k  = the number of 
effect sizes, m = the number of species and n = the number of broods. L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
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Q M 
Data 
set 
k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI I2study 
I2 
species 
I2 Effect 
size 
I2phylo I2total H2 
1 2 1 46 Guard 0.205 0.098 0.334       
   
15 Manipulation 0.203 0.047 0.383       
   
15 Copulation 0.182 0.018 0.362       
   
 Year 0.086 -0.014 0.170 18.08 14.29 12.53  44.89  
  
2 51 Guard 0.178 0.045 0.277       
   
15 Manipulation 0.215 0.040 0.364       
   
15 Copulation 0.167 -0.009 0.322       
   
 Year 0.082 -0.016 0.158 19.09 12.36 11.03  42.47  
  
3 51 Guard 0.169 0.055 0.294       
   
15 Manipulation 0.209 0.029 0.361       
   
15 Copulation 0.172 -0.004 0.322       
   
 Year 0.076 -0.014 0.162 24.71 10.93 10.26  45.90  
 
4 1 46 Guard 0.197 0.012 0.352       
   
15 Manipulation 0.187 -0.045 0.399       
   
15 Copulation 0.180 -0.025 0.362       
   
 Year 0.085 -0.013 0.170 17.47 13.96 11.93 8.66 43.37 26.09 
  
2 51 Guard 0.170 -0.006 0.328       
   
15 Manipulation 0.199 -0.010 0.400       
   
15 Copulation 0.166 -0.043 0.341       
   
 Year 0.079 0.002 0.180 19.53 12.16 10.20 8.08 41.88 24.09 
2 2 1All 84 Guard -0.249 -0.393 -0.074       
   
12 Copulation 0.250 -0.009 0.476       
   
 Year 0.029 -0.086 0.140 7.55 46.01 23.93  77.49  
  2All 97 Guard -0.239 -0.393 -0.086       
   12 Copulation 0.246 -0.007 0.461       
    Year 0.038 -0.062 0.141 7.84 50.88 17.20  75.93  
  3All 97 Guard -0.206 -0.384 -0.030       
   12 Copulation 0.250 -0.032 0.455       
    Year 0.053 -0.066 0.157 7.73 53.16 17.91  78.80  
  
1 22 Age -0.369 -0.570 -0.155       
  
Guard 16 Color -0.092 -0.409 0.273       
   
4 Hormone 0.242 -0.171 0.617       
   
11 Polygyny -0.394 -0.689 -0.039       
   
24 Size -0.189 -0.428 0.084       
   
7 Song -0.383 -0.630 -0.053       
   
 Year -0.041 -0.164 0.074 4.35 59.88 12.64  76.87  
  2 26 Age -0.358 -0.534 -0.144       
  Guard 18 Color -0.057 -0.351 0.243       
   4 Hormone 0.244 -0.165 0.596       
   11 Polygyny -0.378 -0.654 -0.036       
   31 Size -0.164 -0.362 0.070       
   7 Song -0.370 -0.611 -0.042       
    Year -0.033 -0.161 0.084 4.12 65.85 8.25  75.23  
  3 26 Age -0.307 -0.503 -0.053       
  Guard 18 Color 0.025 -0.275 0.349       
   4 Hormone 0.237 -0.183 0.630       
   11 Polygyny -0.363 -0.667 0.027       
   31 Size -0.132 -0.386 0.103       
   7 Song -0.409 -0.636 -0.043       
    Year -0.011 -0.126 0.113 6.84 61.78 9.78  78.39  
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Q M Dataset k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI I2study I2species 
I2Effect 
size 
I2phylo I2total H2 
2 4 1 84 Guard -0.225 -0.455 0.042       
   
12 Copulation 0.262 -0.016 0.561       
   
 Year 0.027 -0.081 0.135 8.19 44.36 24.23 10.14 76.78 50.38 
3 2 1 2 Guard -0.222 -0.886 0.679       
   
27 Manipulation 0.390 -0.012 0.659       
   
9 Copulation -0.079 -0.595 0.498       
   
 Year -0.238 -0.499 0.098 7.62 15.95 67.35  90.93  
 
4 1 2 Guard -0.217 -0.905 0.777       
   
27 Manipulation 0.417 -0.184 0.780       
   
9 Copulation -0.060 -0.604 0.576       
  
  Year -0.259 -0.531 0.080 7.04 13.04 69.79 16.04 89.88 12.48 
Table 7. Results from the phylogenetic multilevel  meta-analyses for each of the questions, 
paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – 
paternal care, for Models 2 and 4 (multi-level meta-regression and phylogenetic multi-level meta-
regression (Ericsson phylogeny), respectively). k  = the number of effect sizes, m = the number of 
species and n = the number of broods. L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals 
respectively. 
Question Model 
Data-  
set 
t, 
Egger’s 
Df 
(t) 
p (t) 
Missing 
k: TAF 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI 
1 1 1 0.938 74 0.351 0    
 3 1 0.874 74 0.385 0    
2 1 1 0.379 94 0.706 11 -0.057 -0.121 0.008 
 3 1 0.360 94 0.720 11 -0.056 -0.120 0.009 
3 1 1 0.560 36 0.579 0    
 3 1 0.536 36 0.593 0    
Table 8. Results of Egger’s regression tests and trim-and-fill (TAF) tests for the multilevel meta-
analyses. Paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, 
Question 3 – paternal care for Models 1 and 3 (null model and phylogenetic null model (Ericsson 
phylogeny), respectively). L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Phylogenetic results 
In general, inclusion of the phylogenies did not greatly change the model outcomes 
(compare Model 1 to Model 3, and Model 2 to 4; Tables 6 and 7, respectively). In some 
cases, where the confidence interval boundary was close to 0 for Model 1 and 2, the 
inclusion of a phylogeny altered the estimate so that the boundary fell on the other side of 
zero in Model 3 or 4.  
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Heterogeneity and publication bias 
Table 6 shows the variance not due to sampling error for models 1 and 3 (and table 7 
shows these for models 2 and 4) that can be attributed to differences between: studies 
(I2study), species (I2species) , and at the effect size level (I2effect size), and, for model 3, the 
variance due to the phylogeny (I2phylogeny). For model 3 we also measured the phylogenetic 
signal (H2, Table 6 and 7), which estimates how much of the variation is explained by the 
phylogeny. We ran meta-regressions (Models 2 and 4) with year of publication as a 
moderator to see if it can explain some of this heterogeneity. Year did not explain a 
significant proportion of this variation for any of the three questions, with the exception of 
the phylogenetic meta-regression (Model 4) for Question 1 (Table 7).  
Egger’s regression tests based on model residuals did not suggest asymmetry in the 
distribution of effects for any of the multilevel meta-analyses (see funnel plots, Figure S4 
in Supplement VI). Although for Question 2 trim-and-fill identified 11 missing studies on 
the left side in both the phylogenetic and non-phylogenetic models, adjusting our 
estimates to account for these putative missing studies would still not result in a mean 
effect that differed significantly from zero (Table 8). Trim-and-fill did not identify ‘missing 
studies’ in any of the models for Questions 1 or 3. 
Discussion 
The results of the two types of random-effects meta-analyses (standard and multilevel) 
used here are always in agreement for direction, even though on some occasions one type 
reported a significant effect while the other type suggested a marginally non-significant 
effect. We will discuss the patterns for each question separately based on the general 
consensus from the different models. For the exact significance level associated with 
specific models see the Results section. 
Do the presumed paternity protection behaviours predict paternity? 
The first obvious question about putative paternity protection behaviours is whether they 
actually protect a male’s paternity. Our results suggest that they do, although perhaps only 
weakly (mean r = 0.18; ‘All’). When we look at the individual categories of presumed 
paternity protection, both mate-guarding (r = 0.17) and manipulations of paternity 
protection (e.g.  male removal, r = 0.23) are positively correlated with paternity. The 
relationship between frequent copulation and paternity is, however, non-significant. A 
previous meta-analysis reported that the relationship between mate-guarding or 
copulation frequency and actual paternity was non-significant (Møller and Ninni 1998). 
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The larger sample size, hence greater statistical power, available for our analysis is likely 
to be one factor responsible for the significant results we obtained.  
It is possible, however, that the number of actual studies conducted is even larger still, but 
that some results remain unpublished due to their statistical non-significance (the file 
drawer problem, Rosenthal 1979). This concern is partly substantiated by our observation 
that some of the studies used in our meta-analysis reported the results of the relationship 
between paternity protection and paternity as ‘additional results’, i.e. paternity protection 
was not the main focus (e.g. Bjørnstad and Lifjeld 1997; Lifjeld et al. 1998; Buchanan and 
Catchpole 2000). It is also worth noting that we included studies that measured paternity 
and putative paternity protection behaviours even if they did not detect any extra-pair 
paternity in the population (e.g.  Mota and Hoi-Leitner 2003). 
Paternity protection behaviours are seemingly costly: this idea underlies the expectation 
that a positive relationship with paternity is expected to offset these costs. Mate-guarding 
is costly in terms of energy expenditure, risk of injury, reduced feeding opportunities and 
greater predation risk (Birkhead and Møller 1992; Komdeur 2001; Cooper and Vitt 2002; 
Low 2006; Ancona et al. 2010; Rodríguez-Muñoz et al. 2011). Similarly, frequent 
copulations are likely to be energetically costly (Birkhead and Møller 1992; Lens et al. 
1997), may reduce the vigilance of pair members (Hunter et al. 1993) and increase the 
risk that sexually transmitted diseases or microbes are transferred (Lombardo et al. 1996; 
Stewart and Rambo 2000, though the risks are presumably smaller when frequently 
copulating with the same partner than dividing the copulations among multiple ones).  
Although, as already outlined, we might expect that the effort a male puts into paternity 
protection should relate to his actual paternity, it is worth noting that a male’s share of 
paternity is also strongly dependent on female cooperation (Birkhead and Møller 1993; 
Lifjeld et al. 1994; Petrie and Kempenaers 1998). Female control of paternity can arise in 
the form of, for example, active pursuit and timing of extra-pair copulations (EPCs) by 
females or sperm ejection after mating (Birkhead and Møller 1993; Lifjeld et al. 1994; 
Pizzari and Birkhead 2000; Westneat and Stewart 2003). It follows that if a male can 
perceive that his pair female is unlikely to actively pursue EPCs and that she might even 
actively reject attempts by other males, then paternity could remain high despite little 
mate guarding effort. Such possibilities did not, however, appear to threaten the main 
pattern of better paternity prospects for males who express stronger paternity protection 
behaviours. 
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How does male quality relate to the presumed paternity protection behaviours? 
Based on the widely invoked argument that females engage in EPCs for good-genes, 
females should prefer high quality males both as within-pair and extra-pair mates. We 
might therefore predict that, all else being equal, high quality males can afford to invest 
less in protecting their paternity, because their mate is less likely to solicit EPCs. This 
prediction assumes that EPCs are solicited by females, which generally seems to be the 
case (see Birkhead and Møller 1992; Hunter et al. 1993), although in some species EPCs 
appear to be forced (e.g. Alatalo et al. 1987; Morton 1987; Jones et al. 2012). If forced EPCs 
or harassment occur then females are expected to cooperate more willingly with male 
mate-guarding attempts. In such cases, we might predict that high quality males will 
protect their paternity more due to, for example, their greater energetic reserves. If so, 
paternity protection could be considered a signal of male quality to females. The second 
question answered in our meta-analysis sheds some light on the phenotypic relationship 
between investment in paternity protection and male quality. Higher quality males have a 
tendency to invest less in protecting their paternity. However, because the relationship 
between male quality and mate-guarding is negative while the relationship with 
copulation frequency is positive, we will look at each behaviour separately.  
Copulation frequency 
There are two potential explanations for the positive relationship between copulation 
frequency and all measures of male quality combined. First, frequent copulation might be 
of general benefit to males, with males of high quality having potentially larger energy 
stores and therefore able to copulate more frequently. Alternatively, in many species 
females solicit copulations, and they might solicit more copulations from high quality 
males to increase their share of paternity (assuming females sometimes mate with lower 
quality males for material benefits or to reduce harassment). It is interesting to note, 
however, that the relationship between copulation frequency and paternity is non-
significant, potentially indicating that high quality males do not gain greater paternity 
from their more frequent copulations. We should also note though that the sample size for 
relationship between male quality and copulation frequency is small, so our statistical 
power remains low.  
Mate guarding 
Our results indicate that high quality males guard their mate less. Does this then mean that 
males of higher quality can afford to guard their mates less because these females are 
unlikely to look for EPCs? Our results cannot answer this question as it requires linking 
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both male and female behavior during the fertile period to male quality. In the bluethroat 
(Luscinia s. svecica) older males, supposedly of higher quality, guard their mate less 
intensely but their females appear to cooperate by moving less, indicating that they do not 
actively search for EPCs (Johnsen et al. 2003). Higher quality males could thus reduce their 
mate-guarding intensity and invest in attempts to gain paternity with other females 
(Kempenaers et al. 1995; Wagner et al. 1996). Conversely, low quality males may guard 
their mate more intensely because they are unlikely to gain paternity elsewhere while 
their mates may be more likely to accept EPCs from other males (Kempenaers et al. 1995). 
We looked at how five different categories of male quality correlated with mate-guarding 
intensity: age, colour, polygyny, size and song. Only polygyny and song had a significant 
negative relationship, while the relationships for age and colour were marginally non-
significant, but still negative. The sample sizes for these five categories are relatively small, 
therefore we will only discuss those factors that have explicitly been linked to mate-
guarding.  
Polygyny in birds has been linked to a male’s ability to guard as, according to the trade-off 
hypothesis (see Table 1), a male actively attracting a second female is unable to guard his 
primary mate with the same intensity as a monogamous male (Hasselquist and Sherman 
2001; Birkhead and Møller 1992). Additionally, the female choice hypothesis suggests that 
females prefer to mate with high quality males (Hasselquist and Sherman 2001), so if 
polygynous males are more attractive their mates are unlikely to look for EPCs and will 
require less intense mate-guarding. Our analysis suggests that polygynous males guard 
less intense than socially monogamous males of the same species. We cannot distinguish 
between a pattern driven by males that are polygynous guarding less because they have 
little need for paternity protection, or guarding less because they are investing in 
attracting a second mate. Ideally we need empirical data on when a male attracts a second 
female. If this is outside of the primary female’s fertile period than it is unlikely to 
influence male mate-guarding behaviour. Of the six studies linking polygyny to mate-
guarding included in our meta-analysis only half mention whether the male starts to 
attract a second female during his primary mate’s fertile period (Alatalo et al. 1987; 
Kempenaers et al. 1995; Pinxten and Eens 1997). In the remaining three studies the 
assumption is made that the male is guarding the primary female less because he is 
attracting a secondary female (Kempenaers et al. 1992; Dunn and Robertson 1993; 
Pilastro et al. 2002). 
We found that intensively guarding males sing less. This finding supports the male 
announcement of fertility hypothesis (Møller 1991) whereby high quality males sing more 
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and females mated to these males do not look for EPCs, and therefore require less mate-
guarding. It is worth noting that song duets are sometimes considered a form of mate-
guarding, although there is evidence that many well studied bird species use duetting to 
communicate with (potential) extra-pair mates (review: Dahlin and Benedict 2014).  
Paternity protection and parental care 
Males of many bird species provide care for eggs and/or offspring (Cockburn 2006). This 
behaviour is costly (Liker and Szekely 2005) so males are expected to provide care in 
relation to actual, or at least perceived, paternity (Whittingham et al. 1992; Westneat and 
Sherman 1993; Kempenaers and Sheldon 1997; Sheldon 2002; Griffin et al. 2013). Males 
are likely to use a range of cues to assess their likely paternity (Lifjeld et al. 1998; Sheldon 
2002). Investment in presumed paternity protection behaviour is one such cue: a male 
guarding his mate intensely or copulating frequently should, all else being equal, be more 
certain of his paternity than one that has been separated from his mate for a period of time 
(Sheldon et al. 1997). Experimental studies suggest that certainty of paternity is, in fact, 
relatively easy to manipulate by temporary removing the male or his partner (e.g.  
Whittingham et al. 1993; Brylawski and Whittingham 2004; also see: Kempenaers and 
Sheldon 1997).  
Our results suggest that males that (are able to) protect their paternity more intensely 
provide more care. This is most clear for studies where paternity protection was 
manipulated, for all types of paternity protection combined the relationship is marginally 
non-significant. The number of studies linking un-manipulated paternity protection to 
paternal care is, unfortunately, small (two studies for mate-guarding and five for 
copulation frequency). This is somewhat surprising given the considerable theoretical and 
empirical attention given to the relationship between paternity and paternal care (e.g.  
Houston 1995; Kempenaers and Sheldon 1996; 1997; Westneat and Sargent 1996; Lifjeld 
et al. 1998; Mauck et al. 1999; Kokko 1999; Sheldon 2002; Griffin et al. 2013; Matysioková 
and Remeš 2013), with the general conclusion that sufficiently good cues of paternity 
should make males respond to them in a phenotypically plastic way. Males that do not 
respond to cues of paternity may do so because they are unable to differentiate between 
extra-pair and their own offspring (Maynard-Smith 1977; Whittingham et al. 1992). Not 
caring might reduce offspring survival and a male’s reproductive success, especially in 
many species where biparental care seems obligate (Mauck et al. 1999; Arnold and Owens 
2002).  Ultimately, variation in paternity will only favour phenotypic plasticity in male 
care if males can redirect their investment to other fitness-enhancing activities (Kokko & 
Jennions 2008).  
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Publication bias and year effects 
For some questions we found evidence for publication bias (see Results), however, while 
Egger’s regression tests indicated a bias the trim-and-fill often did not identify any missing 
studies (standard random-effects meta-analyses). When trim-and-fill did identify missing 
studies the correction in all cases strengthened the observed trend, even  leading to  a 
significant mean effect. Our analyses also indicated some influence of year of publication 
in the standard random-effects meta-analyses. For our first question about paternity, more 
recent publications had more positive effect sizes. This may be explained by paternity 
analyses becoming cheaper and easier in the last decade, which is likely to increase the 
number of studies, their sample size and their accuracy. For the second question about 
male quality, technological advances may have played a role in creating larger effect sizes. 
For example, radio tracking collars have become smaller making it easier to track male 
and female movements accurately. For question three about parental care, earlier 
publications had more positive effect sizes, and the reasons for the trend are unclear.   
The big picture: relating paternity, paternity protection, male quality, paternal care 
and other relevant factors. 
There is a need to integrate existing knowledge on paternity, paternity protection, male 
quality, paternal care and other factors assumed to influence these traits. We have 
illustrated some of these relationships schematically in Figure 3.  
Socially monogamous birds are presumed to avoid or reduce sperm competition by using 
putative paternity protection behaviours such as mate-guarding and frequent copulation. 
We show (bearing in mind that correlation is not causation) that these behaviours seem to 
be moderately effective at protecting a male’s paternity. Due to costs associated with 
frequent copulation and mate-guarding (see above) the observed positive relationship 
would be expected. 
Because of costs associated with putative paternity protection behaviours, we expect 
males to use them less intensely if they can afford to do so. Based on adaptive hypotheses 
for extra-pair copulations, females are expected to prefer to mate with high quality males 
(because quality is usually linked to genetic or material resources provided by the male), 
whether this is within the pair bond or outside of it. Does this then mean that higher 
quality males can invest less into paternity protection? Our results indeed suggest that 
high quality males use these putative paternity protection behaviours less. But does this 
then paradoxically imply that high quality males gain lower paternity? Models in which 
both male and female behaviours are allowed to evolve suggest that high quality males’ 
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effort in guarding can sometimes evolve to be lower than that of low quality males, yet 
realized paternity remains higher (because females paired to high quality males ‘need less 
convincing’ to remain faithful, Kokko & Morrell 2005). Apart from female behaviours 
remaining unknown in our data, several factors make definitive tests of such ideas hard. 
First, we are reporting on correlations (the exception being effects associated with 
experimental manipulation of mate guarding where causality can be inferred). Second, 
even if correlations are treated as indicative of causality, we would still need to test for the 
relationship between male quality and paternity directly. It is a general statistical rule, 
often overlooked, that knowing the pairwise correlations between two variables and a 
third focal variable (here ‘paternity protection behaviour’) does not allow us to determine 
the correlation between the two variables (explained by Langford et al. 2001).  
 
Figure 3. The inter-relationships between factors discussed in relation to paternity. The thick black 
lines represent two of the three relationships that we directly researched. Our third relationship is 
represented with the dashed line, this is because we have used paternity protection as a proxy for 
certainty of paternity. The thinner black lines represent relationships from existing theory, 
comparative and meta-analyses. The specifics of all these factors and inter-relationships are 
discussed in text.  
There are at least three additional caveats as to why a negative relationship between 
paternity protection and male quality need not imply that males of high quality will have 
low paternity. First, the phenotypic relationship between paternity and mate-guarding can 
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at best be classified as weak. Second, the manner in which paternity is measured could 
play a role: some studies only make a distinction between full and partial paternity (e.g.  
Møller and Tegelstrom 1997; Chuang-Dobbs et al. 2001). Thus high quality males could 
lose paternity but still, on average, have a higher proportion of within-pair paternity than 
lower quality males, but this is only apparent when results are based on the proportion of 
within-pair paternity. Third, high quality males may lose some paternity in their own nest 
but sire offspring elsewhere, resulting in higher offspring count for high quality males 
even if the paternity per nest remains meagre (Webster et al. 1995; Neff and Pitcher 2005; 
Balenger et al. 2009; Cleasby and Nakagawa 2012). 
Male quality has been related to paternity in a number of studies. For example, Møller and 
Ninni (1998) included a range of measures of male quality, and found significant positive 
relationships for the factors male age, secondary sexual characters, wing length, and 
survival, while the relationship with polygyny was negative. However, Hasselquist and 
Sherman (2001) found that predominantly monogamous species had lower proportions of 
within-pair young than species with a larger proportion of polygyny. These two results 
regarding polygyny are not mutually exclusive: the patterns within species can be 
different from those among species. A recent meta-analysis reporting on the phenotypic 
correlation between male age and within-pair paternity did not find a significant 
relationship (Cleasby and Nakagawa 2012). Song has also been positively related to 
paternity (e.g.  Hasselquist et al. 1996; Krokene et al. 1996; Gil et al. 2007; Hill et al. 2011), 
although a relatively recent meta-analysis and comparative analysis did not find this 
relationship (Garamszegi and Møller 2004). Akçay and Roughgarden (2007) compared 
extra-pair and within-pair male quality, they report a positive relationship between 
paternity and male age or size, however the relationship between paternity and body 
condition or sexual secondary characteristics was non-significant when correcting for 
publication bias. In general the support for a positive relationship between male quality 
and within-pair paternity seems quite weak. 
The ‘good genes’ literature conventionally uses measures of male phenotypic condition 
and secondary sexual traits as male quality (Akçay and Roughgarden 2007). However 
whether these so called measures of quality are appropriate has been debated (Kokko and 
Lindström 1996; Brooks and Kemp 2001; Arnqvist and Rowe 2005). Additionally, some 
measures of quality may be more appropriate than others, for example we include a study 
where experimentally manipulated testosterone levels are related to mate-guarding 
intensity (Foerster and Kempenaers 2005). Although males with high levels of 
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testosterone may be of higher quality, experimentally manipulating testosterone  levels 
may not cause a male to be of high quality.    
In Figure 3 we highlight that the female’s role could be crucial to the observed relationship 
between paternity and male quality. This can be in the form of cooperation, i.e. the female 
makes no attempts at cuckolding her mate depending on his quality. However, a female 
pursuing extra-pair copulations is likely to succeed as males are unlikely to be guaranteed 
full paternity by intense mate-guarding or frequent copulation due to the costs of 
paternity protection behaviours (hence the direct line between female role and paternity 
in Figure 3).  Why females accept or pursue EPCs is still vigorously debated (see 
Forstmeier et al. 2014 and references therein). Additionally, males may adjust the level of 
paternity protection in direct response to female quality, if the latter is linked to fecundity 
or otherwise related to reproductive success (Clutton-Brock 2009). 
In this analysis we have not directly reported on the phenotypic correlation between 
paternity and paternal care (see Griffin et al. 2013 and Matysioková and Remeš2014 for 
meta-analyses of this relationship). Instead, we have used putative paternity protection 
behaviours as a ‘proxy’ for certainty of paternity (hence the dashed lines, Figure 3). 
Comparative studies and meta-analyses have demonstrated that males may reduce 
paternal care in response to extra-pair paternity, but that this is also dependent on other 
factors, such as the cost of paternal care and the likelihood of cuckoldry (Møller and 
Birkhead 1993b; Griffin et al. 2013; Matysioková and Remeš 2014). Paternal care has also 
been linked to male quality, as providing care to offspring is generally costly and males of 
good quality may be able to allocate more resources to care than lower quality males 
(Kempenaers and Sheldon 1997; Mauck et al. 1999; but see Kokko and Jennions 2008 for 
the counter argument that these males might gain more by investing disproportionately 
into seeking out additional matings). In some species females might be able to compensate 
for a reduction in male parental care and successfully fledge the brood (Ketterson and 
Nolan 1994), thereby reducing the costs to males of not providing care.   
It is important to note that assessment of male quality is often context dependent. A 
female has to correctly assess the quality of her own mate as well as that of potential 
extra-pair mates (Slagsvold and Lifjeld 1997). Based on this fact certain environmental 
factors are commonly invoked to favour greater investment in paternity protection. For 
example, simply by providing many potential extra-pair mates nearby, both high local 
breeding density (Westneat and Sherman 1997; Møller and Ninni 1998; Griffith et al. 
2002; Mougeot 2004; Neudorf 2004) and breeding synchrony (Stutchbury and Morton 
1995; Stutchbury 1998; Møller and Ninni 1998; Neudorf 2004; but see Westneat and 
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Sherman 1997; Weatherhead and Yezerinac 1998) are expected to increase EPCs and thus 
extra-pair paternity . Similarly, nearest neighbour distance (e.g. Mougeot 2004) and the 
local adult sex ratio (ASR) or operational sex ratio (OSR) might also influence the value of 
paternity protection (Harts and Kokko 2013; Weir et al. 2011). In many bird species the 
ASR may not have a strong effect because unpaired or floater males are presumed to be 
non-preferred as extra-pair mates (Slagsvold and Lifjeld 1997; Kempenaers et al. 2001; 
Brekke et al. In press). But in species where extra-pair copulations are forced, male-biased 
ASR could favour greater paternity protection.  
In conclusion, in socially monogamous birds presumed paternity protection behaviours do 
appear to protect a male’s paternity, although perhaps weaker than expected (r = 0.18). 
These presumed paternity protection behaviours are negatively correlated with measures 
of male quality (r = −0.19), however splitting these paternity protection behaviours into 
mate-guarding and frequent copulation reveals different patterns. Mate-guarding remains 
negatively correlated with male quality (r =−0.28),  while frequent copulation correlates 
positively with male quality (r = 0.33). The presumed paternity behaviours correlate 
positively with male parental care (r = 0.23), however this result is marginally non-
significant. These patterns are consistent between the standard and multilevel 
(phylogenetic) random-effects meta-analyses. There are ample reviews, comparative and 
meta-analyses exploring the many hypotheses that attempt to explain within and extra-
pair paternity in socially monogamous birds. Our results are an attempt to include the role 
of presumed paternity protection behaviours into the context of paternity, male quality, 
paternal care and other relevant factors.   
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Supplement V – Data extracted from literature.   
Effect sizes (r) for 87 papers covering all three questions. Note that the effect sizes have a direction, either positive, negative or unknown. For male quality the 
table includes on a few occasions ‘color (1)’ and ‘color (2)’ this is to identify that the data is based on different years and are treated as independent data points. 
‘No EPP’ indicates there was no variation in the level of paternity within the study. References are below the table. 
Species 
ID & 
Ref. 
study 
ID 
Effect 
size (r) 
N Question 
Paternity 
protection 
Male 
quality 
Publ. 
year 
N1 N2 Orig. stat. 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 -0.3398 17 2. Male quality guard age 2002 6 11 mean ± SD 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 -0.0353 17 2. Male quality guard age 2002 6 11 mean ± SD 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 -0.3522 17 2. Male quality guard age 2002 6 11 mean ± SD 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 -0.0993 17 2. Male quality guard age 2002 6 11 mean ± SD 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 ?0.3413 17 2. Male quality guard size 2002 6 11 P 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 ?0.1408 17 2. Male quality guard size 2002 6 11 P 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 ?0.3733 17 2. Male quality guard size 2002 6 11 P 
Acanthiza pusilla 1 1 ?0.3341 17 2. Male quality guard size 2002 6 11 P 
Acrocephalus arundinacues 2 2 -0.1237 130 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 102 28 2 x 2 
Acrocephalus schoenobaenus 3 3 ?0.0932 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
2000 3 12 MWU 
Acrocephalus schoenobaenus 3 3 ?0.0186 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
2000 3 12 MWU 
Acrocephalus sechellensis 4 4 0.7198 17 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2007 8 9 Wald 
Acrocephalus sechellensis 4 4 0.3099 17 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2007 8 9 2 x 2 
Acrocephalus sechellensis 5 5 -0.9055 7 2. Male quality guard size 2001 
  
R² 
Agelaius phoeniceus 6 6 0.2708 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
1996 
  
K τ 
Agelaius phoeniceus 6 6 0.2377 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
1996 
  
K τ 
Agelaius phoeniceus 6 6 0.6217 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
1996 
  
K τ 
Agelaius phoeniceus 6 6 0.6340 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
1996 
  
K τ 
Agelaius phoeniceus 7 7 0.0865 24 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1994 11 13 mean ± SD 
Alca torda 8 8 -0.3200 21 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1992 
  
P r 
Alca torda 8 8 0.0100 26 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1992 
  
P r 
Alca torda 8 8 0.0600 24 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1992 
  
P r 
Bubulcus ibis 9 9 0.5338 52 2. Male quality copulation color 2004 
  
F 
Bubulcus ibis 9 9 ?0.0859 45 2. Male quality guard color 2004 
  
F 
Calidris mauri 10 10 0.7083 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
2002 2 11 mean ± SD 
Ciconia ciconia 11 11 -0.1360 9 2. Male quality copulation size 1992 
  
S r 
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Ciconia ciconia 11 11 0.4465 23 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1992 
  
S r 
Columbia livia 12 12 -0.3222 12 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Columbia livia 12 12 -0.2973 12 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 13 13 0.1232 34 2. Male quality guard hormone 2005 19 15 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 13 13 -0.1147 34 2. Male quality guard hormone 2005 19 15 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 13 13 -0.1232 34 2. Male quality guard hormone 2005 19 15 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 14 1415 -0.6332 36 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1992 28 8 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 14 1415 -0.1213 36 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1992 28 8 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 14 1415 -0.7924 36 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1991 28 8 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 0.1986 26 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 0.2195 7 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.0209 26 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 0.0733 7 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.3645 26 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.3542 7 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 0.5680 26 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.2403 7 1. Paternity guard 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.5571 16 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1995 8 8 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.0105 36 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 1995 28 8 mean ± SD 
Cyanistes caeruleus 15 1415 -0.2018 36 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1995 28 8 mean ± SD 
Dendroica caerulescens 16 16.1 0.7397 8 1. Paternity guard 
 
2001 2 6 mean ± SD 
Dendroica caerulescens 16 16.1 0.8947 8 1. Paternity guard 
 
2001 2 6 mean ± SD 
Dendroica caerulescens 16 16.2 0.5774 16 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2001 8 8 2 × 2 
Dendroica caerulescens 16 16.2 0.3282 16 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2001 8 8 mean ± SD 
Dendroica caerulescens 17 17 -0.0625 8 2. Male quality guard size 2001 4 4 MWU 
Dendroica caerulescens 17 17 ?0.5625 8 2. Male quality guard size 2001 4 4 MWU 
Emberiza citrinella 18 18 -0.2568 50 2. Male quality guard age 1992 17 33 mean ± SD 
Emberiza citrinella 18 18 -0.1498 50 2. Male quality guard age 1992 17 33 mean ± SD 
Emberiza schoeniclus 19 19 -0.9701 18 2. Male quality guard age 2006 8 10 mean ± SD 
Emberiza schoeniclus 20 20 0.4960 21 1. Paternity guard 
 
2005 
  
t 
Empidonax virescens 21 21 0.0000 7 1. Paternity guard 
 
2009 1 6 mean ± SD 
Ficedula albicollis 22 22 0.3256 42 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1997 17 25 F 
Ficedula albicollis 22 22 0.3475 42 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1997 17 25 F 
Ficedula hypoleuca 23 23 -0.2042 26 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1987 5 21 mean ± SD 
Ficedula hypoleuca 24 24 0.4938 54 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1997 27 27 2 x 2 
Ficedula hypoleuca 25 25 0.1398 23 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 17 6 mean ± SD 
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Ficedula hypoleuca 25 25 0.1703 23 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 17 6 mean ± SD 
Ficedula hypoleuca 26 26 0.1037 39 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2001 19 20 2 x 2 
Fringella coelebs 27 27 -0.3961 6 2. Male quality guard age 1992 1 5 mean ± SD 
Fringella coelebs 27 27 -0.2106 6 2. Male quality guard age 1992 1 5 mean ± SD 
Fulmarus glacialis 28 28 0.0000 19 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1992 
  
NO EPP 
Gavia immer 29 29 0.0000 36 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1997 
  
NO EPP 
Gavia immer 29 29 0.0000 36 1. Paternity guard 
 
1997 
  
NO EPP 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 0.2000 10 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 5 5 2 x 2 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 -0.2000 10 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 5 5 2 x 2 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 -0.2363 5 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 2 3 mean ± SD 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 0.9144 5 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 3 2 mean ± SD 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 0.4898 10 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 5 5 mean ± SD 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 -0.0917 10 1. Paternity guard 
 
2006 5 5 mean ± SD 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 ?0.3352 13 2. Male quality guard color 2006 8 5 t 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 ?0.0121 13 2. Male quality guard size 2006 8 5 t 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 ?0.0024 13 2. Male quality guard size 2006 8 5 t 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 0.2406 15 2. Male quality guard size 2006 7 8 mean ± SD 
Geothlypis trichas 30 30 -0.5114 13 2. Male quality guard size 2006 8 5 mean ± SD 
Hirundo rustica 31 31 -0.0900 51 2. Male quality guard age 1987 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 31 31 0.0900 51 2. Male quality guard size 1987 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 31 31 0.0900 51 2. Male quality guard size 1987 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 31 31 -0.0200 51 2. Male quality guard size 1987 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 31 31 0.0900 51 2. Male quality guard size 1987 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 32 32.1 0.4400 38 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1988 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 32 32.1 0.6000 38 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1988 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 32 32.2 0.8645 20 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1988 10 10 mean ± SD 
Hirundo rustica 32 32.2 0.7164 20 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1988 10 10 mean ± SD 
Hirundo rustica 33 33 -0.0921 38 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1997 17 21 mean ± SD 
Hirundo rustica 33 33 -0.1898 38 1. Paternity guard 
 
1997 17 21 mean ± SD 
Hirundo rustica 34 34 0.5200 26 2. Male quality guard hormone 1995 
  
r 
Hirundo rustica 34 34 -0.1200 26 2. Male quality guard size 1995 
  
r 
Jacana jacana 35 35 0.0000 14 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1998 
  
NO EPP 
Luscinia svecica 36 36 -0.3333 13 2. Male quality guard color 1995 7 6 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.1 -0.0278 12 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1997 6 6 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.1 -0.1667 12 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1997 6 6 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.1 -0.5417 10 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1997 6 4 MWU 
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Luscinia svecica 37 37.2 -0.2500 15 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1997 8 7 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.2 -0.2321 15 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1997 8 7 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.2 -0.2041 14 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1997 7 7 MWU 
Luscinia svecica 37 37.3 -0.6775 27 2. Male quality guard song 1997 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 0.5680 12 1. Paternity guard 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 0.4872 12 1. Paternity guard 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 0.3850 12 1. Paternity guard 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 -0.3772 13 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1998 7 6 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 -0.6088 13 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1998 7 6 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.1 -0.4888 13 2. Male quality guard color (1) 1998 7 6 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.2 -0.1630 17 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1998 6 11 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.2 -0.3832 17 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1998 6 11 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 38 38.2 -0.2182 16 2. Male quality guard color (2) 1998 6 10 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 ?0.0408 27 1. Paternity guard 
 
2003 
  
P 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 ?0.0943 27 1. Paternity guard 
 
2003 
  
P 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 -0.6285 32 2. Male quality guard age 2003 10 22 mean ± SD 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 0.0419 11 2. Male quality guard color 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 -0.2195 11 2. Male quality guard color 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 0.0524 11 2. Male quality guard color 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 -0.6280 16 2. Male quality guard size 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 -0.2299 28 2. Male quality guard size 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 0.2091 28 2. Male quality guard size 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 39 39 -0.5075 28 2. Male quality guard size 2003 
  
S r 
Luscinia svecica 40 40 0.2127 48 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2008 23 25 2 x 2 
Luscinia svecica 40 40 0.2958 48 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2008 23 25 F 
Oenanthe oenanthe 41 41 0.3200 12 1. Paternity guard 
 
1998 3 9 mean ± SD 
Oenanthe oenanthe 41 41 ?0.2849 12 2. Male quality guard age 1998 
  
t 
Oenanthe oenanthe 41 41 0.0300 12 2. Male quality guard size 1998 
  
r 
Oenanthe oenanthe 42 42 0.3016 26 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1999 16 10 2 x 2 
Parus cristatus 43 43 0.7500 17 2. Male quality copulation size 1997 
  
r 
Parus montanus 44 44 -0.2910 47 2. Male quality guard age 1995 22 25 F 
Parus montanus 44 44 -0.2509 47 2. Male quality guard age 1995 22 25 F 
Passer domesticus 45 45 0.5100 43 2. Male quality copulation size 2011 
  
r 
Passer domesticus 45 45 0.4800 43 2. Male quality guard size 2011 
  
r 
Passer domesticus 46 46 0.7069 12 1. Paternity copulation 
 
2002 
  
S r 
Passer domesticus 46 46 0.6280 12 1. Paternity guard 
 
2002 
  
S r 
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Passer domesticus 46 46 0.1047 14 2. Male quality copulation size 2002 
  
S r 
Passer domesticus 46 46 0.7069 14 2. Male quality guard size 2002 
  
S r 
Passerina cyanea 47 47 -0.0653 67 2. Male quality guard age 1988 18 49 mean ± SD 
Petronia petronia 48 48 0.0202 39 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 2002 9 30 mean ± SD 
Petronia petronia 48 48 -0.4196 37 2. Male quality guard polygyny 2002 9 28 mean ± SD 
Phylloscopus trochilus 49 49 -0.0580 20 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1997 5 15 2 x 2 
Phylloscopus trochilus 50 50 -0.4913 20 2. Male quality guard song 1999 
  
S r 
Plectrophenax nivalis 51 51 -0.6950 63 2. Male quality guard song 2009 
  
P r 
Plectrophenax nivalis 51 51 -0.1841 63 3. Paternal care guard 
 
2009 
  
F 
Progne subis 52 52 -0.2420 22 2. Male quality guard age 1987 9 13 mean ± SD 
Progne subis 52 52 -0.5400 8 3. Paternal care guard 
 
1987 4 4 r 
Progne subis 53 53 0.2629 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
1990 
  
r 
Progne subis 53 53 0.2748 13 2. Male quality guard age 1990 7 6 mean ± SD 
Progne subis 54 54 0.6775 11 1. Paternity guard 
 
1996 
  
S r 
Progne subis 54 54 -0.3743 58 2. Male quality guard age 1996 25 33 mean ± SD 
Prunella modularis 55 55 0.0000 15 1. Paternity guard 
 
1989 
  
NO EPP 
Prunella modularis 56 56 0.9999 9 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1992 2 7 2 x 2 
Prunella modularis 56 56 0.0000 13 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1992 6 7 2 x 2 
Remiz pendulinus 57 57 0.0052 34 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1997 
  
S r 
Remiz pendulinus 57 57 -0.0628 34 1. Paternity guard 
 
1997 
  
S r 
Sericornis frontalis 58 58 -0.5075 6 1. Paternity guard 
 
1998 
  
S r 
Serinus serinus 59 59 0.0000 16 1. Paternity copulation 
 
2003 
  
NO EPP 
Serinus serinus 59 59 0.0000 16 1. Paternity guard 
 
2003 
  
NO EPP 
Serinus serinus 59 59 0.0000 16 1. Paternity guard 
 
2003 
  
NO EPP 
Setophaga ruticilla 60 60 0.0456 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
2010 5 8 mean ± SD 
Setophaga ruticilla 60 60 -0.0442 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
2010 5 8 mean ± SD 
Sialia mexicana 61 61 0.0325 19 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2003 6 13 mean ± SD 
Sialia mexicana 61 61 0.1785 60 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2003 32 28 mean ± SD 
Sialia sialis 62 62 -0.1116 15 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 7 8 F 
Sialia sialis 62 62 0.0250 15 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 7 8 t 
Sialia sialis 63 63 0.4284 25 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1996 11 14 2 x 2 
Sialia sialis 64 64 0.3822 31 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 13 18 mean ± SD 
Sialia sialis 64 64 0.0694 31 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 13 18 mean ± SD 
Sialia sialis 65 65 -0.2382 8 1. Paternity guard 
 
1994 
  
S r 
Speheniscus humboldti 66 66 0.0000 21 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1999 
  
NO EPP 
Sterna hirundo 67 67 0.6379 18 2. Male quality copulation age 2002 
  
S r 
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Sturnus vulgaris 68 68 -0.1527 8 3. Paternal care copulation 
 
1995 
  
S r 
Sturnus vulgaris 69 69 0.2585 6 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1993 1 5 mean ± SD 
Sturnus vulgaris 70 70 0.6755 14 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 1997 5 9 mean ± SD 
Sturnus vulgaris 70 70 -0.7926 15 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1997 7 8 mean ± SD 
Sturnus vulgaris 70 70 -0.3201 14 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1997 7 7 mean ± SD 
Sturnus vulgaris 70 70 -0.1243 14 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1997 7 7 mean ± SD 
Sula nebouxii 71 71 0.0953 13 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2001 5 8 mean ± SD 
Sula nebouxii 71 71 0.5348 33 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2001 16 17 2 x 2 
Tachycineta bicolor 72 72 0.4161 34 1. Paternity copulation 
 
2009 
  
F 
Tachycineta bicolor 73 73 -0.1369 35 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 1993 7 28 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 73 73 -0.5748 22 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1993 7 15 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 73 73 -0.3559 25 2. Male quality guard polygyny 1993 7 18 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 74 74 -0.1256 21 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1994 
  
S r 
Tachycineta bicolor 74 74 0.0838 21 1. Paternity guard 
 
1994 
  
S r 
Tachycineta bicolor 75 75 -0.1598 44 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 23 21 F 
Tachycineta bicolor 75 75 -0.2414 46 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1998 25 21 t 
Tachycineta bicolor 76 76 0.0000 26 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
1992 10 16 2 x 2 
Tachycineta bicolor 77 77 -0.0314 12 1. Paternity copulation 
 
1993 
  
S r 
Tachycineta bicolor 78 78 0.1200 15 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1993 
  
r 
Tachycineta bicolor 78 78 -0.0520 11 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1993 6 5 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 78 78 0.0788 8 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1993 4 4 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 78 78 -0.2592 10 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1993 5 5 mean ± SD 
Tachycineta bicolor 78 78 0.0000 7 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
1993 3 4 mean ± SD 
Troglodytes aedon 79 79 0.3651 24 1. Paternity manipulation 
 
2004 15 9 2 x 2 
Troglodytes aedon 79 79 -0.1917 11 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2004 6 5 mean ± SD 
Troglodytes aedon 79 79 0.2509 12 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2004 7 5 mean ± SD 
Troglodytes aedon 79 79 -0.0837 11 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2004 6 5 mean ± SD 
Troglodytes aedon 79 79 0.2892 12 3. Paternal care manipulation 
 
2004 7 5 mean ± SD 
Turdus merula 80 80 -0.2037 21 2. Male quality guard age 2001 3 18 MWU 
Turdus merula 80 80 -0.3148 21 2. Male quality guard age 2001 3 18 MWU 
Vanellus vanellus 81 81 0.2614 19 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 2001 7 12 mean ± SD 
Vanellus vanellus 81 81 0.3327 19 2. Male quality copulation polygyny 2001 7 12 mean ± SD 
Wilsonia citrina 82 82 0.1491 14 1. Paternity guard 
 
2008 
  
2 x 2 
Wilsonia citrina 82 82 0.5449 14 1. Paternity guard 
 
2008 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 82 82 -0.2559 17 2. Male quality guard song 2008 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 82 82 0.5861 17 2. Male quality guard song 2008 
  
S r 
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Wilsonia citrina 83 83 ?0.7000 11 2. Male quality guard age 2002 5 6 MWU 
Wilsonia citrina 83 83 ?0.5333 11 2. Male quality guard age 2002 5 6 MWU 
Wilsonia citrina 83 83 ?0.5333 11 2. Male quality guard age 2002 5 6 MWU 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 -0.2776 9 1. Paternity guard 
 
1997 2 7 mean ± SD 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 0.5774 12 2. Male quality guard age 1997 6 6 2 x 2 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 -0.0419 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 -0.0962 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 10 3 mean ± SD 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 0.3953 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 0.2751 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 10 3 mean ± SD 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 -0.2922 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 84 84 0.4683 13 2. Male quality guard size 1997 10 3 mean ± SD 
Wilsonia citrina 85 85 -0.3649 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
2005 6 7 t 
Wilsonia citrina 85 85 ?0.4911 13 1. Paternity guard 
 
2005 6 7 t 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 -0.0838 9 2. Male quality guard age 1998 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 -0.1256 9 2. Male quality guard age 1998 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 0.4261 9 2. Male quality guard size 1998 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 -0.4261 9 2. Male quality guard size 1998 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 0.1882 10 2. Male quality guard song 1998 
  
S r 
Wilsonia citrina 86 86 -0.1047 10 2. Male quality guard song 1998 
  
S r 
Zosterops lateralis 87 87 0.0000 11 1. Paternity copulation 
 
2001 
  
NO EPP 
Zosterops lateralis 87 87 0.0000 9 1. Paternity guard 
 
2001 
  
NO EPP 
Zosterops lateralis 87 87 0.0000 9 1. Paternity guard 
 
2001 
  
NO EPP 
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Supplement VI – Supplementary figures and results 
Figure S1. The Ericsson backbone phylogenetic trees used for each of the three questions. 
  
Q1. 
Q2. 
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Figure S2. The Hackett backbone phylogenetic trees used for each of the three questions.  
 
 
 
 
Q3. 
Q1. 
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Figure S3. Funnel plots for each of the three questions in the random-effects meta-analyses, 
Question 2 is separate on the next page. “All “  refers to the meta-analysis with all categories 
combined and other labels refer to the categories that we ran separate meta-analyses for. Note the 
effect size is given as Zr. 
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Figure S4 Funnel plots for each of the three questions in the multi-level meta-analyses, plots use 
the meta-analytic residuals of Model 1 and Model 3 (phylogenetic, Ericsson tree). Note the effect 
size is given as Zr.  
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Table S1. Results from the multilevel meta-analyses for each of the questions taking into account 
that effect sizes from a single study may be correlated, paternity protection in relation to: Question 
1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – paternal care, for Models 1 and 3 (null model 
and phylogenetic null model (E and H refer to the Ericsson and Hackett phylogeny), respectively). Q 
= question, M = model, k  = the number of effect sizes, m = the number of species and n = the 
number of broods. L. CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Q M Data
set 
k m n Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI I2study 
(%) 
I2species 
(%) 
I2ES  
(%) 
I2phylo 
(%) 
I2total  
(%) 
H2 
(%) 
1 1 1 76 31 1144 0.186 0.088 0.280 9.70 9.52 22.14  41.35  
  2 81 32 1199 0.176 0.078 0.271 9.75 8.50 20.46  38.71  
  3 81 32 1199 0.167 0.071 0.281 10.74 9.14 19.08  38.96  
 3 1E 76 31 1144 0.176 0.012 0.330 8.78 8.38 20.90 8.99 47.05 18.44 
  2E 81 32 1199 0.165 0.018 0.317 8.52 7.88 19.13 8.32 43.84 18.67 
  3E 81 32 1199 0.164 -0.008 0.312 24.86 10.39 8.40 8.03 51.67 20.08 
  1H 76 31 1144 0.168 -0.003 0.302 8.15 8.21 20.76 8.92 46.03 18.34 
2 1 1 96 28 2262 -0.162 -0.340 0.011 4.03 46.90 34.98  85.90  
 3 1E 96 28 2262 -0.046 -0.383 0.380 3.16 33.05 31.46 19.64 87.32 37.87 
  1H 96 28 2262 -0.059 -0.372 0.427 3.27 32.78 31.72 19.37 87.14 37.57 
3 1 1 38 15 869 0.210 -0.062 0.455 15.73 18.84 12.23  46.80  
 3 1E 38 15 869 0.196 -0.204 0.493 14.35 16.63 10.11 17.83 58.92 28.02 
  1H 38 15 869 0.206 -0.141 0.517 13.79 15.78 10.45 18.68 58.70 26.80 
 
Table S2. Results from the phylogenetic multilevel  meta-analyses for each of the questions taking 
into account that effect sizes from a single study may be correlated, paternity protection in relation 
to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – paternal care, for Models 2 and 4 
(multi-level meta-regression and phylogenetic multi-level meta-regression (E and H refer to the 
Ericsson and Hackett phylogeny), respectively). Q = question, M = model, k  = the number of effect 
sizes, m = the number of species and n = the number of broods. L. CI and U. CI are the lower and 
upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Q M 
Data 
set 
k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L CI U CI I2study I2species 
I2Effect 
size 
I2phylo I2total H2 
1 2 1 46 Guard 0.193 0.061 0.317       
   
15 Manipulation 0.204 0.016 0.363       
   
15 Copulation 0.187 0.012 0.337       
   
 Year 0.087 -0.010 0.019 8.68 9.06 21.93  39.66  
  
2 51 Guard 0.168 0.041 0.289       
   
15 Manipulation 0.206 0.026 0.343       
   
15 Copulation 0.173 -0.013 0.316       
   
 Year 0.084 -0.018 0.174 8.72 7.97 20.20  36.90  
  
3 51 Guard 0.149 0.021 0.274       
   
15 Manipulation 0.207 0.053 0.364       
   
15 Copulation 0.171 0.011 0.339       
   
 Year 0.078 -0.015 0.178 9.28 9.05 18.56  36.89  
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Q M 
Data 
set 
k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L CI U CI I2study I2species 
I2Effect 
size 
I2phylo I2total H2 
1 4 1E 46 Guard 0.180 0.009 0.343       
   
15 Manipulation 0.179 -0.075 0.371       
   
15 Copulation 0.176 -0.022 0.376       
   
 Year 0.085 -0.006 0.180 8.69 9.36 22.57 8.54 40.62 18.82 
  
2E 51 Guard 0.161 -0.015 0.328       
   
15 Manipulation 0.193 -0.028 0.392       
   
15 Copulation 0.173 -0.020 0.359       
   
 Year 0.080 -0.011 0.173 8.05 8.86 20.40 7.70 37.30 19.64 
 
4 1H 46 Guard 0.184 0.021 0.355       
   
15 Manipulation 0.193 -0.044 0.392       
   
15 Copulation 0.184 -0.015 0.372       
   
 Year 0.084 -0.026 0.180 9.03 9.21 22.30 8.12 40.53 18.93 
  2H 46 Guard 0.165 -0.011 0.315       
   
15 Manipulation 0.197 0.002 0.398       
   
15 Copulation 0.177 -0.012 0.366       
   
 Year 0.078 -0.011 0.173 8.35 8.26 20.37 7.85 36.97 18.67 
  3H 46 Guard 0.149 -0.032 0.294       
   15 Manipulation 0.193 -0.033 0.372       
   15 Copulation 0.174 -0.011 0.375       
    Year 0.071 -0.029 0.170 9.96 9.06 17.68 7.63 36.70 20.47 
2 2 1All 84 Guard -0.262 -0.411 -0.101       
   
12 Copulation 0.267 -0.011 0.488       
   
 Year 0.017 -0.107 0.120 5.87 35.68 39.78  81.32  
  2All 97 Guard -0.247 -0.396 -0.073       
   12 Copulation 0.254 -0.000 0.491       
    Year 0.030 -0.071 0.150 4.59 43.10 34.11  81.80  
  3All 97 Guard -0.211 -0.371 -0.053       
   12 Copulation 0.270 -0.019 0.491       
    Year 0.037 -0.078 0.148 7.15 40.48 32.07  79.71  
  
1 22 Age -0.360 -0.556 -0.119       
  
Guard 16 Color -0.089 -0.459 0.269       
   
4 Hormone 0.231 -0.249 0.650       
   
11 Polygyny -0.419 -0.710 -0.039       
   
24 Size -0.233 -0.509 0.016       
   
7 Song -0.354 -0.634 0.038       
   
 Year -0.049 -0.186 0.078 4.41 49.56 27.81  81.79  
  2 26 Age -0.349 -0.550 -0.158       
  Guard 18 Color -0.053 -0.336 0.255       
   4 Hormone 0.241 -0.251 0.613       
   11 Polygyny -0.397 0.699 -0.005       
   31 Size -0.215 -0.437 0.025       
   7 Song -0.326 -0.574 0.025       
    Year -0.039 -0.157 0.010 3.48 54.07 24.81  82.35  
  3 26 Age -0.312 -0.524 -0.084       
  Guard 18 Color 0.058 -0.290 0.366       
   4 Hormone 0.273 -0.208 0.647       
   11 Polygyny -0.391 -0.662 0.055       
   31 Size -0.138 -0.359 0.125       
   7 Song -0.376 -0.637 -0.029       
    Year -0.026 -0.156 0.124 5.50 53.65 19.76  78.90  
2 4 1E 84 Guard -0.249 -0.473 0.032       
   
12 Copulation 0.271 -0.021 0.560       
   
 Year 0.011 -0.110 0.116 6.12 32.69 41.34 9.12 7.89 36.46 
  1H 84 Guard -0.243 -0.498 0.015       
   12 Copulation 0.275 -0.051 0.534       
    Year 0.014 -0.096 0.132 5.98 32.08 42.03 9.37 80.09 35.74 
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Q M 
Data 
set 
k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L CI U CI I2study I2species 
I2Effect 
size 
I2phylo I2total H2 
3 2 1 2 Guard 0.157 -0.717 0.828       
   
27 Manipulation 0.333 -0.027 0.613       
   
9 Copulation 0.042 -0.551 0.583       
   
 Year -0.196 -0.498 0.154 17.16 19.66 13.84  50.66  
 
4 1E 2 Guard 0.169 -0.704 0.905       
   
27 Manipulation 0.337 -0.131 0.677       
   
9 Copulation 0.060 -0.546 0.601       
  
  Year -0.209 -0.485 0.172 17.11 19.54 14.16 20.50 50.81 26.13 
  
1H 2 Guard 0.149 -0.740 0.840       
   
27 Manipulation 0.350 -0.069 0.699       
   
9 Copulation 0.062 -0.564 0.614       
  
  Year -0.199 -0.509 0.194 17.39 20.47 13.91 19.98 51.77 26.95 
 
Table S3. Results from the multilevel meta-analyses for each of the questions (Hackett phylogeny), 
paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, Question 3 – 
paternal care, for Model 3 (phylogenetic null model). Q = question, M = model, k  = the number of 
effect sizes, m = the number of species and n = the number of broods. L. CI and U. CI are the lower 
and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Q M 
Data  
set 
k m n 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI 
I2study 
(%) 
I2spec 
(%) 
I2ES 
(%) 
I2phylo 
(%) 
I2total  
(%) 
H2 
(%) 
1 3 1H 76 31 1144 0.175 0.012 0.327 17.11 12.35 10.56 10.69 50.71 24.59 
  2H 81 32 1199 0.168 0.005 0.309 19.52 10.19 9.41 9.16 48.27 21.19 
  3H 81 32 1199 0.169 0.016 0.306 24.06 10.38 8.53 8.48 51.45 20.34 
2 3 1H 96 28 2262 -0.044 -0.373 0.388 3.94 40.57 19.20 21.11 84.82 47.82 
3 3 1H 38 15 869 0.219 -0.241 0.588 6.86 13.56 58.19 13.75 92.36 14.66 
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Table S4. Results from the phylogenetic multilevel  meta-analyses (Hackett phylogeny) for each of 
the questions, paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 – male quality, 
Question 3 – paternal care, for Model 4 (phylogenetic multi-level meta-regression). Q = question, M 
= model, k  = the number of effect sizes, m = the number of species and n = the number of broods. L. 
CI and U. CI are the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
Q M 
Data-
set 
k 
Paternity 
protection 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI 
I2study I2 
species 
I2Effect 
size 
I2 phylo I2 total H2 
1 4 1 46 Guard 0.201 0.031 0.366       
   
15 Manipulation 0.187 -0.037 0.394       
   
15 Copulation 0.186 -0.030 0.371       
   
 Year 0.086 0.001 0.173 17.73 14.95 11.86 9.23 44.55 26.95 
  
2 51 Guard 0.172 0.014 0.328       
   
15 Manipulation 0.202 -0.037 0.372       
   
15 Copulation 0.172 -0.035 0.338       
   
 Year 0.079 -0.013 0.164 18.94 12.39 10.18 7.92 41.51 24.37 
  
3 51 Guard 0.163 -0.007 0.317       
   
15 Manipulation 0.198 -0.027 0.382       
   
15 Copulation 0.169 -0.039 0.345       
   
 Year 0.072 -0.031 0.156 24.41 11.89 10.06 7.99 46.36 21.40 
2 4 1 84 Guard -0.232 -0.474 -0.016       
   12 Copulation 0.259 -0.091 0.509       
    Year 0.029 -0.078 0.141 8.21 44.09 24.56 9.76 76.87 50.43 
  
2 97 Guard -0.227 -0.480 0.015       
   
12 Copulation 0.254 -0.033 0.528       
   
 Year 0.030 -0.080 0.139 8.81 43.13 24.10 10.04 76.05 49.63 
3 4 1 2 Guard -0.250 -0.910 0.758       
   
27 Manipulation 0.404 -0.138 0.740       
   
9 Copulation -0.075 -0.614 0.541       
   
 Year -0.253 -0.524 0.108 7.49 13.24 69.34 16.28 90.06 12.79 
 
Table S5. Results of Egger’s regression tests and trim-and-fill (TAF) tests for the multilevel meta-
analyses (Hackett phylogeny). Paternity protection in relation to: Question 1 – paternity, Question 2 
– male quality, Question 3 – paternal care for Model 3 (phylogenetic null model). L. CI and U. CI are 
the lower and upper confidence intervals respectively. 
 
Question Model 
Data-  
set 
t, 
Egger’s 
Df 
(t) 
p (t) 
Missing 
k: TAF 
Mean 
(r) 
L. CI U. CI 
1 3 1H 0.902 74 0.370 0    
2 3 1H 0.344 94 0.732 11 -0.056 -0.120 0.009 
3 3 1H 0.568 36 0.574 0    
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Conclusion 
One of the interesting outcomes of my thesis is the importance of including both male and 
female roles in models. Many models assume asexual populations without age or other life 
history structures. This is completely appropriate as selective pressures can act in a 
comparable manner on individuals independent of sex or age. For example, in chapter 3 
sex specific dispersal rates did not evolve because there were no sex specific selective 
pressures. For chapter 4 we did not include sex specific arrival timing, even though in 
many species males arrive before females, in this chapter this is appropriate as for both 
sexes the selection on early arrival is strong (Smith and Moore 2005) and we were 
interested in the average population arrival time.  
However, in many species males and females do not have the same requirements 
potentially leading  to sexual conflict over traits and optimal strategies (e.g. Cox and 
Calsbeek 2009). Chapter 2 highlights how taking differences between the sexes into 
account can have important implications for population dynamics. Although it shows that 
in a polygynous breeding system the evolution of female advantageous alleles is good for 
population survival, there are severe implications for the populations where these alleles 
are not advantageous to females. 
In the first chapter we approach mate-guarding only from the male perspective — females 
are only included as passive components of the ASR. This is not because we consider the 
female perspective as unimportant, indeed females are expected to influence male mate-
guarding behavior. For example, in many species there may be sexual conflict over the 
optimal guarding duration (e.g. Yamamura and Jormalainen 1996; Jormalainen 1998; 
Westneat and Stewart 2003) however there are also species in which the female has 
additional benefits from being guarded thus selecting for cooperation (e.g. Rodríguez-
Muñoz et al. 2011).  In the last chapter of this thesis the female role is considered more 
extensively in relation to mate-guarding, one of the two types of presumed paternity 
protection behaviors in birds (the other being frequent copulation). First of all we 
consider that males of high quality are preferred as mates and that males of high quality 
may thus potentially expect more cooperation with paternity protection. And second, we 
highlight a number of ways in which females may influence the different aspects of the 
relationships associated with paternity.  
All the chapters in my thesis have either used a theoretical approach or existing data (i.e. 
meta-analysis). Using simulation models and other theoretical approaches has many 
benefits, one can research facets of animal behavior that are difficult to study in the wild. 
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For example, predation has been studied as a selective force on migratory birds (e.g. Sillett 
and Holmes 2002), however the impact it may have upon arrival phenology has not. It is 
likely that this has not been done because it is hard to assess whether a bird has been 
predated or if it has simply moved on to another breeding area, although we do have such 
information for species of other taxa (e.g. Williams et al. 1993; Devito et al. 1998). This 
makes our research novel as it is to our knowledge the first to suggest that predation on 
birds upon arrival at the breeding ground may affect phenology.  
Another benefit of a theoretical approach is being able to examine a large number of 
parameter combinations. In an empirical experimental approach the number of parameter 
combinations is often limited by factors such as development time of the species, space for 
housing and animal ethics. Although being able to examine a large number of parameter 
combinations is obviously a clear advantage of modelling, a model will always remain a 
simplification of a natural system.  
In conclusion, this thesis highlights the importance of demography for the evolution of 
breeding strategies. In the first chapter we demonstrate how the ASR can influence the 
male mate-guarding strategy and shape the evolution of mating systems. The second, third 
and fourth chapters examine the effects of movement on breeding strategies. The decision 
and timing of this movement can largely determine an individuals reproductive success 
and may even have severe implications for a population as a whole. The final chapter 
explores the use of paternity protection strategies in birds and additionally highlights the 
complexity of natural systems and the sheer volume of information that complicate these 
seemingly simple behaviors.   
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